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In 2005, Australia changed its accounting standards from the Australian General Accepted 
Accounting Principles to International Financial Reporting Standards. This change raised 
concerns that introducing a fair-value model to measure various assets can introduce greater 
variability in earnings in financial statements due to unrealised earnings emerging from these 
measurements (e.g., Chalmers et al., 2008; 2011; Clarkson et al., 2011; Goodwin et al., 
2008a); this resulted in measures of financial performance that are difficult to analyse (IASB 
& FASB, 2008). In response, firms are reporting alternative non-statutory earnings identified 
as ‘underlying earnings’ where ‘underlying earnings’ are deemed to be a better measure of 
firms’ underlying economic performance to supplement statutory earnings. Firms do this to 
reflect their ongoing business activities and help investors understand their ‘actual’ economic 
performance.   
 
This thesis consists of three papers that are consistent with a thesis prepared for publication. 
The three papers examine the underlying earnings reporting quality and its relationship to 
equity overvaluation and intellectual capital reporting based on a sample of Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) 200 listed firms from year 2009 to year 2012. Since there is no 
existing empirical evidence to investigate whether managers disclose underlying earnings to 
help investors evaluate the ‘true value’ of a firm, or opportunistically to influence investors’ 
perceptions of firm performance to mislead them, the first paper examines underlying 
earnings reporting behaviour by managers and how the market reacts to such behaviour. Two 
types of reporting behaviour are tested in the first paper: efficient reporting based on 
signalling theory and opportunistic reporting based on prospect theory and agency theory. 
 iv 
Efficient reporting is investigated by the relationship between earnings persistence and the 
likelihood of underlying earnings reporting, and the relationship between earnings 
predictability and the likelihood of underlying earnings reporting. Opportunistic reporting is 
examined by the likelihood of managers using opportunistic income-increasing underlying 
earnings exclusions when firms miss their statutory earnings target or make current statutory 
losses. The results confirm the opportunistic reporting hypothesis that when firms do not 
meet earnings targets or make current statutory losses, managers are more likely to use 
income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions to make underlying earnings look greater 
than statutory earnings. Specifically, managers opportunistically exclude recurring expenses 
to make underlying earnings look better than statutory earnings, and categorise such recurring 
expenses as ‘Other’ unspecific expenses so there is less chance of them being detected. This 
suggests that income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions represent inappropriate 
classification of the earnings components, but investors are misled by this opportunistic 
reporting behaviour because they perceive current statutory earnings to be irrelevant and react 
favourably to underlying earnings.   
Based on the finding of the first paper that managers report underlying earnings 
opportunistically to increase the stock prices, the second paper examines whether overvalued 
firms engage in earnings management and whether the duration of overvaluation is an 
important determinant of their decision to use accruals earnings management and 
opportunistic underlying earnings reporting based on the agency theory of overvalued equity. 
According to this theory, when a firm’s stock price becomes overvalued, the potential for 
conflicts of interest between owners and managers grows. Here, managers of overvalued 
firms not only refuse any market correction of overvalued stock prices, but they actually tend 
to extend overvaluation by engaging in different earnings management techniques that 
increase reported earnings. Therefore, equity overvaluation induces managers to engage in 
 v 
alternative earnings management techniques in order to maintain this upward trend in stock 
prices (Jensen, 2005). The second paper shows evidence consistent with this reasoning, 
finding that overvalued firms are more likely to disclose underlying earnings and report them 
opportunistically for the whole sample period. Considering how the duration of overvalued 
equity influences managers’ choices of earnings management, the results suggest that 
managers engage in accruals earnings management at an early stage, and as overvaluation 
continues, they are more likely to disclose underlying earnings opportunistically.  
The argument in the first and second papers indicates that reporting opportunistic underlying 
earnings is an earnings management technique that is difficult for investors to detect, whereas 
the third paper assumes that the level of intellectual capital disclosure may be a better way to 
detect opportunistic underlying earnings reporting. The reasoning here is based on signalling 
theory and resource-based theory, whereby high reporting quality firms that gain a 
competitive advantage from more unique resources are more likely to disclose intellectual 
capital because it represents the inimitable and non-replaceable resources that enhance their 
performance, whereas low reporting quality firms with less intellectual capital would find it 
difficult to disclose sufficient intellectual capital because it is hard to imitate. As a market 
valuation incentive, low reporting quality firms would engage in opportunistic underlying 
earnings reporting to influence investors’ perceptions. Based on the premise that firms 
engage in opportunistic underlying earnings because they have no more intellectual capital to 
disclose, the third paper examines whether firms engaging in opportunistic underlying 
earnings have difficulty in disclosing the inimitable intellectual capital. The third paper also 
examines whether disclosing intellectual capital representing the inimitable and non-
substitutable resources of a firm can reflect the firm’s current and future financial 
performance, and whether signalling resources to investors is relevant to firm valuation. 
Paper three proves that intellectual capital signals firms’ future economic benefits, which are 
 vi 
value-relevant for decision-making and carry future benefits forward to current stock returns. 
Specifically, intellectual capital disclosure and sufficient intellectual capital disclosure are 
positively and significantly related to a firm’s current and future financial performance (i.e., 
they are positively and significantly related to current and future return on equity ratios, 
return on assets ratios, revenue growth ratios, and revenue-to-assets ratios); in fact, sufficient 
intellectual capital disclosure is significantly and positively associated with the amount of 
future earnings reflected in the current stock returns. In addition, paper three confirms the 
hypothesis that low quality firms are less likely to voluntarily disclose intellectual capital, as 
intellectual capital disclosures and sufficient intellectual capital disclosures are negatively 
related to opportunistic underlying earnings reporting. The results of the third paper, 
combined with those of the first and second papers, suggest that low quality firms are less 
likely to disclose intellectual capital because it is a difficult signal to imitate, so they use 
opportunistic underlying earnings reporting to influence investors’ perception of firm 
performance to increase and maintain their stock prices. 
The three papers make several significant contributions to the extant literature. Paper one 
makes three major contributions. First, prior research in the United States of America 
provides mixed results about how managers report non-statutory earnings (e.g., Bradshaw & 
Sloan, 2002; Brown & Sivakumar, 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Doyle et al., 2003; 
Johnson & Schwartz, 2005), so the paper one contributes to existing debates about non-
statutory earnings reporting by examining the way managers report underlying earnings and 
market reactions to underlying earnings reporting in the Australia context. Second, only a few 
studies have examined how managers report non-statutory earnings based on theories, so 
paper one developed research hypotheses based on signalling theory, prospect theory, and 
agency theory. Signalling theory is used to test the efficient underlying earnings reporting 
hypothesis, whereas prospect theory and agency theory are used to examine the opportunistic 
 vii 
underlying earnings reporting hypothesis. Third, paper one contributes to the policy debate 
surrounding the usefulness of underlying earnings for users such as investors or creditors. 
Australian Institute of Company Directors support firms’ reporting underlying earnings as an 
alternative performance measurement (AICD & FINSIA, 2009), but the Australian Securities 
& Investments Commission is concerned that underlying earnings is information that may 
mislead investors (ASIC, March, December 2011). Paper one contributes to these debates by 
stating that underlying earnings are opportunistically manipulated by managers when they do 
not meet earnings targets, or make current statutory losses.  
 
The second paper contributes to the literature on equity overvaluation and earnings 
management by examining whether overvalued equity firms engage in earnings management 
and whether managers alternate between accruals earnings management and opportunistic 
underlying earnings reporting to sustain the overvaluation. There are three papers in the 
extant literature that have examined the association between opportunistic non-statutory 
earnings disclosure (pro forma earnings) with within-statutory earnings management 
techniques (accruals earnings management and/or real activities earnings management) 
(Black et al., 2014; Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al., 2010). All three papers found that 
managers alternate between within-statutory earnings management and opportunistic non-
statutory earnings disclosure, but these three papers did not examine whether the duration of 
equity overvaluation motivates managers to use different earnings management tools 
alternatively. Second, while previous studies have examined the relationship between pro 
forma earnings and accruals earnings management using the absolute value of accruals 
earnings management, paper two examines the absolute value of accruals earnings 
management and also whether managers use income-increasing accruals earnings 
management and income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions alternatively. Third, 
 viii 
paper two empirically tests Jensen’s (2005) agency theory of overvalued equity. Badertscher 
(2011) examined overvaluation and manager’s choice of non-statutory earnings management 
and found that overvalued firms are more likely to engage in non-statutory earnings 
management than firms that are not overvalued. However, Badertscher (2011) defined non-
statutory earnings management as firms that identified restatement announcements that raised 
questions about the quality of financial reporting. It is not clear whether managers use 
opportunistic non-statutory earnings disclosure as an earnings management tool to substitute 
for other earnings management tools to sustain overvalued equity. Paper two extends 
Badertscher’s (2011) study by investigating how the duration of overvalued equity influences 
managers to use accruals earnings management and opportunistic underlying earnings 
reporting. Fourth, Zang (2012) examined the role of earnings management costs in managers’ 
decisions to trade off different earnings management tools. Paper two extends Zang’s study 
by examining whether the constrained abilities of managers using accruals earnings 
management and income-increasing accruals earnings management influence their decision 
to transit into underlying earnings disclosure and disclose these underlying earnings 
opportunistically in order to sustain overvalued equity.  
 
The third paper makes several contributions to existing literature on intellectual capital 
disclosure and earnings management. First, none of that literature looked at whether firms 
with earnings management are less likely to disclose intellectual capital. Paper three is the 
first to examine the relationship between earnings management and intellectual capital 
disclosure, and suggests that firms with earnings management find it hard to disclose 
intellectual capital because it is difficult to imitate and replace. Second, studies examining 
whether intellectual capital disclosure can demonstrate to investors the value-relevant 
information that took place during the reporting period, or value-creation for the future are 
 ix 
rare (Abeysekera, 2011, p. 20). Paper three is the first study in Australia to examine whether 
intellectual capital disclosure can enhance current and future financial performance, and 
whether disclosing intellectual capital through annual reports is value-relevant to investors’ 
decision making, using content analysis for a large sample of Australian listed firms. Third, 
Abeysekera (2006) observed that the development of a theoretical framework underlying 
intellectual capital disclosure is in its infancy, with few studies providing a strong theoretical 
basis for interpreting their findings; in fact, research on intellectual capital underpinned by 
signalling theory is extremely limited (Li et al., 2008). Paper three has built a theoretical 
framework grounded on resource-based theory and signalling theory to develop research 
hypotheses. 
The findings of this thesis can have positive implications for the development of accounting 
standards and practices in Australia. As this thesis finds that managers report underlying 
earnings opportunistically to mislead investors and sustain overvalued equity, these findings 
provide useful insights for corporate regulators such as the Australian Securities & 
Investments Commission, who presently oppose firms’ publishing underlying earnings, so 
that they can make an empirically valid decision for further action. It may prove useful for 
investors to have a better understanding of how managers exercise the discretion inherent 
within accounting standards and outside accounting standards alternatively, to mask poor 
firm performance or to sustain the overvalued stock prices. Findings are also useful to those 
who use intellectual capital to assess the quality of a firm (such as creditors and investors) 
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1.1 Changes to Australian Accounting Standards  
 
On the first of January 2005, Australia became the first country in the world to adopt the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), as formulated by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). While the Australian Accounting Standards Board 
(AASB) had been converging the Australian General Accepted Accounting Principles 
(AGAAP) with IFRS, the mandatory adoption of IFRS moved accounting standards towards 
the introduction of fair value as a preferred basis for measuring assets while recognising 
unrealised gains and losses through changes in the fair value of assets reported in the income 
statements, along with extensive disclosures to explain them (Australian Institute of 
Company Directors (AICD) and Financial Services Institute of Australasia (FINSIA), 2009). 
The adoption of IFRS by Australia changed accountancy practices for intangible assets, 
goodwill, financial and taxation instruments, share-based payments, and the impairment of 
non-current assets (see, Chalmers et al., 2008; 2011; Haswell & Langfield-Smith, 2008). 
IFRS-led earnings are considered to be high quality because they represent a series of the best 
accounting practices in the world and are claimed to be more capital-market-oriented than 
many domestic accounting standards due to the adoption of a fair value measurement basis 
(Ding et al., 2007). Moreover, IFRS has enhanced the quality of information and the 
compatibility of financial reporting by promoting a uniform set of accounting standards 
across the globe (Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2008). Consequently, the adoption of IFRS could 
decrease costs for investors when comparing firms from different markets and nations to 
boost international investment and integrate capital markets (Covrig et al., 2007).  
 
There are some doubts that the globalised usage of IFRS could lead to more comparable and 
informative financial reporting. Studies argue that regulatory, cultural, and political 




because the professional judgements of accounting standards are influenced by such 
contextual factors (e.g., Ali & Hwang, 2000; Ball, 2006; Burgstahler & Eames, 2006; 
Holthausen, 2009; Lang et al., 2006). According to former Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Chairman Pitt, limiting reporting practices to a single set of accounting 
standards cannot capture the significant aspects of a firm and nation-specific performance, 
and furthermore, it also complicates comprehension for users across the globe because they 
have little knowledge about how contextual factors influence the application of accounting 
standards (Pitt, 2001). Literature also cited that IFRS should not be used to measure the 
underlying performance of firms because using the IFRS fair-value model to measure various 
assets can introduce greater variability in earnings in financial statements due to unrealised 
earnings emerging from such measurement that are then reported in financial statements by 
firms (e.g., Chalmers et al., 2008; 2011; Clarkson et al., 2011; Goodwin et al., 2008a). 
Researchers acknowledged that Australian firms were not prepared for the transition to IFRS 
(e.g., Chua et al., 2012; Goodwin et al., 2008b; Jones & Higgins, 2006). From a regulatory 
perspective, the IASB and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the U.S. 
acknowledged that including unrealised gains and losses through changes in the fair value of 
assets in income statements has undermined projecting the underlying economic reality of 
firms, and resulted in measures of financial performance that are difficult to analyse (IASB & 
FASB, 2008). In response to this dissatisfaction with statutory earnings, firms have begun to 
report an alternative non-statutory earnings identified as ‘underlying earnings’ where they 
assert that ‘underlying earnings’ is a better measure of their underlying economic 
performance to supplement statutory earnings, in order to accurately reflect the ongoing 
business activities of reporting firms and help investors better understand the ‘actual’ 




1.2 Motivation and purpose for this research  
This thesis presents its material in the form of three papers that are consistent with a thesis 
prepared for publication. The three papers examine the underlying earnings reporting quality 
and its relationship to equity overvaluation and the reporting of intellectual capital by 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 200 listed firms. Since there is no empirical evidence 
to investigate whether managers disclose underlying earnings in a way that helps investors to 
evaluate the ‘true value’ of a firm, or in an opportunistic way that influences investors’ 
perceptions of firms performance to mislead them, the first paper in this thesis attempts to 
examine the underlying earnings reporting behaviour by managers (either efficient or 
opportunistic) and how the market reacts to these underlying earnings. If managers disclose 
underlying earnings opportunistically to induce investors’ perceptions of firm performance 
such that they overvalue the stock price, then the question is, do managers use underlying 
earnings reporting opportunistically to substitute other types of earnings management to 
sustain equity overvaluation? Based on the first paper, that managers report underlying 
earnings opportunistically to increase the stock price, the second paper attempts to examine 
how the duration of equity overvaluation affects management’s use of opportunistic 
underlying earnings reporting and accruals earnings management. Specifically, do managers 
engage in accruals earnings management at the early stage of equity overvaluation and then 
disclose underlying earnings opportunistically to sustain overvaluation at later stages of 
overvaluation due to a limited ability to use accruals earnings management? Revealing 
opportunistic underlying earnings may be problematic to some investors because 
opportunistic underlying earnings are more likely to go undetected as they are not externally 
audited. From the argument of the first and second papers that reporting opportunistic 
underlying earnings are difficult for investors to detect, the third paper in this thesis assumes 




underlying earnings reporting. The reasoning behind this is based on signalling theory and 
resource-based theory where the high reporting quality firms that gain a competitive 
advantage from more unique resources are more likely to disclose IC because it represents the 
inimitable and non-replaceable resources that enhances their performance, whereas low 
reporting quality firms with less IC would find it difficult to disclose sufficient IC because it 
is hard to imitate. As a market valuation incentive, low reporting quality firms would engage 
in opportunistic underlying earnings reporting to influence investor’s perceptions. The third 
paper of this thesis examines whether disclosing IC representing the inimitable and non-
substitutable resources of a firm can reflect their current and future financial performance and 
whether signalling resources to investors are relevant to firms’ valuation. More importantly, 
the third paper examines whether firms engaging in opportunistic underlying earnings have 
difficulty in disclosing the inimitable IC. This is on the basis that firms engage in 
opportunistic underlying earnings because they have no more IC to disclose.   
 
1.3 Data and methods 
This thesis uses ASX 200 listed firms as a sampling frame to identify firms that report 
underlying earnings and IC from years 2009 to 2012. The underlying earnings data were 
collected from the annual reports of sample firms, but to do so meant searching the annual 
reports available on Annual Reports Online database and DatAnalysis database by typing in 
the keywords ‘underlying’, ‘adjusted’, ‘normalised’, ‘earnings before’, ‘profit before’, and 
‘pro forma’. Following Black & Christensen (2009), this thesis does not include earnings 




(EBITDA), because they are commonly reported as standard steps in the income statement
1
. 
This thesis also excluded firms involved in banking, insurance, diversified financials, and real 
estate because they are subjected to different reporting requirements. Moreover, firms 
without annual reports and financial information available on the database between year 2009 
and year 2012 were also deleted. These actions reduced the sample size from 800 to 610 firm-
year observations. To capture IC information, this thesis applied a content analysis for 610 
annual reports. To analyse the IC content disclosed in the annual reports, the frequency of IC 
items reported was counted. The coding framework recorded data from the content analysis 
using 33 pre-defined IC items. The detailed underlying earnings data capture and IC data 
capture are discussed in section 2.4.1 and section 4.4.1 respectively.    
  
This thesis used the panel data that meets the cross-sectional firms observed, and at least 
once more over the observed years from 2009 to 2012. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
technique on panel data may not be optimal because it omits the observed variability of a 
given firm over time, unduly influencing the predictor variables (Verbeek, 2004). Two ways 
of improving the estimation were suggested under the panel data setting, i.e., fixed-effects 
and random-effects regression models. The fixed-effects models assume that the unobserved 
attributes of a given firm over time will remain constant as the intercept of a given firm 
remains constant over time. The random-effects models assume that the unobservable 
attributes of a given firm change over time because each firm can have different intercepts 
across the years. The variability of intercepts of a given firm varies randomly and is included 
as part of the error term (Kennedy 2008, p.284). Borenstein et al. (2009, p. 85) summarised 
the major discrepancies between fixed-effects model and random-effects model by arguing 
that a fixed-effects model estimates a single effect that is assumed to be specific to the 
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sample firms because the unobserved variance is within-the-study (sampling or estimation) 
error. The random-effects model estimates the mean of effects distribution and the model of 
random-effects because it includes unobserved variance within the study and unobserved 
variance between studies. Kennedy (2008, p.290) asserts that the fixed-effects estimator is 
better with selection bias problems because the findings are specific to the sample being 
observed. Therefore, the fixed-effects regression models are used in this thesis. Detailed 
information about the fixed-effects variables is discussed in the research design section of 
each paper.    
 
1.4 Overview of subsequent Chapters  
The following chapters contain the three papers of this thesis and an overall conclusion. 
Chapter 2 is paper one that examines management underlying earnings reporting behaviour 
and the influence of underlying earnings on market reactions. Chapter 3 is paper two that 
investigates the relationship between equity overvaluation and managers use alternative 
earnings management mechanisms that consider underlying earnings to be an earnings 
management tool used by firms. Chapter 4 is paper three to explore the relationship between 
the disclosure of intellectual capital and management opportunistically reporting on 
underlying earnings. Each paper follows the same structure: section one introduces the paper; 
section two provides literature reviews; section three explains the theoretical framework and 
development of hypotheses; section four describes the research design; section five presents 
the analyses and results of each paper, including the descriptive statistics, pearson and 
spearman correlations, and the results of regressions; section six provides the additional tests; 
and section seven is a summary of each paper. The final chapter (Chapter 5) provides the 
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As discussed in the introduction and overview chapter (i.e., chapter one), empirical studies 
provide mixed evidence about the influence of IFRS on the quality of financial reporting. By 
considering that the quality of financial reporting reflects the true underlying financial 
performance of firms, some studies provide evidence which supports that IFRS has increased 
the quality of financial reporting (e.g., Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2008; Covrig et al., 2007), while 
other studies provide evidence suggesting that IFRS has either decreased it or had no 
influence (e.g., Ali & Hwang, 2000; Ball, 2006; Burgstahler & Eames, 2006; Holthausen, 
2009; Lang et al., 2006). Some firms suspect that changes achieved through IFRS standards 
have enhanced the reflection that firms reporting on their underlying performance are now 
more understandable, more comparable, more reliable, and contain more relevant information 
(Sloan & Bradshaw, 2002; Doyle et al., 2003).  
In response, some firms are now reporting non-statutory earnings that are identified as 
‘underlying earnings’; indeed firms assert that underlying earnings is a better measure of their 
underlying economic performance because it accurately reflects their ongoing business 
activities and helps investors better understand their ‘core’ economic performance.   
Reporting non-statutory earnings has been a common phenomenon across countries in recent 
decades, starting in 1998 in the U.S., and then spreading worldwide (Bhattacharya et al., 
2003; Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Doyle et al., 2003). Non-statutory earnings reported by 
managers in the U.S. are commonly known as pro forma earnings that stand for alternate and 
unaudited measures of firm performance that are called ‘recurring earnings,’ ‘core 
earnings,’ or ‘adjusted earnings’. Pro forma earnings represent recurring cash-related 
earnings where such computations exclude non-recurring or non-cash items that would 




determination. Firms argue that these non-recurring and non-cash items might not reflect 
their underlying financial performance (Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Brown & Sivakumar, 
2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2004), while managers consider that pro forma earnings could 
help investors make better decisions because they report on firms’ cash-related recurring 
economic performance (Albring et al., 2010; Collins et al., 2009). Pro forma earnings 
reported by firms have received considerable attention by researchers, although previous 
research has revealed mixed results about managers’ pro forma earnings reporting. Some 
researchers found that managers who efficiently reported pro forma earnings helped investors 
to improve decision making with information that is more relevant to them in ascertaining 
firms’ valuation (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Collins et al., 
2009; Brown & Sivakumar, 2003). Other researchers have found that managers 
opportunistically report pro forma earnings to obtain personal economic benefits, such as 
meeting earnings targets set for them, or to unduly influence investors’ perception about 
firms’ performance (e.g., Doyle et al., 2003; 2013; Johnson & Schwartz 2005; Black & 
Christensen, 2009).  
The notion of underlying earnings in this thesis is similar to those pro forma earnings made in 
the U.S., but with some distinct differences. From a similarity perspective, managers assert 
that non-statutory earnings are measurements of ongoing business activities that more 
accurately reflect their ‘core’ or ‘recurring’ economic performance. Pro forma earnings and 
underlying earnings are voluntarily reported by managers, but they are not part of an external 
financial audit that reviews the preparation of statutory financial statements. From a 
regulatory and reporting perspective, underlying earnings and pro forma earnings have 
several differences. Firstly, adjustments excluded from pro forma earnings made by U.S. 
firms differ from the adjustments excluded from underlying earnings made by Australian 




interest effects, merger and acquisition costs, research and development costs that are written 
off, depreciation and amortisation costs, gains or losses on asset dispositions, and other 
unspecific adjustments (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Black & 
Christensen, 2009). The common adjustments excluded from underlying earnings in Australia 
are: impairment or/and revaluation of assets, purchase or/and disposal of assets and business, 
restructuring costs, and other unspecific adjustments (Deloitte, 2010; KPMG, 2009). 
Secondly, the main sectors reporting on pro forma earnings in U.S. differ from the main 
sectors reporting on underlying earnings in Australia. Pro forma reporters are heavily 
concentrated in the service and high-tech industries in U.S. (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Black 
& Christensen, 2009; Johnson & Schwartz, 2005; Lougee & Marquardt, 2004; Marques, 
2006), whereas in Australia, the financial sector, and the industrial and materials sectors are 
more frequently reporters who report on underlying earnings (Deloitte, 2010; KPMG, 2009). 
Thirdly, unlike the U.S., there is no compulsory regulation to regulate manager’s reporting on 
non-statutory earnings in Australian firms because reporting on underlying earnings in the 
Australian context is ‘principle-based’ rather than ‘rule-based’. Fourthly, compared to their 
U.S. counterparts, analysts do not follow Australian firms intensively (Habib & Hossain, 
2008; Cheung et al., 2010) and institutional investors from Australia are unlikely to utilise 
their voting power to influence managerial behaviour (Craswell et al., 1997; Matolcsy & 
Wright, 2007; Wilson & Wang, 2010). These differences in regulatory and reporting 
environments may lead to different reporting behaviour of management non-statutory 
earnings between Australian and U.S. firms.  
Most literature regarding managers’ reporting of non-statutory earnings is carried out in the 
U.S., so there is no empirical evidence that managers’ underlying earnings reporting has been 
examined, or how the market reacts to such reporting in Australia. The aim of this paper is to 




theory, this paper argues that managers efficiently report underlying earnings to signal firms’ 
underlying economic performance to help investors better understand their recurring 
economic performance when the statutory earnings fail to do so. Based on prospect theory 
and agency theory, this paper investigates whether managers’ opportunistically report 
underlying earnings that is higher than statutory earnings when their firms do not meet 
earnings targets or makes current statutory losses. After examining the behaviour of 
management reporting on underlying earnings, this paper examines how investors react to 
this reporting.  
 
The findings of this paper show that managers disclose underlying earnings opportunistically, 
such that when their firms fail to meet statutory earnings target or make current statutory 
losses, they are more likely to use income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions to 
define underlying earnings so that they are higher than statutory earnings. Higher underlying 
earnings can therefore influence investors’ perceptions on firms’ performance. These 
exclusions of income-increasing underlying earnings are managed to exclude recurring 
expenses that are relevant to future operating earnings rather than non-recurring and non-
relevant expenses from statutory earnings to define underlying earnings that are higher than 
statutory earnings. These recurring expenses are categorised as ‘other’ unspecified expenses 
that are less likely to be detected by investors. The market reactions show that investors 
perceive current statutory earnings are value-irrelevant and react favourably to underlying 
earnings, which suggests that investors are misled by managers’ opportunistically reporting 
on their underlying earnings.   
 
The remaining sections are organised as follows: Section 2.2 examines the relevant literature; 




Section 2.4 discusses the research design; Section 2.5 presents the data analyses and 
regression results; Section 2.6 presents the additional tests for this study, and Section 2.7 
presents the conclusion.  
 
2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Underlying earnings 
‘Underlying earnings’ are calculated based on the judgment of the preparer that reflect the 
‘core’/‘recurring’ business activities of reporting firms. They are voluntarily reported 
earnings on a basis other than IFRS or in line with IFRS and then adjusted by firm managers 
(AICD & FINSIA, 2009). Firms use labels to describe underlying earnings, including ‘pro 
forma earnings’, ‘normalised earnings’, ‘underlying EBIT’, ‘underlying EBITDA’, ‘earnings 
before exceptional items’, ‘result excluding exceptional items’, ‘results before non-recurring 
items’, ‘results before significant items’, ‘results before special items’, ‘results before specific 
items’, ‘adjusted earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation’ or ‘adjusted 
operating earnings’ (Ernst & Young, 2007; AICD & FINSIA, 2009). The underlying earnings 
used in this thesis represent all such terms because they provide an alternative to statutory 
earnings. Although there is no general agreement about computing underlying earnings, 
significant non-recurring items and IFRS-driven unrealised gains and losses are excluded 
(AICD & FINSIA, 2009).  
 
The adoption of underlying earnings is not an uncommon phenomenon in Australian firms 
because Woodside Petroleum Limited’s 2012 annual report documented that ‘underlying net 
profit after tax was $2,061 million, a 25% increase on the 2011 figure’ (p.4); another example 




profit after tax was a positive $132 million in its 2010 annual report (p.23), and Rio Tinto 
Limited reported their underlying earnings in the performance highlights section of their 2012 
annual report. Indeed, it documented that underlying earnings in 2012 decreased by US$5.3 
billion to US$9.3 billion compared with 2011. A study conducted by KPMG in 2009 found 
evidence that 84% of firms on the ASX 100 index presented underlying earnings as a 
response to growing dissatisfaction with the statutory earnings representative of firms’ actual 
economic performance (KPMG, 2009). In 2012, 32 out of 50 ASX index firms chose to 
report results using underlying earnings of economic performance in addition to statutory 
earnings (KPMG, 2013). In a study conducted by FINSIA in 2005 that interviewed 24 
analysts, over 80% agreed that a constant and separate disclosure of underlying earnings 
would be a more useful measure of firm performance (FINSIA, 2005).  
Recently, investors focused more on underlying earnings rather than conventional 
statutory earnings because underlying earnings are considered as proxy for a firm’s ongoing 
profitability, an approach that is useful for evaluation (KPMG, 2009; AICD & FINSIA, 
2009). There is ample evidence to support the fact that underlying earnings increases a firm’s 
share price. As an example, on 21
st
 of April 2014, shares in AMP limited increased by 42c or 
9.3 per cent, to $4.92 with investors warming to the underlying result, a result that beat the 
consensus forecast of $833m (Gluyas, 2014). 
In terms of the impact of underlying earnings on statutory earnings, Deloitte’s (2010) study 
found that 52% of ASX 100 firms reported underlying earnings higher than their statutory 
earnings in year 2009. Twenty five per cent of the ASX 100 index firms reported underlying 
earnings in black (positive earnings) when the statutory earnings were reported in red 
(negative earnings). Moreover, 27% of ASX 100 index firms reported underlying earnings in 




and statutory earnings. This highlights the importance placed on reporting underlying 
earnings by firms.  
 
2.2.2 Non-statutory earnings reporting behaviour  
Studies have examined whether managerial discretion of reporting non-statutory earnings 
helps investors to more accurately ascertain the underlying economic reality (efficient 
reporting behaviour) or perpetuates  managers’ own interests (opportunistic reporting 
behaviour). This paper provides evidence for both reporting behaviours in the following 
sections.  
 
2.2.2.1 Evidence of efficient reporting  
The range of arguments highlights the potential benefits of non-statutory earnings reporting 
made by managers. Bradshaw & Sloan (2002) compared the value relevance of street 
earnings
2
 made by an analyst as proxy for a manager made pro forma earnings with the value 
relevance of GAAP earnings. The authors found that the earnings response coefficients and 
regression R
 
squares were much higher for street earnings than GAAP earnings, which 
suggests that investors perceived that street earnings are more relevant. Moreover, the 
author’s documented that a large portion of significant expenses excluded from street 
earnings are non-recurring expenses. Brown & Sivakumar (2003) extended Bradshaw & 
Sloan (2002)’s study by investigating three qualitative attributes of street earnings; the 
capacity to forecast future earnings (predictive ability), correlating earnings with stock prices 
(valuation), and associating earnings with abnormal stock returns (information content). The 
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 Street earnings are made by firms’ analysts. The numbers of street earnings are announced by firms in their press releases 
and tracked by analyst estimate clearinghouse services such as I/B/E/S, Zacks, and First Call. Similarly, with pro forma 
earnings made by managers, certain exclusions (e.g., non-recurring expenses, non-cash items) are excluded to increase the 
predictive ability of earnings for future performance. Some studies use street earnings as a proxy for pro forma earnings 




authors find that street earnings are a better measure of predictive ability, valuation, and 
information content than GAAP earnings. Both of these studies arrived at conclusions by 
using street earnings that are available on analysts tracking services (e.g., I/B/E/S, First Call, 
Zacks), as proxies for pro forma earnings. However, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) believe that 
adjustments made by managers in computing pro forma earnings differ from adjustments 
made by analysts in computing street earnings. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) study investigated 
whether pro forma earnings reported by managers are more persistent (the earnings will be 
closer to ‘core earnings’ that are likely to continue in future periods) and informative (the 
earnings associate with short-window abnormal stock returns) than GAAP operating 
earnings. The results indicated that pro forma earnings are much more informative and 
persistent than GAAP operating earnings, implying that market participants consider that pro 
forma earnings represent ‘core earnings’ better than GAAP operating earnings. Bowen et al. 
(2005) examined the determinants where the emphasis was placed on pro forma earnings and 
GAAP earnings metrics, and also examined stock market reactions to such an emphasis using 
archival data. They find that when GAAP earnings are less relevant to investors for decision-
making, the incremental information of pro forma earnings was enhanced with greater 
emphasis on this metric. The results also suggested that manager’s report pro forma earnings 
to help investors ascertain market firm evaluations. Collins at el. (2009) used abnormal-return 
volatility, abnormal returns, and abnormal trading volume around quarterly-earnings 
announcement dates to examine the usefulness of pro forma earnings reports, and found that 
market participants increasingly relied on pro forma earnings for their stock pricing decisions 
because abnormal behaviour was associated with pro forma earnings. Albring et al. (2010) 
examined whether reported pro forma earnings were more relevant than computed operating 
earnings based on GAAP, using the stock prices model and stock returns model. The results 




suggesting that pro forma earnings are much more relevant to investors than the GAAP 
measure. Choi et al. (2007) investigated the specific sources of disagreement between analyst 
and management regarding the components of non-statutory earnings in the U.K. context. 
They found that most management-specific adjustments made by managers to define non-
statutory earnings were more useful to increase the persistence aspect of non-statutory 
earnings than the specific adjustments made by analysts. This suggests that management-
specific adjustments to statutory earnings showed managers’ superior knowledge of the 
persistence aspect of earnings components.  
 
Collectively, according to the above studies, non-statutory earnings are more persistent and 
better at predicting firms’ future economic performance. Managers tend to report non-
statutory earnings using the information available to them to make the non-statutory earnings 
more relevant (correlation of earnings of with the stock prices), informative (association of 
earnings with abnormal stock returns), and predictive (to forecast earnings in the future). 
Therefore these arguments support that managers efficiently report the non-statutory to 
increase the quality of financial reporting.   
 
2.2.2.2 Evidence of opportunistic reporting  
Empirical evidence to date does not provide clear evidence with regards to the motives for 
reporting non-statutory earnings, while another stream of research finds that managers tend to 
report non-statutory earnings higher than statutory earnings opportunistically in order to 
influence capital market expectations and valuations. 
 
Doyle et al. (2003) investigated the persistent exclusions managers make when calculating 




not value-irrelevant to future cash flows but useful for determine future cash flows. The 
market, however, perceives pro forma earnings as relevant when earnings are announced but 
if they are reported opportunistically then investors find them in the following year; this 
suggests that pro forma earnings influence market judgment at the time of reporting. Johnson 
& Schwartz (2005) applied the between-samples design to compare the characteristics of 
firms that report pro forma and those that don’t, using hand-collected data, and found no 
evidence that GAAP operating earnings per share (EPS) are less persistent in pro forma than 
non–pro forma firms. The narrow-window stock returns tests revealed no evidence of a stock 
return premium for pro forma firms at the quarterly earnings announcement date. 
Collectively, although the findings do question managers’ assertions that reporting pro forma 
earnings is meant to help investors assess firm performance, however, investors may not be 
misled by pro forma earnings disclosures. Entwistle et al. (2006) examined the wording used 
for pro forma reporting to determine whether the language used in  press releases could 
mislead investors, and found more than 10% of all the American S&P 500 firms misleadingly 
reported pro forma earnings using traditional GAAP terminology. They used traditional 
GAAP language (such as net income) in the headline of a press release, which was later 
revealed as pro forma earnings in the contents (such as net income excluding exceptional 
items). Landsman et al. (2007) examined the components of earnings that analysts exclude 
from the net income of GAAP to reach pro forma earnings based on Ohlson (1999)’s 
methodology by using three quality attributes to examine the relevance of pro forma 
earnings: abnormal earnings forecasting, predictability of exclusions, and the valuation of 
exclusions. Their findings showed that the market mispriced positive and negative total 
exclusions, special items, and other types of exclusions, which suggests that the market is 
misled by managers’ opportunistic pro forma reporting strategy. Black & Christensen 




earnings reporting, and discovered that managers exclude recurring accounting items to 
make pro forma earnings reporting meet strategic earnings targets. Some studies moved 
towards examining specific adjustments to investigate managers’ opportunistic reporting 
behaviour. Barth et al. (2012) examined the differences in recognising stock-based 
compensation expense when managers calculate pro forma earnings and when analysts obtain 
street earnings to understand whether the incentives of managers to report pro forma earnings 
differ from analysts’ street earnings. They found that managers opportunistically excluded 
stock-based compensation expenses from pro forma earnings to increase earnings, smooth 
earnings, and meet earnings benchmarks. This opportunistic incentive also exists in analysts’ 
street earnings reporting, but it does not explain the incremental opportunistic incentive by 
analysts because they are keen on managing investor perceptions of firms’ performance only 
when management is doing the same, which suggests they seek to curry favour with 
managers.  
 
Outside the U.S., opportunistic non-statutory earnings reporting also exists in European 
countries. For example, Walker & Louvari (2003) examined the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure of non-statutory earnings in the U.K. context and discovered that the voluntary 
disclosure of a non-statutory earnings measure is positively related to the extent to which 
non-statutory earnings measure exceeds statutory earnings. Moreover, they found that loss 
firms are less likely to report non-statutory earnings that convert a loss into a lower loss, 
which suggests that firms generally appear to be motivated to present a more favourable 
earnings metric and management do not want to create the impression that a current loss is 
likely to be sustained. Hitz (2010) investigated the determinants of firms’ decisions to report 
non-statutory earnings in a largely unregulated setting in the German capital market and 




that do not meet earnings benchmarks under statutory earnings are much more likely to report 
non-statutory earnings than firms that meet or beat these benchmarks under statutory 
earnings. Isidro & Marques (2014) used hand-collected data for a sample of large European 
firms to study the impact of economic factors and countries’ institutional on managers’ non-
GAAP reporting. They found that in countries with efficient legislative systems there is 
strong protection for investors, and the developed capital market and sound communicational 
channels tend to utilise non-GAAP reporting to reach significant earnings 
benchmarks because managers are under pressure to meet or beat earnings targets in 
institutionally strong and economically developed jurisdictions.  
 
In sum, above discussed suggest that managers opportunistically report non-statutory 
earnings, and when the GAAP earnings cannot meet the earnings thresholds, they tend to 
report non-statutory earnings to meet or beat GAAP earnings targets by excluding the 
recurring earnings components from statutory earnings.  
 
2.2.2.3 Evidence of co-existing reporting  
To generalise non-statutory earnings reporting as opportunistic behaviour is not 
comprehensive because recent literature shows that non-statutory earnings reporting can 
consist of opportunistic and efficient behaviour.   
 
Lougee & Marquardt (2004) was the first study to show that the results of non-statutory 
earnings reporting was mixed, which indicated that the results supporting efficient reporting 
revealed that firms with less informative GAAP earnings is the reason why firms report pro 
forma earnings. In this case then, pro forma earnings are positively related to firms’ future 




the benchmarks of earnings under GAAP earnings tend to report pro forma earnings in press 
releases. Lougee & Marquardt (2004) concluded that this  evidence cast doubt on whether pro 
forma earnings can be utilised to inform or mislead investors depends on the context. Curtis 
et al. (2014) examined quarterly non-GAAP earnings information that contained transitory 
gains to determine whether managers have an incentive to report non-GAAP earnings to 
either misguide or inform investors. They used a between-sample design in their study to 
classify the sample into two types: the informative group (non-GAAP EPS less than GAAP 
EPS by excluding the gains or the EPS effect of the gain in the earnings announcement), and 
the opportunistic group (non-GAAP EPS greater than the GAAP EPS by including the gains 
or the EPS effect of the gain in the earnings announcement). The results supported both 
motivations: evidence consistent with the efficient reporting of non-GAAP earnings 
information suggests that transitory gains help investors to price these gains efficiently, while 
evidence from the opportunistic group finds that among opportunistic reporters, managers’ 
reporting choices affect investors’ perceptions of operating earnings at the earnings 
announcement. Overall, these results suggest that the most persuasive motivation behind non-
GAAP earnings reporting is to inform (47.5% of which 37.6% was to consistently inform, 
and 9.9% to inform to some extent), although a significant number of firms tend to be 
opportunistic to influence investors’ perceptions about earnings (27.2 %). The remaining 25.2 
% of the sample consistently failed to disclose information on non-GAAP earnings.   
 
Unlike Curtis et al. (2014)’s study that used the between samples technique, Choi & Young 
(2015)’s study pooled the full sample to test the motivation of management non-statutory 
earnings reporting in the U.K. To achieve this they examined non-statutory earnings by 
excluding the absolute value of transitory gains and losses and found that, consistent with 




items when  GAAP earnings meet or beat analyst’s consensus earnings forecast, and 
consistent with opportunistic reporting, the positive relationship between transitory items and 
non-GAAP earnings is much weaker when GAAP earnings do not meet the expectations. 
Choi & Young (2015) concluded that whether managers reporting non-GAAP earnings are 
efficient or opportunistic depends on the GAAP earnings surprise.  
 
This evidence suggests that efficient reporting and opportunistic reporting of non-statutory 
earnings co-exists with specific but different drivers in different firms.  
 
2.2.3 Market reactions to non-statutory earnings reporting  
Given the mixed incentives for managers reporting on non-statutory earnings, the ability of 
investors to fully understand management’s reporting strategy is an open question because 
the evidence shows that investors can ‘see through’ opportunistic reporting (e.g., Black et al., 
2014; Curtis et al., 2014; Lougee & Marquardt, 2004), and there is also evidence to show that 
investors can be misled by managers’ opportunistic reporting (e.g., Doyle et al., 2003; 
Landsman et al., 2007).  
Studies found that different market participants can respond to non-statutory earnings 
reporting differently because of differences in financial knowledge. The early evidence 
provided by Bhattacharya et al. (2003) shows that analysts and ordinary investors react 
differently to pro forma reporting. Investors may consider that pro forma reporting is less 
informative when pro forma earnings can meet analyst’s expectations while the GAAP 
operating earnings fall below analysts’ expectations, whereas analysts can be more sceptical 
of pro forma earnings when firms report them in order to convert the GAAP operating loss 




examine how reporting on pro forma earnings affects the judgment of more sophisticated 
(i.e., analysts) and less sophisticated (i.e., non-professional investors) investors. They found 
that non-professional investors who received an earnings announcement that reported both 
pro forma and GAAP earnings, evaluated a higher stock price than non-professionals who 
obtained an announcement with GAAP reporting only. However, the stock price judgments 
of more sophisticated investors were not influenced by pro forma reporting. Elliott 
(2006) examined how non-professional investors and analysts’ reacted to two pro forma 
reporting features (i.e., the existence of a quantitative reconciliation between GAAP earnings 
and pro forma earnings; the pro forma emphasis) and found that for non-professional 
investors, the emergence of pro form earnings emphasised by managers influenced their 
judgment and decision making. Such an impact can be alleviated by showing a quantitative 
reconciliation. Analysts were not influenced by the presence of and emphasis on pro forma 
earnings, but their judgement and decision making were influenced by the emergence of 
reconciliation in the opposite direction to non-professional investors. Specifically, the 
emergence of quantitative reconciliation made analysts consider pro forma earnings as being 
more reliable, enhancing their reliance on pro forma reporting to assess the earnings 
performance of a firm. Andersson & Hellman (2007) carried out experimental research in 
Sweden to investigate how analysts’ earnings forecasts are influenced by pro forma earnings 
reporting, and found that analysts with both pro forma and GAAP information made much 
higher GAAP EPS forecasts than the those with only GAAP information; this suggests that 
non-statutory earnings reporting also can influence the judgement of sophisticated users in 
evaluating firm performance in Sweden. 
However, an experimental study might lack external validity with regards to the population 
because experimental settings are necessarily simple (Allee et al., 2007). Allee et al. (2007) 




external validity. They also used the abnormal net purchasing activities of small investors 
over a three day announcement window as proxy for less sophisticated investors, and used 
the net purchasing activities of large investors over a three day announcement window as 
proxy for sophisticated investors. The results conformed to Frederickson & Miller (2004)’s 
experimental evidence showing that less sophisticated investors depend more on quarterly 
earnings press releases that contain pro forma earnings to make decisions, while more 
sophisticated investors exhibit the opposite behaviour. Moreover, like Elliott (2006)’s results, 
Allee et al. (2007) found that less sophisticated investors rely more on pro forma earnings 
when managers opportunistically emphasise pro forma earnings, while the trading activity of 
more sophisticated investors cannot be affected by emphasising the two earnings metrics. 
This evidence shows that an opportunistic emphasis on non-statutory earnings in a press 
release affects the judgments of less sophisticated investors, whereas the influence of 
opportunistic reporting on less sophisticated investors decreases when the reconciliation 
between non-statutory earnings and statutory earnings is included. The motivations for non-
statutory earnings reporting and the market reactions on non-statutory earnings reporting are 
summarised in Appendix 1.1.  
 
2.2.4 Regulatory response on non-statutory earnings 
 
 
2.2.4.1 Regulation in the United States 
Regulators concern about the misleading information contained in pro forma earnings in the 
U.S., so to improve the reliability and accuracy of firm reporting, and to regain the 
confidence of the general public in the stock market, the SEC was instructed in section SOX 




manage pro forma company reporting. The SEC introduced Regulation G (Reg G), item 
10(e) of Regulation S-K and item 12 to govern pro forma earnings reported outside the 
financial statements in 2003. Reg G includes all the public reporting of pro forma financial 
evaluation containing conference calls, press releases, presentations to investors, and other 
forms of media. In order to establish transparency in calculating pro forma earnings, the 
regulation demands that the reporters reconcile pro forma earnings with statutory earnings. 
While the SEC attempts to ensure pro forma earnings reporting is useful and has not been 
completed in a misguided manner, it does not prohibit pro forma reporting (SEC, 2003). 
 
Various empirical studies have examined the influences of regulations on pro forma earnings 
reporting, with some findings showing that Reg G in the U.S. resulted in a decline in the pro 
forma earnings reported. For example, Marques (2006) documented that the average 
percentage of firms that reported pro forma earnings decreased from 63% (before the 
introduction of Reg G) to 50% (after adoption of Reg G). According to Heflin & Hsu (2008), 
not only did the frequency of pro forma earnings reporting decrease, so too did the number of 
exclusions showing discrepancies between GAAP and pro forma earnings. However, this 
declining trend reversed with an upwards trend in 2012 in U.S. (Black et al., 2012). Studies 
found that the quality of pro forma earnings being reported increased after Reg G in terms of 
less opportunistic pro forma measures (Bowen et al., 2005); potentially misleading reporting 
practices decreased (Entwistle et al., 2006); confident in the market increased (Marques, 
2006); the probability that firms disclose pro forma earnings to meet or beat forecasts 






2.2.4.2 Regulation in the Australia  
In 2009, the AICD and FINSIA released guidelines that encouraged Australian listed firms to 
disclose underlying earnings. These guidelines aimed to give financial reporting users (e.g., 
investors) a better understanding of underlying earnings in firms. FINSIA and AICD asserted 
that underlying earnings shows how managers evaluate a firm’s performance for ongoing 
operations. The market may improve if a firm disclosed the number of underlying earnings  
and provided an explanation (AICD & FINSIA, 2009, p.12). 
 
However, Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) concerns about reporting 
underlying earnings may mislead users.  ASIC issued Consultation Paper 150 in March 2011, 
proposing guidelines to minimise any adverse impact that may result from firms’ reporting 
underlying earnings. It includes that managers should explain how these underlying earnings 
are calculated and why it is important to include this information; underlying earnings should 
not be shown with greater prominence than statutory information; and managers should 
reconcile between underlying earnings and statutory earnings. Besides, underlying earnings 
should be consistently shown on a regular basis (ASIC 2011, March). 
 
‘Regulatory Guide 230: Disclosing non-IFRS financial information’ was published in 
December, 2011 to promote clear and full underlying earnings reported for financial 
information users and reduce the probability of users being misguided by that information. 
These guidelines do not replace the legislation but following them may reduce the probability 
of firms trying to mislead investors and analysts. Regulatory Guide 230 documents that 
underlying earnings are permitted in communications such as directors’ reports, press 
releases; notes to financial statements, and analyst briefings, but such reporting must not be 




earnings can only be disclosed when it is important to offer a true and fair view of financial 
statements. Moreover, firms must reconcile underlying earnings and statutory earnings by 
showing and explaining the adjustments (ASIC 2011, December).  
 
 
2.2.4.3 Regulation in the international  
Permissive international rules govern non-statutory earnings  (Young, 2014). According to 
the International Accounting Standard 33 (IAS 33), reporting non-statutory earnings may be 
permitted with the accompanying notes and income statement. Similar to Reg G in U.S. and 
Regulatory Guide 230 in Australia, it does not restrict communicating non-statutory earnings 
to investors but it requires that non-statutory earnings must not be presented more 
prominently than statutory earnings, and non-statutory earnings should be reconciled to a 
corresponding line item in the income statement. 
In sum, although regulators are concerned that non-statutory earnings reporting could mislead 
investors’ judgment on a firm’s value but they do not prohibit firms reporting their non-
statutory earnings. 
 
2.3 Theoretical framework and development of hypotheses   
While acknowledging that most recent researchers found that managers’ motivations for 
reporting non-statutory earnings received mixed responses from investors, this paper 
develops research hypotheses based on signalling theory, prospect theory, and agency theory, 
to examine the behaviour of managers’ underlying earnings reporting where signalling theory 





2.3.1 Signalling theory    
2.3.1.1 Definition of signalling theory 
Signalling theory was first introduced by Spence (1973) to reduce information asymmetry 
between job candidates and employers. Spence used the labour market to model the 
signalling educational function. In explaining signalling theory, Spence argued that potential 
employers lack information on the capabilities of job candidates, and candidates used 
education to signal their capabilities to potential employers. Spence then formulated two 
types of candidates, one with high productivity and another with low productivity. Highly 
educated candidates signalled their more formal education as a trustworthy signal for high 
productivity so that employers would pay a higher wage. Therefore, signalling theory asserts 
that the attributes of one party can be used to communicate with another party to reduce 
information asymmetry. 
 
2.3.1.2 Key concepts of signalling theory  
 
Figure 1: Key concepts of signalling theory 
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Figure one presents the key concepts of signalling theory where signallers are insiders who 
gain information about an individual (Spence, 1973), an organization (Ross, 1977), or a 
product (Kirmani & Rao, 2000), which is useful but unavailable to outsiders. Private 
information offers insiders a privileged viewpoint of the underlying quality of individuals, 
goods, or firms, but to distinguish it from others, signallers signal their private information to 
receivers. How effective this signal is to a receiver is the extent to which signaller’s signal 
honestly and reliably (Durcikova & Gray, 2009; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009; Connelly & Certo 
et al., 2011). The former refers to the extent to which a signaller actually has the 
unobservable attribute being signalled (Arthurs et al., 2008), while the latter refers to 
the degree to which the signal is associated with unobservable attributes (signal fit) and the 
degree to which signallers attempt to deceive (signaller honesty) (Connelly & Certo et al., 
2011). Signalling theory emphasises the actions signallers take to reduce information 
asymmetry, but they are not all useful as signals because effective signals contain the 
following qualities as a given attribute:  
First, signals should be observable, which means the extent to which outsiders can notice 
them because if the actions of insiders are not observed by outsiders, it is hard to utilise those 
actions to communicate with outsiders (Warner et al., 2006).  
The second is that the cost of marginal signals should be less than the benefits. This notion of 
cost means that some signallers are much better than others at absorbing the related costs 
(Spence, 1973), so to retain their effectiveness, the costs should be structured such that 
dishonest signals do not pay. The most effective signals are information that is hard to imitate 
(Toms, 2002) because individuals or corporations might try to deceive by sending dishonest 




The third, signalling efficacy could be improved by sending out more observable signals or 
enhancing the amount of signals which can be called the frequency of signal (Janney & Folta, 
2003). Moreover, signalling consistency is an agreement between signals from one source; 
this can also increase the signalling process, particularly if various signals are utilised to 
communicate information about the same message (Balboa & Marti, 2007).  
In signalling theory, information asymmetry can operate in both directions. Receivers
3
 want 
information about signallers and signallers want information about receivers, so signallers 
might understand what kind of signals are most relevant and how receivers interpret signals 
(Connelly, Ketchen & Slater, 2011). Receivers are important in signalling theory because the 
extent to which they scan the environment for signals (receiver attention) and how other 
receivers translate signals in a different way compared to others (receiver interpretation) 
influence the signalling process (Perkins & Hendry, 2005; Srivastava, 2001; Connelly, 
Ketchen & Slater, 2011). 
 
2.3.1.3 Applications of signalling theory in the literature 
Signalling theory has been used for several decades in research. In marketing literature, 
Kirmani & Rao (2000) provide a basic signalling model which assumes that a firm may 
signal the unobservable quality of its products through several mixed marketing variables. In 
that model the authors utilised low quality and high quality firms, and stated that if signals 
are an appropriate mechanism to convey unobservable qualities, then firms will probably use 
the least expensive signal. Signalling costs should be just high enough to dissuade a low 
quality firm from signalling, but low enough to make signalling attractive for a high quality 
firm. Scholars have investigated how management decision can be used to signal firm’s 
                                                          
3
 Receivers in signalling theory are outsiders who lack information about the organisations but would like to perceive this 




quality to others. Connelly, Ketchen & Slater (2011) for example, found that  a large 
investment in a production plant can signal a firm’s quality because it is highly visible and 
costly to imitate.  
Literature relating to accounting and finance has also provided several examples to 
demonstrate signalling theory. Ross (1977) for instance, posited that debt levels signal a 
firm’s credit risk to lenders, and argued that only high quality firms can make long term 
interest payments, while low quality firms find these payments difficult to sustain. As a 
consequence, debt levels would influence a lenders’ perception of firm quality. Bhattacharya 
(1979) showed that dividends signalled firm profitability to investors, and then stated that 
only high quality firms can make sustainable dividend payments, and therefore firm 
dividends would influence investors’ perceptions of firm quality. In the line with 
Bhattacharya’s (1979) study, Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad (2011) found that dividends are a 
signal and market reactions to increased dividend announcements are mainly positive, which 
suggests that these announcements are a signalling event to communicate future profitability. 
Other researchers found that managers may signal firm quality through their ownership to 
outsiders because management ownership is costly (e.g., Dainelli et al., 2013; Sanders & 
Boivie, 2004; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). Signalling theory in accounting and finance 
literature then moves towards management voluntarily reporting strategy. Empirical studies 
find that a high quality firm will not hide their quality in the market and they are willing to 
provide additional financial information to help investment decision making because 
managers expect a high level of future growth (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007; Mitchell, 2006; 
Cotter et al., 2011). Penman (1980) found that firms with good news often forecast voluntary 
earnings. Lim et al. (2007) investigated the management voluntarily reporting choice in 
Australia context and discovered a positive relationship between firm profitability and 




additional supplemental earnings guidance in their financial statements to investors for equity 
valuation decision making.  
There are many studies in recent literature pertaining to signalling theory which shows that 
when information available to the public does not inform the market, managers are more 
likely to disclose high quality relevant information. Tasker (1998) for instance, found that 
firms with less informative financial information tend to make quarterly conference calls, 
while Chen et al. (2002) found evidence that firms with less informative earnings tend to 
report on voluntary balance more than firms with higher informative earnings, and Lougee & 
Marquardt (2004) found that managers are more likely to report pro forma earnings when 
they believe that GAAP earnings are less informative than pro forma earnings.   
 
2.3.2 Development of efficient reporting hypothesis  
According to current literature, managerial motivations to signal additional financial 
information are as follows: (1) management talent signalling (Shehata, 2014); studies have 
found that talented managers voluntarily forecast earnings in order to display their talent, 
because investors observe their ability to forecast transformations in the corporate financial 
environment and provide feedback in the future; this is one of the determining elements for a 
corporations’ market value  (e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Trueman, 
1986); (2) limitation of mandatory reporting (Shehata, 2014). In most cases legislation and 
regulations only offers investors the minimum amount of information during the decision 
making process (Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004), so the need for voluntary reporting of 
information fills the gaps made by mandatory reporting (Graham et al., 2005; Shehata, 2014); 
(3) information asymmetry (Arvidsson, 2011). Since information asymmetry between those 




principal and agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, to decrease information 
asymmetry and also reduce their agency problems, a firm can voluntarily choose to disclose 
information that exceeds the mandatory regulations of reporting (Wyatt, 2002; Tasker, 1998).
  
Managers assert that IFRS-based earnings fail to reflect ongoing business activities and do 
not accurately measure recurring economic performance, in which increases information 
asymmetry between firms and investors. In response, firms attempt to report underlying 
earnings to help investors better evaluate their underlying values. It is argued that the 
increasing dissatisfaction with IFRS-based statutory earnings in Australian listed firms means 
that information asymmetry between management and investors has increased. This result 
provides appropriate incentives for firms to signal underlying earnings as an alternative to 
announce recurring economic performance to investors. Indeed, voluntarily reporting to 
outsiders could reduce information asymmetry but also increase the efficient allocation of 
resources on the stock market, while forcing external stakeholders to improve their evaluation 
of a firm’s future performance, and thus lower the average cost of debt capital (Sengupta, 
1998) and equity capital (Kristandl & Bontis, 2007; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002), decrease bid-
ask spreads (Petersen & Plenborg, 2003), and increase stock liquidity (Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991; Healy et al., 1999). Consequently, voluntarily reporting underlying 
earnings (an observable attribute) are perceived as a signal in annual reports to help investors 
uncover the underlying performance (an unobservable attribute).  
The relationships described above are summarised in figure 2. In stage one, since IFRS-based 
earnings are perceived as performance measures that fail to reflect the recurring economic 
performance of managers, managers obtain information on what constitutes firms’ recurring 




recurring economic performance is signalled to investors through annual reports in the form 
of underlying earnings. This paper uses annual reports as a communication tool because they 
can be made on regular basis, and they give a compact and comprehensive historical account 
of firm concerns and managerial thoughts (Niemark 1995, pp. 100-101). Empirical evidence 
suggests that annual reports offer a special opportunity for firms to communicate beyond 
financial reports (Cameron & Guthrie 1993;  Abeysekera, 2008) to show leadership and 
vision and also reflect firm values and position (Clackworthy 2000;  Abeysekera, 2008). 
Noise can be introduced by the signalling environment when processing signals, by external 
referents (e.g., regulators, previous employees outside the firm, or members of a relevant 
comparison group), or other signallers (Branzei et al. 2004; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). 
Stage three assumes that investors receive information about underlying earnings and give 
feedback on such an alternative performance measure in the form of changes in the stock 
prices.  
Figure 2: Flow chart of theoretical framework for efficient underlying earnings 
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Based on these discussions, underlying earnings is viewed as a signal that indicates the 
recurring economic performance of firms when statutory earnings fail to do so. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is made: 
 
H1: When statutory earnings fail to reflect their recurring economic performance, firms are 
more likely to disclose underlying earnings.  
 
2.3.3 Prospect theory  
2.3.3.1 Definition of prospect theory 
Prospect theory was first put forward by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) and extended by 
Tversky & Kahneman (1992). According to Kahneman & Tversky (1979), decision makers 
derive value from losses and gains by referring to a ‘reference point’, while individuals who 
are loss averse will frame decisions on perceived gains rather than perceived losses. Loss 
aversion that results in the value function around the reference point, is convex in losses and 
concave in gains (the S-shaped  value function), and steeper for losses than for gains in 
general (diminishing sensitivity).  
 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) further stated that people tend to overweigh outcomes 
considered as certain and underweight outcomes that are merely probable. People tend to be 
risk averse for gains (Certainty effects) and be risk seeking for losses (Reflection effect). As 
an example, consider the following problems: 
Problem 1 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.265) 




Plan B: win $3,000 with certainty 
The result showed that most people (80% of 95 respondents) chose Plan B. 
Problem 2 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.268) 
Plan A: 0.8 chance to loss $4000  
Plan B: loss $3000 with certainty 
The result showed that most people (92% of 95 respondents) chose Plan A. 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) concluded that risk aversion in the positive domain is 
accompanied by risk seeking in the negative domain, which results in the value function 
being S-shaped where it is normally concave for gains and mostly convex for losses, and is 
generally steeper for losses than for gains (diminishing sensitivity).  
 
2.3.3.2 Key concepts of prospect theory 
This combination of loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity, probability weighting and 
reference dependence are the main components of prospect theory (Hastie & Dawes, 2001; 
Barberis, 2013; Yao & Li, 2013). 
(1) Reference dependence 
Prospect theory argues that an individual frames a decision problem, not according to final 
wealth levels, but according to their perception of losses and gains relative to a reference 
point (Yao & Li, 2013; Li & Yang, 2013). Therefore, for a certain growth in wealth, the 
corresponding growth in value is greatest when it transforms from a loss to gain relative to a 
reference point. Different decision makers tend to have different reference points. In 




earnings are the natural reference points for decision makers who estimate wealth as a 
multiple of earnings (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Zhang et al., 2008). 
(2) Loss aversion 
The important insight into prospect theory is that individuals tend to be loss averse. An 
individual loses overweight with respect to comparable gains (Yao & Li, 2013; Li &Yang, 
2013; Zhang et al., 2008; Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997). Loss aversion leads people to value 
what they have more than things they do not have. The pleasure of getting something new is 
less than the pain of losing existing possessions of comparable value, and the process of 
getting an object greatly increases its value; for example, people are likely to become more 
upset when they purchase a stock which decreases in value than when they fail to purchase a 
stock whose value increases (Levy, 1996). 
 (3) Diminishing sensitivity 
The value function is convex in the region of losses and concave in the region of gains. The 
marginal value of both losses and gains is a decreasing function of their magnitude (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992). For example, while replacing a $100 gain (or loss) by a $200 gain (or 
loss) is an important utility influence, while replacing a $1000 gain (or loss) with a $1100 
gain (or loss) has less influence (Barberis, 2013). Concavity over gains finds that people are 
more likely to be risk averse over moderate gains than probability gains, while convexity 
over losses finds that people are likely to be risk seeking over  moderate probability losses. 
Diminishing sensitivity means that the influence of a given change in probability decreases 
with its distance from the boundary. For instance, the growth of  0.1 in the probability of 
winning a given prize is more influential than when the probability of winning changes from 




from 0.6 to 0.7. Thus, diminishing sensitivity results in a weighting function that is convex 
near 1 and concave near 0 (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p.303). 
 
(4) Probability weighting  
In prospect theory, people weigh results by transformed probabilities or decision weights  
instead of their objective probabilities (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Decision weights are 
computed with help from a weighting function whose argument is an objective probability. 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) and Tversky & Kahneman (1992) concluded that unlike the S-
shaped value function, the weighting function is an inverted S-shape, because when 
individual is presented with very low probabilities, the very low probabilities are generally 
over-weighted by people, while the high probabilities are generally under-weighted.  
 
2.3.3.3 Applications of prospect theory in literature  
Insurance is a promising place to apply prospect theory (Barberis, 2013). For example, 
Sydnor (2010) studied the insurance decisions of 50,000 clients and found that the annual 
claim rate is around 5% and customers tended to pay $100 annually to insure against a 5% 
chance of paying an extra $500 in the event of a claim, thus confirming the probability 
weighting assumption that low probability is overweighted by individuals. Barseghyan et al. 
(2012) developed a structural model of risky choice that allows for standard risk aversion and 
nonstandard probability distortions using data on households’ deductible choices in auto and 
home insurance. They found that large probability distortions (that is only mild insensitivity 
to probability changes but substantial overweighting of small probabilities) played an 
economically and statistically significant role in explaining households’ deductible choices, 
thus suggesting that probability weighting is important to customer’ decisions on choosing an 




comprehending the reason why annuities are unpopular; within their framework, people 
consider an annuity as a risky gamble with an unknown payoff at retirement, so it is the 
current value of the payouts to be gained from annuity before death, minus the amount 
initially paid for the annuity. This confirms the assumption of loss aversion suggested by 
prospect theory because they found that an annuity is not appealing because people tend to be 
more sensitive to the potential loss on the annuity (if a person dies soon) rather than the 
potential gain (if a person lives for a long time). 
 
Finance is another field where prospect theory has been actively adopted. Finance studies 
have applied prospect theory to examine situations where a number of fiscal assets generate 
higher returns on average than others. For example, Barberis & Huang (2008) examined asset 
pricing in a one-period economy populated by investors and found that investors overestimate 
the impossible state of the world where they make lots of money by investing in overpriced 
stock. Thus, they want to pay a high price for stock, even when it is earning a low return on 
average. Kyle et al. (2006) applied prospective theory to the liquidation decisions of an agent 
who owns a project (e.g., a housing position or an indivisible financial asset) and found that 
agents are willing to delay liquidation of relatively inferior projects if they are making losses, 
but they tend to accelerate liquidation of relatively superior projects due to loss aversion. 
 
In extant literature, only one article applied prospect theory to explain pro forma earnings 
reporting. Andersson & Hellman (2007) carried out an experimental study from a users’ 
perspective to investigate how pro forma reporting influences analysts’ decisions. The study 
has two groups: one that includes accounting data based on pro forma and GAAP 
calculations where pro forma earnings are greater than GAAP earnings, and a second group 




earnings per share forecasts when they were presented with two different earnings (GAAP 
earnings and pro forma earnings) than when they only received GAAP earnings. The authors 
therefore concluded that analysts’ judgments are loss averse because they frame decisions on 
perceived gains rather than perceived losses, as proposed by prospect theory. 
 
2.3.4 Agency theory  
2.3.4.1 Definition of agency theory 
Agency theory is concerned with the principal-agent problem in the separation of ownership 
and control of a firm, so assumed that individuals are bounded by rationality and self-interest 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The separation between suppliers of capital to a firm (e.g., 
investors and creditors are the principal) and managers (they are agent) controlling a firm 
leads to information asymmetry where managers (the agent) have more information than 
capital providers (the principal) and initiate conflict between capital providers and managers 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Capital providers have an incentive to align the self-interest of 
managers with theirs own by incurring additional agency costs. Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
defined agency costs as the sum of the monitoring and bonding costs undertaken to reduce 
costs due to conflicts of interest plus the ‘residual loss’. Bonding costs are costs incurred to 
align self-interests, and monitoring costs are to ensure that self-interests are aligned. A 
‘residual loss’ occurs because it is generally impossible to perfectly align the agent’s interests 
with that of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). A ‘residual loss’ remains even though 
all parties have been completely informed (Morris, 1987). 
 
2.3.4.2 Key concepts of agency theory 
The theory focuses on determining the most efficient contracts governing the principal-agent 




(information asymmetry and information is a commodity which can be bought), the people 
(people are bounded by rationality, self-interest and risk aversion), and the organisations 
(goal conflict amongst members) (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Information  
The separation of ownership and control of a firm leads to the information asymmetry 
between the managers and suppliers of capital. According to agency theory, information has a 
price and therefore can be purchased as a commodity. Firms can invest in information 
systems to control agent opportunism, but this gives an important role to formal information 
systems such as the board of directors and budgeting, and informal information systems such 
as managerial supervision. The board of directors is an information system for monitoring 
managers’ behaviour, so they can be used as monitoring devices for shareholder interests 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). When a board of directors provides richer information, managers are 
more likely to be consistent with stockholders’ interests, while their opportunistic behaviour 
that tends to benefit them more than stockholders are less likely when boards are better 
monitors of stockholders’ interests (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Bounded rationality, self-interest and risk aversion  
Agency theory assumes that both parties (the agent and the principal) are rational and will act 
on their own self-interest, and this will not necessarily coincide. Capital providers will be 
interested in maximising their wealth (e.g., maximise the share price) while manager will 
want to maximise their rewards for managing the firm (e.g., management compensation) 
(Gaffikin, 2008, p.59). The other important assumption of agency theory is that the principal 
and the agent may prefer different actions because of different risk preferences. Generally, 
agents are risk averse because they cannot diversify their employment, while principals are 




Conflicting Goals  
The heart of agency theory is the conflicting goals that are inherent when agents and 
principals with differing preferences cooperate, and where the essential metaphor is the 
contract (Eisenhardt, 1989). The conflicting goals and different attitudes towards risk 
between principals and agents leads to two aspects of the agency problem: moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Moral hazard refers to a lack of effort by managers (the agent), with the 
argument being that managers are shirking and may not be putting forth the effort they agreed 
upon (Eisenhardt, 1989). For example, managers may take over-delegation of duties and 
responsibilities (Gaffikin, 2008, p.59). Adverse selection refers to managers misrepresenting 
their ability by claiming to have certain skills or abilities. This happens because the capital 
providers (the principal) cannot completely verify these skills or abilities either at the time of 
hiring or while the agent is working (Eisenhardt, 1989). For instance, managers may be less 
willing to engage in high-risk, high-return investments because they may lose their job if the 
investments ‘fail’ (Gaffikin, 2008, p.60). 
 
2.3.4.3 Applications of prospect theory and agency theory in literature  
There are two particularly influential articles produced in the late twentieth century; Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) explored the ownership structure of a firm who argued that managerial 
ownership can limit managers’ opportunistic behavior because managers will incur greater 
costs for misconduct. Fama & Jensen (1983) described the role of the board of directors as 
control function of an information system that the owners could use to monitor manager’s 
opportunism. Later literature on agency theory examined the trade-off between the behavior 
and outcomes in transferring risk to the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989), and showed how contracts 
based on behaviour or outcomes are better at controlling agency problems (Argawal & 




Prospect theory amends agency theory by offering insights into the fear of loss related to 
current wealth, which has an enormous impact on the risk preferences of decision makers (Li 
& Yang, 2013). The shift of risk preferences against a reference point for framing decisions 
as a loss or gain amends the main emphasis on risk aversion articulated by agency theory 
(Zhang et al., 2008).  
 
In accounting literature, prospect theory has been aligned with agency theory to argue that 
individuals are self-wealth maximising and loss averse, and therefore managers have 
incentives to utilise earnings management techniques
4
 to avoid  missing the earnings 
benchmarks (zero earnings, previous earnings, or analysts’ forecast earnings) to influence 
how investors frame their decisions on firm performance. For example, Burgstahler & Dichev 
(1997) found evidence that managers attempt to manage earnings upwards when unmanaged 
earnings fall short of earnings thresholds. In their study, there are 30% to 44% of firms with 
slightly negative pre-managed earnings that exercise discretion when reporting positive 
earnings. By focusing on earnings management to prevent losses, the study found that 
operating cash flows and changes in working capital were utilised to manage earnings. The 
study concluded that managers tend to apply earnings-increasing management around the 
wealth reference points (in the vicinity of zero changes of earnings and zero levels of 
earnings) to affect firm value as perceived by investors and other stakeholders. Burgstahler & 
Eames (2006) found that managers manage earnings upwards to increase reported earnings in 
order to achieve small positive earnings surprises. Bartov et al. (2002) studied the 
‘expectation game’ where firms and investors emphasize the extent to which reported 
earnings are the same as or different to analysts’ forecasts. Their findings showed that a 
quarter’s abnormal returns are significantly and positively related to the earnings surprise, 
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 The definition and motivation of earnings management are discussed in section 3.2.1 and section 3.2.2 in 




suggesting that firms become better at meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts and this success 
is achieved in part by earnings management. Dhaliwal et al. (2004) examined whether 
management manipulates accounting numbers (tax expense) as an earnings management tool 
to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. They found that firms lower their projected tax rates to 
decrease their tax expense if their non-tax income will not reach the earnings threshold. The 
study concluded that when non-tax earnings are less likely to achieve analysts’ forecasts, 
managers would manipulate tax expenses to get a last chance to meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts. Shen & Chih (2005) examined the incentive of banks to manage earnings across 48 
countries from 1993 to 1999. The sample was divided into a high earnings group (banks with 
earnings or changes in earnings higher than zero), and a low earnings group (banks with 
earnings or changes in earnings lower than zero). The authors regressed risk on returns for 
each group and found the coefficient of risk and returns for the high earnings group was 
positive and negative for the low earnings group. This result suggests that a manager is 
motivated to report earnings that exceeded the threshold or reference point, where for 
instance zero earnings levels or there are zero changes in earnings to gain a reward. Holland 
& Ramsay (2003) examined the distribution of earnings at two benchmarks (zero earnings 
and either a sustaining or increase last year’s earnings)  in the Australian context, and found 
that firms with small profits and small earnings frequently increased while those firms with 
small losses and small earnings frequently decreased. These results draw inferences regarding 
the manipulation of earnings around zero earnings and zero changes in earnings. Sun & Rath 
(2012) investigated the motivations of managers to manipulate the reported earnings utilising 
a sample of Australian firms from 2000 to 2006, and found that managers manipulate 
earnings by attempting to reach two earnings benchmarks: a positive change in earnings and 




previous years or zero, firms tended to engage in positive discretionary accruals to increase 
earnings so that to beat  both of these earnings benchmarks.  
 
2.3.5 Development of opportunistic reporting hypothesis  
According to prospect theory and agency theory, the opportunistic underlying earnings 
reporting hypothesis in this paper assumes that when firms make IFRS earnings losses or 
miss IFRS earnings target
5
, stock prices will drop dramatically because investors are loss 
averse and the impact of these losses on investor’s value is greater than the gains (S-shaped 
value function). Managers have an incentive to manipulate earnings using earnings 
management techniques to avoid the stock price decreasing when firms make IFRS earnings 
losses or miss IFRS earnings targets because their compensation is tied to budgets and 
targets; this means they are paid for what they do relative to some targets (Jensen, 2005). 
Since applying within-IFRS earnings management (e.g., accruals earnings management) is 
costly for listed public firms, because they are regulated rigorously, managers must find other 
earnings management techniques that are hard to be detected to manage investors’ 
perceptions. Since no entries are involved (no debits or credits) when calculating and 
reporting underlying earnings that will not be audited, opportunistic underlying earnings 
reporting is perceived to be a less detectable earnings management technique and good 
communication channels for managers (Doyle et al., 2003;  Doyle et al., 2013; Andersson & 
Hellman, 2007). By providing investors with two earnings measurements (underlying 
earnings and IFRS earnings) where one is higher than the other (underlying earnings higher 
than IFRS earnings), when firms make current statutory losses or miss statutory earnings 
targets, investors are affected more by managers’ opportunistic underlying earnings reporting 
behaviour. This is because prospect theory suggests that decision makers depend on 
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references and will frame decisions on perceived gains rather than losses, the price of firms 
will increase.  
 
These discussions are summarised in figure 3. Since investors reduce stock prices when firms 
make losses or fail to meet earnings target (loss-averse), it provides reasonable incentives for 
managers using reporting strategy to opportunistically exclude income-increasing exclusions 
in order to define underlying earnings more favourably than the reported IFRS earnings. By 
providing two earnings numbers (IFRS earnings and more favourable underlying earnings) to 
investors, their judgment of firm values are more likely affected by management’s 
opportunistic underlying earnings reporting and they may react positively to stock prices 
(reference dependence).  
 
Figure 3: Flow chart of theoretical framework for opportunistic underlying earnings 













0 or previous statutory 
earnings 
Current statutory Earnings  
Convert current statutory losses into positive underlying earnings to 
convert negative stock prices to positive stock prices 
When firms report 
current statutory losses 
or do not meet 
earnings target, firms 
define underlying 
earnings  higher than 
statutory earnings to 
decrease negative 




Although this paper assumes that managers opportunistically use income-increasing 
underlying earnings exclusions to influence investors’ perception of firm performance, the 
first step is to confirm whether this assumption is true or not. Given the debates on non-
statutory earnings reporting behaviour, it is reasonable to ask whether the exclusions are 
unimportant, non-recurring, and value-irrelevant to investors. If the income-increasing 
exclusions contain recurring expenses that can be used to determine future earnings and these 
income-increasing exclusions will be realised in future earnings, then it can be concluded that 
managers opportunistically define underlying earnings as being higher than statutory earnings 
to make to influence investors’ judgments of firm value. The second hypothesis in this thesis 
states that underlying earnings are opportunistically manipulated by managers; it is stated as 
follows:  
H2: The recurring expenses included in income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions are 
realised in future earnings. 
Based on prospect theory and agency theory, when firms do not meet the IFRS earnings 
target or make IFRS losses, managers have an incentive to use income-increasing underlying 
earnings exclusions to make firm performance more favourable. This thesis therefore states 
the following hypotheses:  
H3a: When firms do not meet the IFRS earnings target, they are more likely to use income-
increasing underlying earnings exclusions to make underlying earnings higher than IFRS 
earnings.   
H3b: When firms make IFRS losses, firms are more likely to use income-increasing 





2.3.6 Market reactions to underlying earnings reporting 
 
Market reactions to either underlying earnings or statutory earnings depend on how it is 
processed by market participants. If reported efficiently, the evidence suggests that manager’s 
report non-statutory earnings to reflect the ‘core earnings’ of a firm and the market reacts 
positively on non-statutory earnings reporting (e.g., Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya 
et al., 2003; Brown & Sivakumar, 2003). However, the evidence for opportunistic reporting is 
mixed because on one hand it shows that investors can ‘see through’ opportunistic reporting 
made by managers and thus react negatively to non-statutory earnings (e.g., Black et al., 
2014; Curtis et al., 2014; Lougee & Marquardt, 2004), while on the other, evidence exists that 
investors can be misled by managers’ opportunistic reporting and misprice firm value (e.g., 
Doyle et al., 2003; Landsman et al., 2007). Since the influence of underlying earnings on 
stock prices is unspecified, this paper states the market reactions hypothesis in null form:  
H4: Underlying earnings are not related to the stock prices. 
 
2.4 Research design 
2.4.1 Data and sample selection 
This study used ASX 200 firms from years 2009 to 2012 as the sampling frame. Information 
related to financial data was obtained from the DatAnalysis database supplemented by the 
Finanalysis database
6
. The underlying earnings data were hand-collected from the annual 
reports of ASX 200 firms. Following Dahmash et al. (2009) and Graham & King (2000), 
firms involved in banking, insurance, diversified financials, and real estate were excluded 
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 FinAnalysis was expired in March of 2013 but still available until November of 2013 in the University of Wollongong 




because they are subjected to different reporting requirements. ASX 200 firms were selected 
as the sample frame because the ASX 200 is recognised as the primary investment 
benchmark in Australia. ASX 200 firms cover approximately 78% of Australian equity 
market capitalisation (ASX announcement, 2011). This paper attempted to examine the post-
IFRS period so the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 were avoided because the three years 
following the adoption of IFRS meant a lot of changes to financial reporting processes and 
systems in firms adopting IFRS standards for the first time in Australia. In order to collect the 
underlying earnings data, annual reports that are available in the Annual Reports Online 
database and DatAnalysis database were searched by typing the keywords ‘underlying’, 
‘adjusted’, ‘normalised’, ‘earnings before’, ‘profit before’, and ‘pro forma’. Following Black 
& Christensen (2009), EBIT or EBITDA were not included because they are commonly 
reported as standard steps in the income statement. The detailed sample selection process is 
shown in table 1. There were 107 out of 153 firms that reported underlying earnings at least 
once during the study periods (2009-2012). In total, 321 firm-year observations in the sample 
disclosed underlying earnings over four observation years. Table 2 shows the sample industry 
distribution based on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sector. ‘Materials’ 
is the largest sample industry comprising 28% of total sample industries, followed by the 










Table 1: Sample selection 
Sample selection 
 Number of firms Firm-year observations 
Top ASX200 firms 200 800 
Exclusions:   
Banks 6 24 
Insurance 4 16 
Diversified financials 9 36 
Real estate 19 76 
No annual reports variable 9 367 
Final group investigated 153 612 
Underlying earnings disclosures 107 321 
 
Table 2: Industry distribution 
Industry distribution 





Consumer discretionary  31 124 20% 
Energy  18 72 12% 
Health care  11 44 7% 
Industrials  33 132 22% 
Materials  44 176 28% 
Software&Services  3 12 2% 
Telecommunication Services  6 24 4% 
Utilities  7 28 5% 
Total 153 612 100% 
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2.4.2 Testing efficient reporting (H1) 
Only one paper has examined the recurrence of statutory earnings on the probability of pro 
forma earnings reporting. These recurring statutory earnings are measured by the earnings 
persistence of earnings quality attributes. The authors found no economically significant 
relationship between GAAP earnings persistence and the probability of firms reporting pro 
forma earnings. The results doubt managers’ assertions that they report pro forma earnings 
because GAAP earnings show less persistence (Johnson & Schwartz, 2005). This paper 
expanded Johnson & Schwartz (2005)’s study to measure recurring statutory earnings using 
two earnings quality attributes: earnings persistence and earnings predictability, to test H1.  
 
2.4.2.1 Earnings persistence 
As the earnings quality construct, persistence is derived from a value relevance perspective 
(Beneish & Vargus, 2002; Mohammady, 2010; Penman & Zhang, 2002). Persistence 
earnings are studied under the context of ‘sustainable’ or ‘core earnings’  and will have better 
inputs into models of equity valuation (e.g., Dechow, 2004; Dechow et al., 2010; Kormendi 
& Lipe, 1987; Schipper & Vincent, 2003). A high persistence earnings number is one of 
high-quality earnings that accurately shows the operating performance of a firm, and as such 
is a good indicator of future operating performance (Dechow, 2004; Merton & Rock, 1985; 
Schipper & Vincent, 2003). 
 
This study approximates earnings persistence using Kormendi & Lipe’ (1987) model, where 
a future period is considered to be the current reporting period, and the current period is 






Ej,t =  α0 + α1Ej,t-1 + vj,t  (1) 
Where: Ej,t, measured as firm j’s earnings before tax in year t divided by total assets for 
year t-1; 
Ej,t-1, measured as firm j’s earnings before tax in year t-1 divided by total assets for year t-1; 
vj,t —residual; 
j—firm observations; 
t—years from 2005 to 2012. 
Earnings persistence is measured by the slope coefficient from Equation (1) using a 5-year 
rolling window ending in year 2012 for firm j, year t
8
. High values imply more persistent 
(high quality) earnings, while low values indicate more transitory (low quality) earnings 
(Kormendi & Lipe, 1987).  
 
 
2.4.2.2 Earnings predictability 
Persistence is perceived as the degree to which earnings performance persists into the next 
period (Dechow, 1994). However, a dilemma for researchers is that persisting into the next 
period’s earnings is not equivalent to predicting the stream of future cash flows  (Dechow et 
al., 2010). If the variance (e.g., the absolute magnitude) of a typical shock to the series is 
large, highly persistent earnings will have low predictive ability, and therefore earnings with 
high quality on the persistence construct may have low quality on the predictive ability 
construct (Schipper & Vincent, 2003). 
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Researchers refer specifically to predictive ability as ‘the ability of past earnings to predict 
future earnings’ (Lipe, 1990), so predictive ability is linked to a specific task. Information 
about future earnings is needed by investors because their investment is the present value of 
future earnings that will be generated by the firm in which they invest. Furthermore, the 
power of a firm to create earnings can be shown in the market value of its equity, so the 
prediction of future earnings helps to predict stock returns (Schipper & Vincent, 2003). 
Collectively, the predictive value is a significant part of the decision making process and 
plays a critical role in investment decisions. Hence, earnings predictability is used in this 
thesis as another earnings quality attribute to assess recurring statutory earnings. 
 
Following a previous study (e.g., Francis et al., 2004; Lipe, 1990; Schipper & Vincent, 2003), 
this study defines earnings predictability as information in the earnings number that tends to 
repeat into future periods and indicates high quality earnings. This study uses Lipe’s (1990) 
multivariate model to measure earnings predictability, which is measured as a standard 
deviation of the residuals from the earnings persistence multivariate model (i.e., Equation (1)) 
using a 5-year rolling window ending in year 2012 for firm j, year t. A high value indicates 
low earnings predictability. 
 
Predictability =√𝜎2(𝑣j, t̂)         (2) 
 
2.4.2.3 Empirical model for testing H1 
UEj,t=a0+a1Persisj,t / Predj,t + a2Controlsj,t + Year effects + Industry effects+ ej,t  (3) 
Where: j is firm observations, and t is years from 2009 to 2012.  
Dependent variable: UEj,t is dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm discloses a underlying 





Independent variables: Persisj,t is measured by the slope coefficient from Equation (1) using a 
5-year rolling window ending in year 2012 for firm j, year t. Predj,t is measured by the 
residuals of Equation (1) using a 5-year rolling window ending in year 2012 for firm j, year t. 
 
Detailed explanations of control variables are discussed in section 2.4.4. 
 
2.4.3 Testing opportunistic reporting (H2, H3a & H3b) 
2.4.3.1 Persistence of income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions (H2) 
Doyle et al. (2003) have found that adjustments made by managers to define the non-GAAP 
earnings are not completely transitory because recurring items are then realised in future cash 
flows. This result was confirmed by Frankel et al.’s (2011) study. However, both of these 
studies examined the persistence of non-GAAP exclusions using total exclusions measured 
by pro forma EPS minus GAAP EPS, and total non-GAAP exclusions include income-
decreasing and income-increasing exclusions. The assumption of opportunistic reporting in 
this paper assumes that when firms do not meet IFRS earnings target and make IFRS losses, 
they are more likely to use income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions 
opportunistically to make it more favourable than IFRS earnings in order to influence 
investors’ perceptions. Therefore, unlike Frankel et al. (2011) and Doyle et al. (2003)’s 
studies, this paper examines the persistence of income-increasing underlying earnings 
exclusions rather than total exclusions to test H2. If income-increasing exclusions (positive 
exclusions) are presented faithfully by managers, where positive exclusions are deemed to be 
value irrelevant, then positive exclusions should not relate to future operating earnings, but if 




between future operating earnings and positive exclusions should be related because the 
usefulness of these exclusions are realised in future years. This paper also extends extant non-
statutory earnings literature by investigating the persistence of eight individual adjustments 
made by managers to achieve underlying earnings for the sample of firm-year observations 
that reports underlying earnings higher than IFRS earnings.  
 
Empirical model for testing H2: 
 
OEj,t+1to2 =a0 + a1InExj,t/ IndADJj,t + a2 Controlsj,t + Year effects + Industry effects+vj,t(4)  
 
Where: j is firm observations, and t is years from 2009 to 2012.  
 
Dependent variable: the one-year ahead operating earnings
9
 and sum of two-years ahead 
operating earnings, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t.  
 
Independent variable: InExj,t is designed to detect the decision by management to use 
income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions, but if the underlying earnings exceed the 
statutory earnings then InExj,t is equal to one, or zero otherwise; IndADJj,t represents eight 
dummy variables that equal to one if managers excluded any of the following eight individual 
adjustments, or zero otherwise
10
. The eight individual adjustments are (1) impairment or 
revaluation of assets (IRj,t), (2) tax or interest effects (TIj,t), (3) losses on asset dispositions or 
investments (GLAj,t), (4) redundancies and restructuring costs (RCj,t), (5) merge or demerge 
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 Doyle et al. (2003) used future cash flows as dependent variables. However, this dependent variable is less accurately in 
evaluating the persistence of adjustment as current liabilities have implications on future cash flow (Kolev et al., 2008). 
Future statutory before tax also as dependent variables also is less desirable as statutory before tax often includes expenses 
that are excluded from non-statutory profit resulting in the systematic relation that does not reflect opportunism (Frankel et 
al., 2011).    
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and acquisition transaction costs (MACj,t), (6) foreign exchange loss (FGLj,t), (7) equity 
accounting (Equityj,t), (8) all other unspecified adjustments (Otherj,t). 
 
Control variables are discussed in detail in section 2.4.4. 
 
2.4.3.2 Earnings target, earnings losses, and underlying earnings reporting (H3a&H3b) 
Following Lougee & Marquardt (2004), this paper uses previous year earnings before tax at 
the end of the financial year as a proxy for earnings target. Firm that generated earnings 
before tax at the end of the current financial year that equal or exceed the earnings before tax 
of the previous year represents managers that have met their earnings target; they are coded 
as one, or zero otherwise. This paper defines Lossj,t as a dummy variable that equals 1 if j 
firm made statutory losses in year t, and zero otherwise.  
 
The empirical model to test H3a and H3b is designed as follows:  
 
InExj,t=a0+a1Meetj,t/ Lossj,t +a2Controlsj,t + Year effects + Industry effects +ej,t  (5) 
 
Where: j is firm observations. t is years from 2009 to 2012.  
Dependent variable: InExj,t is designed to detect the decision by management to use income-
increasing exclusions. If underlying earnings exceeds statutory earnings, then InExj,t equals to 





Independent variables: Meetj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s earnings before tax 
in year t is greater than or equal to earnings before tax in year t-1, and zero otherwise. Lossj,t 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm made statutory losses in year t, and zero otherwise. 
 
2.4.4 Control variables for efficient and opportunistic reporting  
Following the literature, this paper includes several additional measures that would influence 
the likelihood of variables affecting reporting behaviour. These control variables include the 
leverage ratio, market to book ratio, sales growth, earnings variability, and return on equity, 
net operating assets, capital intensity, and firm size.  
 
Leverage ratio: studies found that when firms close to the debt-to-equity ratio, investors 
consider earnings to be low earnings quality because of an increased likelihood of firm 
failure and an enhanced probability of earnings management, and therefore firms are more 
likely to make voluntary disclosure (e.g., Lougee & Marquardt, 2004). Other literature 
suggests that higher leverage shows a firm is closer to a restriction of debt covenant where 
managers are highly motivated to manipulate earnings upwards to prevent them from 
violating a covenant (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). This 
paper includes the leverage ratio (Leveragej,t) as a control variable measured by short-term 
and long-term debt divided by total assets for firm j, in year t. 
 
Growth rate: Frenkel et al. (2011) stated that growth can act as a correlated or omitted 
variable if it is associated with the persistence of non-GAAP exclusions, so this paper 
includes growth as a control variable. The value of firms with a high growth rate is more 
difficult to evaluate based on historical earnings alone because their value tends to be a 




that in rapidly changing economic industries, the value and relevance of 
financial information to users is much lower than it is in steady industries, so they argued that 
firms with rapid growth are more likely to make voluntary disclosures. However, other 
studies found that firms with high growth rates are less likely to increase earnings for 
opportunistic purposes (e.g., Farrell et al., 2013). Similar to Tasker (1998) and Lougee & 
Marquardt (2004), growth rates are measured using sales growth rate (SalesGj,t) and market-
to-book ratio (MtoBj,t). Here, SalesGj,t is measured by sales for firm j, year t minus the sales 
for firm j, in year t-1, then divided by the sales for firm j, in year t, and MtoBj,t is measured 
by the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity for firm j, in year t.  
 
Statutory earnings variability: when earnings patterns exhibit a high level of variability from 
one period of time to another, investors could perceive earnings with lower quality, which 
generates a demand for additional information to help them interpret earnings information 
(Lougee & Marquardt, 2004). According to literature, analysts tend to forecast cash flows 
when earnings variability is high because the magnitude of earnings volatility lowers earnings 
quality which then increases the probability of managers making voluntary disclosures (e.g., 
Hayn, 1995; Dechow & Dichev, 2002; DeFond & Hung, 2003; Francis et al., 2004; Lougee 
& Marquardt, 2004; Dichev &Tang, 2008; Frankel et al., 2011). This study includes the 
earnings variability (SDEj,t) as a control variable, where SDEj,t is measured by standard 
deviation of statutory earnings before tax scaled by beginning total assets of the firm, 
computed using a 5-year rolling window ending in 2012 for firm j, year t. 
 
Firms’ profitability: studies found that a weak performance provides an incentive for 
managers to make earnings management (e.g., Petroni, 1992; DeAngelo et al., 1994; 




studies argued that earnings management firms are likely to exhibit a high profitability 
because it affects job security and the compensation contract of managers  (e.g., Degeorge et 
al, 1999; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1995; Sun & Rath, 2012). This paper controls firms’ 
profitability using the return on equity ratio (ROEj,t) that is measured by earnings before tax 
divided by the average shareholders’ equity for firm j, in year t. 
 
Net operating assets: firms are less likely to meet or beat analysts’ expectations when the net 
operating assets are high because on a balance sheet they partially show the extent of prior 
earnings management activates and proxies for managers’ constraints in utilising within-
statutory earnings management (Doyle et al., 2013). Barton & Simko (2002) and Baber et al. 
(2011) stated that balance sheets restrict future earnings management by showing that firms 
with bloated balance sheets tend to miss earnings forecasts. Hirshleifer et al. (2004) proved 
that net operating assets are proxy for a bloated balance sheet, and are a powerful negative 
predictor for long-run stock returns. Ettredge et al. (2010) supported that net operating assets 
is an important variable in explaining the use of earnings management. This study includes 
net operating assets at the beginning of year as a control variable because previous net 
operating assets (balance sheet constrains) influence current managers’ decision to use 
earnings management (Badertscher, 2011). Net operating assets at the beginning of year 
(NOAj,t) are measured by shareholders’ equity less cash, and cash equivalent plus total debt 
divided by lagged sales for firm j, at the beginning of the year t.   
 
Capital intensity: consistent with the view that capital-intensive firms have greater volatility 
in earnings due to higher operating leverage and more capital-intensive firms have less 
persistent earnings than less capital-intensive firms (Baginski et al., 1999; Lev, 1983; Francis 




measured by the ratio of net book value of Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE) to total 
assets for firm j, in year t. 
 
Following pervious pro forma reporting literature (e.g., Lougee & Marquardt, 2004; Black & 
Christensen, 2009; Hsu & Kross, 2011; Doyle et al., 2013; Black et al., 2014; Choi & Young, 
2015), this study includes firm size (Sizej,t) in the efficient and opportunistic multivariate 
models as a control variable. Thus Sizej,t is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets 
for firm j, at the beginning of year t.  
 
Year and industry effects: this thesis uses the panel data that meets the cross-sectional firms 
observed, and at least once more over the observed years from 2009 to 2012. Thus, year 
industry fixed-effects regression models are applied to control for the unobservable variables. 
For year effects, 3 dummy variables are generated (year 2010=1, and others zero; year 
2011=1, and others zero; year 2012=1, and others zero) to control for the unobservable 
confounding variables that differ from time to time, but are constant across the industries. 
Year 2009 is dropped by Stata software because the fixed effects model includes a constant. 
For industry effects, 7 dummy variables are generated (energy=1, and others zero; materials 
=1, and others zero; industrials=1, and others zero; health care=1, and others zero; software & 
services=1, and others zero; telecommunication services=1, and others zero; utilities=1, and 
others zero) to control for the unobservable confounding variables that differ across 
industries, but are constant over time. Consumer discretionary is dropped by Stata software 





2.4.5 Testing market reactions (H4) 
Under Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 5 (FASB, 1984), accounting 
information is relevant if it can make a difference to decisions made by users of financial 
statements. Under the AASB Framework, information is regarded as relevant if it ‘influences 
the economic decisions of users by helping them evaluate past, present, or future events, or 
confirming or correcting their past evaluations’ (paragraph 26). For this information to be 
relevant it should have predictive value and feedback value, where the latter refers to whether 
the information confirms or corrects earlier expectations (Deegan, 2010 p.57). Therefore, 
whether an investor reacts to accounting information depends on its value relevance because 
it is a major indicator of the quality of financial reporting; another important indicator is 
reliability. The AASB Framework states that information is deemed to be reliable if it is ‘free 
from material bias and error and can be depended upon by users to faithfully represent the 
underlying items it claims to represent’ (paragraph 31). The value-relevant accounting 
information may be unreliable because managers can influence investors’ economic decision 
making by misrepresenting information.  
Three types of value-relevant models are found in literature: the balance sheet model, the 
earnings model, and the residual income valuation model (or Ohlson (1995)’s model) 
(Holthausen & Watts, 2001).  
The balance sheet model assumes that the market value of equity should include information 
pertaining to the market value of separable assets, the market value of separable liabilities, 
and the market value of the balance sheet component (Holthausen & Watts, 2001). The 
problem with this model is that it contains correlated and omitted variables because it 
requires the inclusion of all market values of liability and asset, but some of them cannot be 




included values are associated with the omitted values, the estimated coefficients of these 
included values can be biased from their predicted values (Holthausen & Watts, 2001, p.56).  
The earnings model defines accounting earnings as value relevance to the market because it 
should explain the information that is impounded in stock returns. Therefore, value relevance 
is the ability of one or more accounting earnings to explain variations in stock returns 
(Francis et al., 2006). In the earnings model studies, stock returns are often regressed on 
alternative measures of earnings such that the coefficients of earnings and returns, and R
 
squares are perceived to be indicators of value relevance. The highest coefficients and R
 
squares are considered to be the most value-relevant or best measure of performance. The 
earnings model is widely used in value relevance literature (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 1999, Barth 
& Clinch, 1996; Francis et al., 2006) even though it has a timing problem, because earnings 
includes cash flows in periods other than those in which they occur. This timing problem 
results in the prediction for coefficient of earnings and returns is incorrect for the firms with 
long investment cycles and cash flow cycles (Dechow, 1994; Holthausen & Watts, 2001).  
A model that is frequently used in value relevance literature is the residual income valuation 
model developed by Ohlson (1995) and refined by Feltham & Ohlson (1995; 1996). This 
model permits imperfect product markets for a finite number of periods and it links market 
values of equity of a firm to its abnormal earnings, net book values and other information 
(Barth et al., 2001). Abnormal earnings in this model includes current earnings and potential 
future earnings (Reuters, 2008), which potentially reduce the timing problem in the earnings 
model (Holthausen & Watts, 2001). 
This paper uses Ohlson’s (1995) model to examine market reactions and also follows Ahmed 
& Falk (2006) who stated that Australian firms normally take three months to release 




ends because it takes that long for annual reports to be released and inform shareholders 
about the accounting information reported in annual reports.  
The value-relevant of earnings is measured by the following regression model:   
Value-relevant model: 
Stockj,t = EARPSj,t + AUEPSj,t + BVEPSj,t +MktCapj,t +MtoBj,t +Year effects + Industry 
effests + ej,t                                                                                                                                                                                  (6) 
 
Where: j is firm observations, and t is the years from 2009 to 2012.  
Dependent variable: Stockj,t is the stock price for firm j, three months after the financial year 
t.  
Independent variables: AUEPSj,t is the actual underlying earnings divided by the number of 
shares outstanding for firm j, in year t. Two sub-samples will be tested: the sample 
observations that report the actual value of underlying earnings and the sample observations 
that reported the actual value of underlying earnings is greater than the reported statutory 
earnings. 
EARPSj,t is measured by statutory earnings that compare to underlying earnings (e.g., if firms 
reported underlying earnings before interest and tax, then statutory earnings before interest 
and tax is selected for comparison) divided by the number of outstanding shares for firm j, 
year t. 
Control variables: BVEPSj,t is the book value of equity divided by the number of shares 
outstanding for firm j, in year t; MtoBj,t is the market-to-book equity ratio, measured as the 




Dzinkowski, 2000; Lundholm & Myers, 2002); MktCapj,t is the size of the firm, measured as 
a natural logarithm of market capitalisation for firm j, at the beginning of year t (e.g., 
Lundholm & Myers, 2002; Ettredge et al., 2005; Abeysekera, 2011). Year and industry 
effects are also included as control variables in Equation (6). For year effects, 3 dummy 
variables are generated (year 2010=1, and others zero; year 2011=1, and others zero; year 
2012=1, and others zero) to control for the unobservable confounding variables that differ 
from time to time, but are constant across the industries. Year 2009 is dropped by Stata 
software because the fixed effects model includes a constant. For industry effects, 7 dummy 
variables are generated (energy=1, and others zero; materials =1, and others zero; 
industrials=1, and others zero; health care=1, and others zero; software & services=1, and 
others zero; telecommunication services=1, and others zero; utilities=1, and others zero) to 
control for the unobservable confounding variables that differ across industries, but are 
constant over time. Consumer discretionary is dropped by Stata software because the fixed 
effects model includes a constant. 
 
2.5 Analyses and results 
2.5.1 Status of current underlying earnings reporting  
Figure 4 shows the categories of adjustments made in calculating underlying earnings by 
managers. Of the 321 firm-year observations that reported underlying earnings, 216 firm-year 
observations that presented adjustments are excluded from statutory earnings to achieve 
underlying earnings. There are eight common adjustments to statutory earnings when 
calculating the underlying earnings found in this thesis: (1) impairment or revaluation of 




redundancies and restructuring costs, (5) merge or demerge and acquisition transaction costs, 
(6) foreign exchange gain or loss, (7) equity accounting, (8) all other unspecified adjustments. 
Of the eight adjustments, impairment or revaluation of assets accounts for 68% of total 
adjustments. Tax and interest-related items are ranked as second (46% of total adjustments), 
followed by redundancies and restructuring costs that accounted for 43% of total underlying 
earnings adjustments, and 33% of firm-year observations do not present any adjustments in 
the sample.  
 






This thesis finds that underlying earnings can have six impacts. First, firms report underlying 
earnings to reduce their statutory loss (decrease the loss). Second, firms report underlying 
earnings to decrease the profit of statutory earnings (decrease the profit). Third, firms report 
underlying earnings to increase the profit of statutory earnings (increase the profit). Fourth, 
firms report underlying earnings to convert statutory loss to a positive figure (convert loss to 
profit). Fifth, firms report underlying earnings the same as statutory earnings (no change). 
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shows that most firms in the sample who reported their underlying earnings posted a more 
favourable figure during the four year period. Based on this sample, 220 out of 321 firm-year 
observations reported underlying earnings higher than statutory earnings by either decreasing 
statutory loss and increasing statutory profit, or converting statutory loss and reporting it as 
underlying profit. There are 82 observations that reported underlying earnings by either 
decreasing statutory profit or increasing statutory loss.  
 
 
Figure 5: Impacts of underlying earnings on statutory earnings 
                       
 
 
Figure 6 shows the locations where underlying earnings are presented. This thesis finds seven 
locations where underlying earnings are presented, i.e., the financial highlights section, the 
managing director’s report section, the financial performance summary section, the 
chairman’s report section, notes to financial statements, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO)’s 
report, and appendix 4E. Figure 6 shows that most underlying earnings reporting (32% out of 
100%) is in the front of annual reports and is highlighted by reporting firms. This is followed 
by the managing directors’ report, which comprises 25% of the seven locations in the sample. 
The detailed current underlying earnings reporting status is presented in Appendix section 2. 










































2.5.2 Descriptive statistics of variables for paper one 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of variables for the sample. Panel A of table 3 shows 
the descriptive statistics of variables for opportunistic and efficient reporting hypotheses. To 
obtain the values of earnings persistence and earnings predictability, a 5-year window that 
continues rolling for five years with firm-specific observations must be used, although this 
requirement reduced the number of observations to 566. In order to make a comparison, this 
paper presents the descriptive statistics for two sub-samples: the firm-year observations that 
report underlying earnings as higher than statutory earnings (firms that use income-increasing 
underlying earnings exclusions) and all other firm-year observations. The mean of Predj,t for 
reporting income-increasing exclusions are much lower than the mean Predj,t for all other 


















earnings for those income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions reporters are higher than 
the predictability of statutory earnings for other observations (high values of Predj,t represent 
low earnings predictability). It rejects managers’ assertion that they disclose underlying 
earnings because of the low earnings predictability of statutory earnings. The mean of Meetj,t 
for income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions reporters is lower than the mean of 
Meetj,t for all other reporters (t=-1.869, p-value=0.062). The mean of Lossj,t for income-
increasing underlying earnings exclusions reporters is much higher than the mean of Lossj,t 
for all other reporters (t=1.977, p-value=0.049). The t-test results suggest that the income-
increasing underlying earnings exclusions reporters are those who do not meet earnings 
targets and make current statutory losses. Compare to all other reporters, the income-
increasing underlying earnings exclusions reporters are those with a lower market-to-book 
ratio (MtoBj,t) (t=-3.705, p-value=0.000), have lower rates of sales growth (SalesGj,t) (t=-
2.502, p-value=0.013), have a larger firm size (Sizej,t) (t=8.742, p-value=0.000), have higher 
leverage ratios (Leveragej,t) (t=2.000, p-value=0.046), have higher returns on equity (ROEj,t) 
(t=2.085, p-value=0.038), have higher operating net assets (NOAj,t) (t=1.464, p=0.072), have 
more intensive capital (Capitalj,t) (t=3.987, p=0.000) and have lower earnings variability 
(SDEj,t) (t=-5.552, p-value=0.000), on average.    
 
Panel B of table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of variables for market reactions. Since there are 
missing financial data in the database, the sample size was reduced to 610 firm-year observations 
for the market reactions model
11
. The mean of stock price (Stockj,t) is higher for income-
increasing underlying earnings exclusions reporters than other reporters (t=2.705, p-value=0.007) 
suggesting that market reacts favourable to underlying earnings when the underlying earnings is 
greater than the statutory earnings. Moreover, the panel B of table 3 finds that the mean of the 
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book value of equity per share (BVEPSj,t) is higher for income-increasing underlying earnings 
exclusions reporters than other reporters (t=1.674, p-value=0.094), and there is no statistically 
difference between the mean of earnings per share for income-increasing exclusions reporters and 






















Table 3: Descriptive statistics for underlying reporting and market reaction variables 
Table 3 Panel A: Descriptive statistics for opportunistic and efficient hypotheses  
 All observations (N12=566) 
Income-increasing underlying earnings  
exclusions (N=204) 
All other observations 
(N=362) 
                                  Mean test between income-increasing  
                                   underlying earnings exclusions  
                                   and all other observations   
Variable Mean Median Std. dev Mean Median Std. dev Mean Median Std. dev T-test  p-Value 
Variables of Interest: 
Persisj,t 0.487 0.483 0.600 0.477 0.484 0.595 0.492 0.483 0.604 -0.295 0.768 
Predj,t 0.142 0.058 0.319 0.080 0.042 0.110 0.176 0.069 0.386 -4.440
*** 0.000 
Meetj,t 0.634 1.000 0.482 0.583 1.000 0.494 0.663 1.000 0.473 -1.869
* 0.062 
Lossj,t 0.208 0.000 0.407 0.255 0.000 0.437 0.182 0.000 0.387 1.977
** 0.049 
Control Variables            
MtoBj,t 2.904 1.942 3.714 2.143 1.478 3.665 3.333 2.249 3.677 -3.705
*** 0.000 
ROEj,t 0.128 0.119 0.318 0.167 0.118 0.362 0.106 0.119 0.289 2.085
** 0.038 
SDEj,t 0.138 0.065 0.268 0.074 0.047 0.083 0.174 0.083 0.325 -5.552
*** 0.000 




0.779 0.724 0.662 0.840 0.734 0.843 0.744 0.714 0.533 1.464* 0.072 
0.000 7.175 7.309 1.826 7.941 8.134 1.442 6.744 6.697 1.879 8.472*** 
Capitalj,t 3.796 3.927 0.932 4.006 4.135 0.969 3.678 3.699 0.890 3.987
*** 0.000 
SalesGj,t 0.097 0.036 0.267 0.061 0.026 0.260 0.119 0.050 0.269 -2.502
** 0.013 
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                              Table 3: Descriptive statistics for underlying reporting variables and market reaction variables (continued) 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for market reaction  
 All observations (N=610) 
Income-increasing underlying earnings  
exclusions (N=218) 
All other observations (N=392) 
Mean test between income-increasing  
underlying earnings exclusions and  
all other observations   
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. dev Mean Median Std. dev T-test  p-Value 
Variables of Interest: 
Stockj,t 0.584 0.335 0.779 0.718 0.346 1.065 0.509 0.331 0.548 2.705
*** 0.007 
EPSj,t 0.590 0.280 1.043 
130.672 0.313 1.252 0.545 0.263 0.904 1.316 0.188 
BVEPSj,t 3.278 1.747 4.344 3.911 2.107 4.828 2.584 1.321 3.627 1.674
* 0.094 
Control Variables: 
MtoBj,t 2.876 1.912 3.631 2.193 1.496 3.630 3.256 2.213 3.579 -3.481
*** 0.000 
MktCapj,t 7.188 7.145 1.605 7.598 7.557 1.346 6.961 6.962 1.692 5.097
*** 0.000 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: Persisj,t is earnings persistence of firm j, in year t. Predj,t  is earnings predictability of firm j, in year t. Meetj,t is dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s earnings before tax in year t is greater than or equal to earnings before tax 
in year t-1, and zero otherwise. Lossj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm made statutory losses in year t, and zero otherwise. MtoBj,t is measured by the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity for firm j, in 
year t. ROEj,t is earnings before tax divided by average shareholders’ equity for firm j, in year t. Sizej,t is measured by the natural logarithm of firm j’s total assets, at beginning of year t. Leveragej,t is measured by short-term and 
long-term debt divided by total assets for firm j, in year t. SDEj,t is the standard deviation of earnings before tax scaled by beginning total assets of the firm, computed using a 5-year rolling window ending in year 2012 for firm j, 
year t. NOAj,t is measured by shareholders’ equity less cash and cash equivalent plus total debt divided by lagged sales for firm j, at the beginning of the year t. SalesGj,t is the sales for firm j, year t minus the sales for firm j, in year t-
1, then divided by the sales for firm j, in year t. Capitalj,t is measured by the ratio of net book value of property, plant, and equipment to total assets for firm j, in year t. Stockj,t is stock price at last day of the third month of year t, for 
firm j. EPSj,t is measured by statutory earnings before tax divided by the number of outstanding shares for firm j, in year t. BVEPSj,t is book value of equity divided by the number of outstanding shares for firm j, in year t. MktCapj,t 
is measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the firm at the beginning of year t for firm j. p-values for means are based on two-tailed t-test. 
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 EPSj,t for underlying earnings reporting observations is measured by statutory earnings that compare to underlying earnings (e.g., if firms reported underlying earnings before interest and tax, 
then the statutory earnings before interest and tax is selected for comparison) divided by the number of outstanding shares for firm j, in year t (i.e., EARPSj,t in Equation (6)). For non-underlying 





2.5.3 Pearson and Spearman correlations of variables for paper one 
Because multicollinearity between the variables is a potential concern as a move to 
multivariate analysis, this paper presents both pearson and spearman correlations for the 
interested variables and control variables of paper one in Table 4. Previous authors suggest 
multicollinearity becomes a serious problem where correlations exceed 0.8 (e.g., Li & 
Mangena, 2014; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). The correlation of each variable is less than 0.8, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not a major problem for the variables in this paper. Table 4 
panel A shows the pearson and spearman correlations for variables of efficient and 
opportunistic reporting behaviour, with the result showing that the earnings persistence of 
statutory earnings (Persisj,t) is not correlated to underlying earnings reporting (UEj,t), which 
cast doubts about when statutory earnings show less persistence, managers are more likely to 
disclose underlying earnings. The earnings predictability of statutory earnings (Predj,t) is 
significantly and negatively correlated to underlying earnings reporting (UEj,t) under 
spearman correlation (correlation=-0.169, p-value=0.000) and pearson correlation 
(correlation=-0.198, p-value=0.000) suggesting that when statutory earnings have high 
earnings predictability errors (i.e., low earnings predictability), firms are less likely to 
disclose underlying earnings. This result is opposite to management assertions that they 
disclose underlying earnings because statutory earnings are less predictable for future 
earnings. The InExj,t is negatively correlated to Meetj,t and positively correlated to Lossj,t 
under both spearman and pearsom correlations, which suggests that when statutory earnings 
fail to meet earnings target or firms make current statutory losses, they are more likely to use 
income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions to make underlying earnings more 
profitable. The pearson and spearman correlations between the key variables confirm 




current losses or earnings decrease, they are more likely to disclose underlying earnings as 
being higher than statutory earnings. Table 4 panel B presents the pearson and spearman 
correlations for variables of market reactions only for the sample where firms report 
underlying earnings as being higher than statutory earnings. The result shows that underlying 
earnings and statutory earnings are significantly related to stock prices, but the correlation of 
actual underlying earnings (AUEPSj,t) on stock prices (Stockj,t) (spearman correlation=0.719; 
pearson correlation=0.673) is much higher than the correlation of statutory earnings 
(EARPSj,t) on stock prices (Stockj,t) (spearman correlation=0.293; pearson 
correlation=0.364), which suggests that investors price the underlying earnings higher than 





Table 4: Pearson and Spearman correlations for opportunistic and efficient hypotheses variables 
Table 4 Panel A: pearson and spearman correlations for the variables of opportunistic and efficient reporting behaviours (566 firm-year observations)  
 UEj,t InExj,t Persisj,t Predj,t Meetj,t Lossj,t SDEj,t NOAj,t MtoBj,t SalesGj,t Capitalj,t Leveragej,t ROEj,t Sizej,t 
 
UEj,t 1.000 0.717*** 0.032 -0.198*** -0.035 -0.050 -0.245*** 0.039 -0.258*** -0.147*** 0.137*** 0.111*** 0.100** 0.454*** 
  (0.000) (0.452) (0.000) (0.408) (0.238) (0.000) (0.349) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.018) (0.000) 
InExj,t 0.717*** 1.000 -0.012 -0.145*** -0.079* 0.086** -0.179*** 0.0482 -0.244*** -0.104** 0.169*** 0.092** 0.093** 0.315*** 
 (0.000)  (0.769) (0.001) (0.059) (0.041) (0.000) (0.252) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.029) (0.027) (0.000) 
Persisj,t 0.031 -0.022 1.000 -0.161*** 0.123*** -0.086** -0.103** 0.017 -0.012 0.012 -0.086** 0.004 0.060 0.026 
 (0.458) (0.608)  (0.000) (0.003) (0.041) (0.014) (0.691) (0.781) (0.769) (0.042) (0.928) (0.152) (0.535) 
Predj,t -0.169*** -0.134*** -0.256*** 1.000 -0.061 0.213*** 0.094*** 0.028 0.237*** 0.058 -0.208*** 0.072* -0.111*** -0.359*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
 
(0.149) (0.000) (0.000) (0.504) (0.000) (0.168) (0.000) (0.087) (0.008) (0.000) 
Meetj,t -0.035 -0.079* 0.130*** -0.125*** 1.000 -0.342*** -0.072* 0.010 0.021 0.338*** 0.009 0.069 0.189*** -0.028 
 
(0.408) (0.059) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.000) (0.088) (0.816) (0.617) (0.000) (0.824) (0.103) (0.000) (0.505) 
Lossj,t -0.050 0.086** -0.089** 0.212*** -0.342*** 1.000 0.232*** 0.006 0.053 -0.152*** 0.038 -0.080* -0.345*** -0.198*** 
 
(0.238) (0.041) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.892) (0.209) (0.000) (0.367) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) 
SDEj,t -0.358*** -0.270*** -0.070* 0.781*** -0.071* 0.227*** 1.000 0.001 0.213*** 0.037 -0.204*** 0.020 -0.144*** -0.405*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.098) (0.000) (0.092) (0.000) 
 
(0.996) (0.000) (0.377) (0.000) (0.632) (0.001) (0.000) 
NOAj,t 0.053 0.044 -0.005 0.039 -0.012 -0.032 -0.003 1.000 -0.091** 0.060 0.126*** 0.121*** -0.081* 0.061 
 
(0.211) (0.296) (0.903) (0.358) (0.779) (0.450) (0.935) 
 
(0.031) (0.155) (0.003) (0.004) (0.055) (0.146) 
MtoBj,t -0.263*** -0.240*** 0.071* 0.218*** 0.108** -0.014 0.280*** -0.188*** 1.000 0.035 -0.343*** -0.046 0.194*** -0.344*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.000) (0.011) (0.733) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.400) (0.000) (0.280) (0.000) (0.000) 
SalesGj,t -0.149*** -0.130*** 0.060 0.039 0.450*** -0.248*** 0.106** 0.054 0.172*** 1.000 -0.075* 0.110*** 0.126*** -0.219*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.156) (0.353) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.198) (0.000) 
 
(0.073) (0.009) (0.003) (0.000) 
Capitalj,t 0.203*** 0.221*** -0.087** -0.203*** -0.017 0.067 -0.258*** 0.195*** -0.692*** -0.148*** 1.000 -0.062 -0.313*** 0.251*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.684) (0.112) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.142) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leveragej,t  0.230*** 0.175*** 0.035 -0.379*** 0.057 -0.185*** -0.416*** 0.263*** -0.133*** 0.067 0.061 1.000 -0.144*** -0.405*** 
 






Table 4 Panel A: pearson and spearman correlations for the variables of opportunistic and efficient reporting behaviours (566 firm-year observations) (continued) 
 UEj,t InExj,t Persisj,t Predj,t Meetj,t Lossj,t SDEj,t NOAj,t MtoBj,t SalesGj,t Capitalj,t Leveragej,t ROEj,t Sizej,t 
ROEj,t 0.052 0.029 0.145*** -0.139*** 0.314*** -0.528*** -0.113** -0.095** 0.385*** 0.289*** -0.477*** 0.097** 1.000 0.102** 
 
(0.220) (0.496) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) 
 
(0.016) 
Sizej,t 0.467*** 0.319*** 0.033 -0.401*** -0.045 -0.154*** -0.534*** 0.050 -0.420*** -0.189*** 0.347*** 0.355*** -0.050 1.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.429) (0.000) (0.289) (0.000) (0.000) (0.238) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.239) 
 Table 4: Pearson and Spearman correlations for opportunistic and efficient hypotheses variables (continued) 
Table 4 Panel B: pearson and spearman correlations for the variables of market reaction (218 firm-year observations) 
 
Stockj,t AUEPSj,t EARPSj,t BVEPSj,t Mktcapj,t MtoBj,t 
Stockj,t 1.000 0.673*** 0.364*** 0.338*** 0.525*** 0.385*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 




(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.383) 




(0.000) (0.003) (0.082) 
BVEPSj,t 0.462*** 0.484*** 0.354*** 1.000 0.174** -0.016 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.010) (0.810) 
Mktcapj,t 0.509*** 0.395*** 0.226*** 0.352*** 1.000 0.063 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.350) 
MtoBj,t 0.526*** 0.235*** 0.071 -0.047 0.239*** 1.000 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.297) (0.493) (0.000) 
 
                                 p statistics in parentheses 
                                               * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
                                 Pearson (spearman) correlations are presented above (below)  
Note: AUEPSj,t is measured by the actual underlying earnings figure divided by the number of outstanding shares for firm j, in year t. EARPSj,t is measured by statutory earnings that compare to 
underlying earnings (e.g., if firms reported underlying earnings before interest and tax, then the statutory earnings before interest and tax is selected for comparison) divided by the number of 




2.5.4 Regression results 
2.5.4.1 Results for efficient reporting (H1) 
Table 5 presents the year industry fixed-effects logit regressions results for H1. Model 1 
presents the results for the association of earnings persistence with underlying earnings 
disclosure, while model 2 presents the results for the relationship between earnings 
predictability and underlying earnings disclosure. These results show that none of Persisj,t and 
Predj,t are statistically related to UEj,t, indicating that managers disclose underlying earnings 
not because the lack of persistence and predictability of statutory earnings to reflect ‘core’ 
earnings; indeed these results reject the efficient reporting hypothesis. For control variables, 
the Sizej,t and ROEj,t are significantly positively associated with UEj,t under both models, 
which suggests that large firms and firms with high profitability are more likely to disclose 
underlying earnings. The rate of sales growth (SalesGj,t) and market-to-book ratio (MtoBj,t) 
are negatively significantly related to UEj,t under both models, which indicates that slow 
growing firms are more likely to disclose underlying earnings. The SDEj,t is significantly 
negatively related to UEj,t (coefficient=-3.374, p-value=0.004) under model 1 and 
(coefficient=-4.605, p-value=0.003) under model 2, which suggests that firms with high 
earnings variability are less likely to disclose underlying earnings. Collectively, the results of 
table 5 reject efficient reporting behaviour where firms disclose underlying earnings because 
they have less persistence statutory earnings, low predictability statutory earnings, and high 








Table 5: Regression results for efficient reporting (H1) 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
2.5.4.2 Results for opportunistic reporting (H2, H3a & H3b) 
2.5.4.2.1 Results for persistence of adjustments (H2) 
Table 6 provides the year industry fixed-effects panel regressions results for the persistence 
of income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions. Panel A shows the results for the 
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 Standard errors 
15
 Number of observations 
Model 1 with UEj,t as dependent variable  
and  Persisj,t as independent variable 
Model 2 with UEj,t as dependent variable  
and   Predj,t  as independent variable 
 Coef. Std. Err.14 z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Persisj,t 0.047 0.170 0.280 0.780 
    
Predj,t     1.250 1.035 1.210 0.227 
Capitalj,t 0.062 0.163 0.380 0.705 0.068 0.161 0.420 0.673 
Sizej,t 0.508*** 0.084 6.050 0.000 0.499*** 0.084 5.960 0.000 
Leveragej,t 0.694 0.440 1.580 0.115 0.644 0.431 1.490 0.135 
SalesGj,t -0.902* 0.461 -1.960 0.051 -0.947** 0.459 -2.060 0.039 
MtoBj,t -0.310* 0.177 -1.750 0.080 -0.317* 0.176 -1.800 0.072 
ROEj,t 1.606** 0.797 2.020 0.044 1.545* 0.796 1.940 0.052 
SDEj,t -3.374*** 1.164 -2.900 0.004 -4.605*** 1.550 -2.970 0.003 
NOAj,t 0.264 0.199 1.330 0.183 0.241 0.197 1.220 0.222 
Year effects YES    YES    
Industry effects  YES    YES    
_cons -3.847*** 0.997 -3.860 0.000 -3.727*** 0.990 -3.760 0.000 
Number of obs.15 566 
   
566 
   Pseudo R2  24.02% 
   
24.19% 




persistence of income-increasing adjustments using InExj,t as an independent variable, while 
panel B shows the results for the persistence of income-increasing adjustments using eight 
individual adjustments as the independent variables. Panel A shows that InExj,t is 
significantly negatively related to OEj,t+1 (coefficient=-0.146, p-value=0.063) and OEj,t+1to2 
(coefficient=-0.269, p-value=0.063), which indicates that those income-increasing underlying 
earnings exclusions are value-relevant to future earnings, and firms opportunistically exclude 
recurring expenses from statutory earnings to make underlying earnings look better than 
statutory earnings. That means one dollar of income-increasing exclusions implies one year 
ahead operating expenses of $0.146 and one dollar of income-increasing exclusions implies 
future operating expenses over the subsequent two years of $0.269. Following Frankel et al. 
(2011) and Dolye et al. (2003)’ studies, this paper includes AUEPSj,t, which is the actual 
underlying earnings for firm j, in year t, scaled by outstanding shares at the beginning of year 
t in panel B models. The results of panel B shows that the AUEPSj,t is significantly positively 
related to OEj,t+1 (coefficient=0.046, p-value=0.000) and OEj,t+2 (coefficient=0.097, p-
value=0.000) which consistent with the Frankel et al. (2011) and Doyle et al. (2003)’ results. 
For the eight individuals adjustments, only the Otherj,t is significantly and negatively 
associated with OEj,t+1 and OEj,t+2 (coefficient=-0.038, p-value=0.035) and (coefficient=-
0.111, p-value=0.003) respectively. That means one dollar of expense in ‘other’ category 
implies one year ahead operating expenses $0.038 and one dollar of expense in ‘other’ 
category implies future operating expenses over the subsequent two years of $0.111. These 
results indicate that managers opportunistically exclude recurring expenses from statutory 
earnings to make underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings and categorise them as 
‘Other’, which is less likely to be detected by externals. Collectively, the results of table 6 
suggest that managers opportunistically exclude recurring expenses from statutory earnings 




earnings. These income-increasing exclusions reflect inappropriate classification of earnings 
component by managers. For control variables, this paper finds firms with persistent statutory 
earnings have a high leverage ratio because Leveragej,t presents the significantly and 
positively association with OEj,t+1 and OEj,t+1to2 in the results of both panel A and panel B. A 
possible explanation may be because firms with high leverage ratios face a high risk if they 
violate debt covenants, so managers have high incentives to report high operating earnings 
and make them persist in order to avoid violating debt covenants. Moreover, table 6 finds that 
Sizej,t is negative and significantly associated with OEj,t+1 and OEj,t+1to2 under both panel A 
and panel B, which indicates that large firms have less persistent operating earnings, possibly 
because they find transforming future earnings into realised earnings more difficult, since the 
monitoring function is inherently more difficult and expensive in larger firms (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Watt & Zimmerman, 1986). This paper presents different results for the 
relationship between SDEj,t and future operating earnings in the panel A models and panel B 
model 5. These differing results may be due to different sample observations. Panel A uses 
the full sample so the negative relationship found would suggest that high earnings volatility 
generally impairs earnings persistence. In panel B, it only includes the income-increasing 
underlying earnings exclusions firm-year observations as the sample. The positive 
relationship between SDEj,t and OEj,t+1 found in panel B suggests that where firm-year 
observations use income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions as earnings management, 








Table 6: Regression results for persistence of adjustments (H2) 
Table 6 Panel A: the regression results for H2 with InExj,t as an independent variable 
 Model 3 with OEj,t+1 as dependent variable Model 4 with OEj,t+1to2 as dependent variable 
 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
InExj,t -0.146* 0.079 -1.860 0.063 -0.269* 0.145 -1.860 0.063 
MtoBj,t -0.007 0.011 -0.700 0.483 -0.033* 0.019 -1.690 0.092 
ROEj,t 0.576*** 0.125 4.600 0.000 1.215*** 0.230 5.290 0.000 
Sizej,t -0.074*** 0.024 -3.110 0.002 -0.156*** 0.044 -3.570 0.000 
Leveragej,t 0.548*** 0.131 4.190 0.000 1.080*** 0.240 4.510 0.000 
SalesGj,t 0.006 0.138 0.040 0.967 -0.165 0.254 -0.650 0.517 
Capitalj,t 0.121*** 0.045 2.690 0.007 0.242*** 0.083 2.920 0.004 
SDEj,t -1.635*** 0.150 -10.910 0.000 -2.244*** 0.275 -8.150 0.000 
NOAj,t 0.051 0.054 0.940 0.348 0.119 0.099 1.200 0.229 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Industry effects  YES 
   
YES 
   
_cons 0.100 0.258 0.390 0.698 0.293 0.474 0.620 0.536 
Number of obs. 566 
   
56316 
 
  R-squared 25.01% 
   
19.58% 
 
  Table 6 Panel B: the regression results for H2 with eight individual adjustments as the independent variables 
 
Model 5 with OEj,t+1 as dependent variable Model 6 with OEj,t+1to2 as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
AUEPSj,t 0.046*** 0.006 7.140 0.000 0.097*** 0.013 7.260 0.000 
IRj,t 0.011 0.014 0.780 0.436 0.032 0.030 1.070 0.285 
GLAj,t -0.004 0.015 -0.260 0.796 -0.024 0.032 -0.740 0.459 
RCj,t 0.015 0.014 1.130 0.259 0.021 0.028 0.760 0.449 
MACj,t 0.010 0.015 0.680 0.495 0.025 0.031 0.800 0.423 
TIj,t -0.011 0.015 -0.740 0.461 -0.024 0.030 -0.800 0.423 
FGLj,t 0.007 0.018 0.380 0.706 0.021 0.038 0.570 0.569 
Otherj,t -0.038** 0.018 -2.120 0.035 -0.111*** 0.037 -2.990 0.003 
Equityj,t 0.011 0.016 0.650 0.513 0.018 0.034 0.530 0.596 
MtoBj,t 0.003* 0.002 1.870 0.063 0.008** 0.004 2.070 0.040 
ROEj,t -0.022 0.021 -1.040 0.301 -0.050 0.044 -1.150 0.251 
Sizej,t -0.039*** 0.005 -7.440 0.000 -0.092*** 0.011 -8.360 0.000 
Leveragej,t 0.166*** 0.018 9.500 0.000 0.316*** 0.036 8.690 0.000 
SalesGj,t 0.068*** 0.024 2.830 0.005 0.119** 0.050 2.370 0.019 
Capitalj,t -0.011 0.008 -1.380 0.169 -0.023 0.016 -1.400 0.163 
SDEj,t 0.209*** 0.075 2.780 0.006 0.173 0.156 1.110 0.268 
NOAj,t -0.001 0.007 -0.170 0.865 -0.003 0.014 -0.190 0.850 
Year effects  YES 
   
YES 
   
Industry effects YES 
   
YES 
   
_cons 0.395*** 0.050 7.850 0.000 0.955*** 0.104 9.150 0.000 
Number of obs.  204 
   
204 
   
R-squared 68.17% 
   
68.40% 
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Table 6: Regression results for persistence of adjustments (H2) (continued) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: IRj,t is dummy variable coded one if managers exclude impairment or revaluation of assets for firm j, in year t, and 
zero otherwise. GLAj,t is dummy variable coded one if managers exclude losses on asset dispositions or investments for firm 
j, in year t, and zero otherwise. MACj,t is dummy variable coded one if managers exclude losses on merge or demerge and 
acquisition transaction costs for firm j, in year t, and zero otherwise. TIj,t is dummy variable coded one if managers exclude 
tax or interest-related expenses for firm j, in year t, and zero otherwise. FGLj,t is dummy variable coded one if managers 
exclude foreign exchange loss for firm j, in year t, and zero otherwise. Equityj,t is dummy variable coded one if managers 
exclude equity accounting for firm j, in year t, and zero otherwise. Otherj,t is dummy variable coded one if managers exclude 
other items not classified in specific categories for firm j, in year t, and zero otherwise. AUEPSj,t is measured by the actual 
underlying earnings figure divided by the number of outstanding shares for firm j, in year t. 
 
2.5.4.2.2 Results for opportunistic reporting (H3a & H3b) 
Table 7 shows the regression results for H3a and H3b analysed using year industry fixed-
effects logit regression models. Model 7 shows the results for H3a. The result of model 7 
finds that Meetj,t is significantly and negatively related to InExj,t (coefficient=-0.441, p-
value=0.054), which suggests that when firms do not meet their earnings target, managers are 
more likely to use income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions opportunistically to 
report underlying earnings as being higher than the current statutory earnings, which 
confirms H3a. Model 8 shows the result for H3b where Lossj,t is significantly and positively 
associated with InExj,t (coefficient=1.740, p-value=0.000), which indicates that when firms 
make current statutory earnings losses, they are more likely to apply positive exclusion 
opportunistically to define underlying earnings as being higher than statutory earnings, which 
confirms H3b. To conclude, table 7 confirms the opportunistic reporting behaviour where 
firms that do not meet earnings target or make current statutory losses are more likely to use 
income-increasing underlying exclusions opportunistically to define underlying earnings 
more favourable than statutory earnings.  
 
For control variables, the SDEj,t is significantly and negatively related to InExj,t for both 




underlying earnings as greater than statutory earnings, thus rejecting management assertions 
that they report underlying earnings because statutory earnings have high levels of volatility. 
The MtoBj,t is significantly and negatively associated with InExj,t for both models, which 
suggests that low growth firms are more likely to use positive exclusions earnings 
management. The ROEj,t is positively and significantly related to InExj,t indicating that firms 
with high profitability are more likely to define underlying earnings opportunistically. Large 
firms are more likely exclude income-increasing exclusions opportunistically because the 
evidence showing Sizej,t is significantly and positively associated with InExj,t in both models. 
Capitalj,t is significantly and positively related to InExj,t indicating that firms with more 
intensive capital are more likely to use positive exclusions earnings management.  
 
Table 7: Regression results for opportunistic reporting (H3a &H3b) 
 
Model 7 with InExj,t as dependent variables and  
Meetj,t as independent variable 
Model 8 with InExj,t as dependent variables and  
Lossj,t as independent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Meetj,t -0.441* 0.229 -1.930 0.054 
    Lossj,t 
    
1.740*** 0.333 5.230 0.000 
Capitalj,t 0.555*** 0.168 3.310 0.001 0.615*** 0.174 3.530 0.000 
Sizej,t 0.234*** 0.076 3.070 0.002 0.265*** 0.077 3.420 0.001 
Leveragej,t 0.949** 0.440 2.160 0.031 1.041** 0.442 2.360 0.018 
SalesGj,t -0.758 0.482 -1.570 0.116 -0.735 0.471 -1.560 0.118 
MtoBj,t -0.283* 0.168 -1.680 0.093 -0.320* 0.173 -1.850 0.064 
ROEj,t 2.954*** 0.939 3.140 0.002 4.279*** 1.010 4.240 0.000 
SDEj,t -3.663*** 1.233 -2.970 0.003 -4.614*** 1.315 -3.510 0.000 
NOAj,t 0.224 0.181 1.240 0.216 0.215 0.177 1.210 0.225 
_cons -4.758*** 1.023 -4.650 0.000 -5.898*** 1.076 -5.480 0.000 
Number of obs. 566 





18.46%       22.24%     
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
2.5.4.3 Results for market reactions (H4) 
Table 8 provides the results of year industry fixed-effects panel regressions for market 
reactions (H4). To test H4, this paper only investigates observations that reported underlying 
earnings. Model 9 presents the market reactions for sample observations that reported the 




significantly and positively related to Stockj,t (coefficient=0.422, p-value=0.000), which 
indicates that when investors are presented by underlying earnings and statutory earnings, 
they perceive underlying earnings as value-relevant rather than statutory earnings. Model 10 
presents the result of market reactions for sample observations that reported the actual value 
of underlying earnings as greater than the reported statutory earnings. Model 10 finds the 
same results as model 9 where underlying earnings (AUEPSj,t) rather than statutory earnings 
(EARPSj,t) are significantly and positively associated with the stock price (Stockj,t) 
(coefficient=0.447, p-value=0.000). Table 8 indicates that when firms report underlying 
earnings or report underlying earnings that are greater than statutory earnings, investors 
perceive statutory earnings are value-irrelevant, react favourable to those underlying earnings 
figures, and believe that underlying earnings have more incremental value-relevant 
information than statutory earnings. Those underlying earnings which are greater than 
statutory earnings are priced higher than all actual underlying earnings by investors because 
the evidence shows a higher value of coefficient.  
 
Table 8: Regression results for market reactions (H4) 
 Model 9 with Stockj,t as dependent variable  Model 10 with Stockj,t as dependent variable 
 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
EARPSj,t 0.056 0.038 1.460 0.145 0.042 0.045 0.930 0.354 
AUEPSj,t 0.422*** 0.035 12.030 0.000 0.447*** 0.039 11.500 0.000 
BVEPSj,t 0.185*** 0.041 4.490 0.000 0.158*** 0.049 3.260 0.001 
Mktcapj,t 1.796*** 0.238 7.530 0.000 1.427*** 0.290 4.920 0.000 
MtoBj,t 0.334*** 0.042 7.980 0.000 0.356*** 0.050 7.150 0.000 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Industry effects YES 
   
YES 
   
_cons -1.860*** 0.497 -3.740 0.000 -5.649*** 0.602 -9.380 0.000 
Number of obs. 319 
   
218 
   
R-squared 70.05% 
   
68.00% 
   






In sum, this paper confirms the opportunistic underlying earnings reporting hypothesis where 
managers opportunistically exclude recurring expenses from statutory earnings to make 
underlying earnings more profitable than statutory earnings and categorise these recurring 
expenses as ‘Other’ unspecific items because they are difficult for investors to detect.  
Managers do this to influence investors’ perceptions of firms’ performance when they do not 
meet statutory earnings target or make current statutory earnings losses, so they are more 
likely to exclude those opportunistic positive exclusions to make firms’ performance look 
better. Investors, however, are often misled by manager’s opportunistic reporting behaviour 
because they perceive underlying earnings are more value-relevant than statutory earnings.   
 
2.6 Additional tests 
Although the fixed-effects models are the preferred regression models for panel data, any 
errors may present problems with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Heteroskedasticity 
means ‘that the error terms of the model are  mutually uncorrelated, while the variance of 
error terms may vary over the observations’ (Verbeek, 2004, p.82), while autocorrelation 
occurs when the error terms are correlated over time, but it only occurs when using time 
series data. Although tests of serial correlation are applied to macro panels with long time 
series (over 20-30 years), they are not a problem in micro panels (within very few years) 
because serial correlation makes the standard errors of coefficients smaller than they actually 
are, and higher R
 
squares  (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1998). Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation results in fixed-effects models becoming inefficient and their standard errors 
are estimated the wrong way. Since the results of table 6 panel B and table 8 have a relatively 
high R squares, and this paper has confirmed that multicollinerarity is not a problem, it would 




conducted a Newey-West test to control any potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems.  
 
The Newey-West test adjusts the standard errors of variables to heteroskedasticity-and-
autocorrelation-consistent standard errors (Verbeek, 2004, p.110), developed by Newey & 
West (1987). In the Newey-West model, the correction multiplies the traditional standard 
error by√𝑁𝑊, where NW=1+∑ (1 −
𝑖
𝑛
+ 1)𝜌𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 . The variable 𝜌𝑖 is the autocorrelation at lag 
i and n is the number of lags expected to be auto-correlated (Doyle et al., 2003). 
 
This paper tests H2 and H4 again using the Newey-West test; the results for H2 are shown in 
table 9. As with the main results in H2, table 9 finds that recurring expenses are realised in 
future earnings representing managers’ opportunistic reporting behavior. The result for the 
Newey-West test of H4 is shown in table 10 and finds evidence confirming the main result of 
H4 where investors perceive that underlying earnings are more value-relevant than statutory 
earnings for the sample of observations that reported underlying earnings and observations 










Table 9: Newey-West test for persistence of adjustments (H2) 
Table 9 Panel A: the regression results for H2 with InExj,t as an independent variable 
 








InExj,t -0.146* 0.087 -1.680 0.093 -0.269* 0.158 -1.700 0.089 
MtoBj,t -0.007 0.014 -0.530 0.594 -0.033 0.037 -0.890 0.373 
ROEj,t 0.576* 0.324 1.780 0.076 1.215* 0.735 1.650 0.099 
Sizej,t -0.074 0.051 -1.430 0.152 -0.156 0.111 -1.410 0.159 
Leveragej,t 0.548* 0.280 1.960 0.051 1.080** 0.506 2.140 0.033 
SalesGj,t 0.006 0.185 0.030 0.975 -0.165 0.333 -0.490 0.621 
Capitalj,t 0.121 0.082 1.480 0.141 0.242 0.160 1.510 0.132 
SDEj,t -1.635 1.239 -1.320 0.188 -2.244 1.607 -1.400 0.163 
NOAj,t 0.051 0.052 0.980 0.327 0.119 0.102 1.170 0.244 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Industry effects YES 
   
YES 
   
_cons 0.100 0.335 0.300 0.766 0.293 0.684 0.430 0.668 
Number of obs. 566 
   
563 
   
F(19,   546) 1.83 
  
      F(19,   543) 2.04 
   
Prob > F 0.0173 
   
0.0059 
   
Table 9 Panel B: the regression results for H2 with eight individual adjustments as the independent variables  
 











AUEPSj,t 0.046*** 0.011 4.010 0.000 0.097*** 0.021 4.730 0.000 
IRj,t 0.011 0.019 0.590 0.554 0.032 0.040 0.800 0.422 
GLAj,t -0.004 0.013 -0.300 0.765 -0.024 0.028 -0.850 0.398 
RCj,t 0.015 0.013 1.230 0.222 0.021 0.026 0.830 0.409 
MACj,t 0.010 0.011 0.930 0.354 0.025 0.023 1.090 0.277 
TIj,t -0.011 0.012 -0.890 0.373 -0.024 0.025 -0.960 0.337 
FGLj,t 0.007 0.023 0.300 0.763 0.021 0.044 0.480 0.629 
Otherj,t -0.038* 0.020 -1.880 0.061 -0.111*** 0.040 -2.750 0.007 
Equityj,t 0.011 0.017 0.640 0.526 0.018 0.035 0.520 0.602 
MtoBj,t 0.003** 0.002 2.280 0.024 0.008** 0.003 2.560 0.011 
ROEj,t -0.022 0.028 -0.770 0.441 -0.050 0.057 -0.880 0.382 
Sizej,t -0.039*** 0.006 -6.120 0.000 -0.092*** 0.015 -6.290 0.000 
Leveragej,t 0.166*** 0.021 7.840 0.000 0.316*** 0.034 9.310 0.000 
SalesGj,t 0.068*** 0.020 3.450 0.001 0.119*** 0.040 2.960 0.003 
Capitalj,t -0.011 0.012 -0.900 0.369 -0.023 0.026 -0.880 0.379 
SDEj,t 0.209 0.178 1.180 0.241 0.173 0.268 0.650 0.518 
NOAj,t -0.001 0.003 -0.340 0.731 -0.003 0.007 -0.400 0.690 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 
   




Table 9 Panel B: the regression results for H2 with eight individual adjustments as independent variables (continued) 










_cons 0.395*** 0.074 5.310 0.000 0.955*** 0.177 5.410 0.000 
Number of obs. 204 
   
204 
   
F(27,   176) 12.28 
  
  19.17 
   
Prob > F 0.000 
   
0.000 
   
 
 
Table 10: Newey-West test for market reactions (H4) 
 








EARPSj,t 0.056 0.046 1.200 0.229 0.042 0.047 0.890 0.377 
AUEPSj,t 0.422*** 0.063 6.740 0.000 0.447*** 0.073 6.140 0.000 
BVEPSj,t 0.185*** 0.054 3.440 0.001 0.158*** 0.053 2.980 0.003 
Mktcapj,t 1.796*** 0.328 5.480 0.000 1.427*** 0.355 4.010 0.000 
MtoBj,t 0.334*** 0.068 4.920 0.000 0.356*** 0.076 4.680 0.000 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Industry effects YES 
   
YES 
   
_cons -1.860*** 0.693 -2.690 0.008 -5.649*** 0.737 -7.670 0.000 
 Number of obs. 319 
    
218 
  
 F( 14,   303) 32.280 
   
 F(14,   203) 20.180 
  
 Prob > F 0.000 





2.7 Summary of chapter two 
This paper investigates managers’ underlying earnings reporting behaviour based on 
signalling theory, prospect theory, and agency theory where, along with signalling theory 
conjecture, it examines whether managers disclose underlying earnings efficiently to signal 
the underlying economic value of firms to help investors evaluate firms’ ongoing economic 
performance better when statutory earnings cannot. Moreover, based on prospect theory 
combined with agency theory assumptions, this paper investigates whether managers disclose 




performance more prospective when they do not meet earnings targets or make current 
statutory losses. Finally, this paper examines how the market reacts to this underlying 
earnings reporting. The results confirm opportunistic reporting behaviour that when firms do 
not meet statutory earnings target or make statutory losses, they are more likely to 
opportunistically use income-increasing underlying exclusions to make them look better than 
statutory earnings to influence investors’ perceptions of firm performance. Specifically, 
managers exclude recurring expenses from statutory earnings to define underlying earnings 
and categorise those expenses as ‘Other’ unspecific items. Investors, however, are often 

































CHAPTER THREE Equity overvaluation and managers’ choices of 
using alternative earnings management mechanisms 
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3.1 Introduction  
Since earnings and earnings growth are key components in determining firm value, managers 
are highly motivated to manage earnings that ultimately inflate firm value and artificially 
increase earnings and earnings growth expectations to increase the stock prices (Dechow et 
al., 2000; Badertscher, 2011; Adams et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2005; Brown & Caylor, 
2005). Studies have found that manager’s wealth increases as a firm’s stock price increases 
because their compensation is associated with the stock price via stock performance-based 
incentives (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Burns & Kedia, 2003). Moreover, job security 
and current value in the executive labour market of managers typically increases with the 
strong performance of stock because a manager is less likely to lose their job when stock is 
performing well (Weisbach, 1988).  These motivations typically stimulate managers to strive 
for higher stock prices. Studies find that earnings management is the main approach used by 
managers to obtain their desired economic outcomes and they are fully aware of opportunities 
to manage earnings (Nelson et al., 2002; 2003; Badertscher, 2011). However, the aggregate 
value of investors destroyed by earnings management far exceeds that by high-profile fraud 
cases (Graham et al., 2005; Badertscher, 2011) because investors are unlikely to see through 
earnings management (Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001). 
Jensen (2005)’s agency theory of overvalued equity suggests that when a firm’s stock price is 
becoming overvalued, these firms try to maintain their overvaluation by participating in a 
variety of earnings management choices. Prior researches have provided empirical evidence 
consistent with Jensen’s (2005) conjecture. For instance, Efendi et al. (2007) demonstrated 
that restatement firms exhibit signs of being overvalued in the years prior to engaging in non-
statutory earnings management, and provided evidence that stock compensation incentives 
push managers to sustain their overvalued stock prices. Badertscher (2011) presented 




management decisions. The author has found that managers participate in accruals earnings 
management in the early stage of overvaluation, then move to real activities earnings 
management to sustain the overvaluation of the equity, and at a later stage of overvaluation, 
they engage in non-GAAP earnings management. Although several researches investigated 
the correlation between overvaluation of equity and earnings management,  there is still  
limited empirical evidence regarding the correlation between the duration of overvaluation 
and management’s choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms (Badertscher, 
2011). 
Chapter two (i.e., paper one) of this thesis found that underlying earnings is disclosed 
opportunistically by managers to influence investors’ perceptions of firms’ performance to 
increase the stock prices. This paper attempts to examine whether overvalued firms engage in 
earnings management and whether the duration of overvaluation influences manager’s choice 
of using different earnings management mechanisms. First, this paper examines the 
relationship between overall overvalued equity and two types of earnings management 
(opportunistic underlying earnings reporting and accruals earnings management) separately 
to understand which earnings management technique is more likely to be used by overvalued 
firms during the sample years in general. Second, this paper attempts to investigate whether 
the duration of equity overvaluation affects management’s choice of using accruals earnings 
management and opportunistic underlying earnings reporting. Third, as studies have found 
that balance sheet bloat limits managers’ abilities to use accruals earnings management 
(Black et al., 2014; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012), this paper attempts to understand 
whether overvalued firms with accruals earnings management constraints are only to disclose 





The results provide evidence that overvalued firms are more likely to engage in opportunistic 
underlying earnings reporting rather than accruals earnings management during the sample 
years in general. More precisely, overvalued firms not only disclose underlying earnings, 
they are more likely to use opportunistic income-increasing underlying exclusions to make 
underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings. When examining how the duration of 
equity overvaluation affects management’s choice of using earnings management 
mechanisms, this study finds that at the early stage of overvaluation, managers are more 
likely to use accruals earnings management and income-increasing accruals earnings 
management. At a later stage of overvaluation, they then run out of accruals earnings 
management choices, resort to underlying earnings disclosures and disclose them 
opportunistically in order to maintain overvaluation. Lastly, this study finds that it is difficult 
for overvalued firms with high balance sheet bloat to apply either accruals earnings 
management or income-increasing accruals earnings management because they have a 
limited ability to use them, so they tend to opportunistically disclose underlying earnings to 
maintain overvaluation.  
 
Section 3.2 provides the literature reviews of this paper. Section 3.3 explains the theoretical 
framework and development of hypotheses. Section 3.4 describes the research design of this 
paper. Section 3.5 presents the descriptive statistics, pearson and spearman correlations, and 
regressions results. Section 3.6 provides the additional tests of this study, and section 3.7 




3.2 Literature review  
3.2.1 The definition of earnings management 
The definition of earnings management is mixed in literature; some parties perceiving 
earnings management to be desirable, while others define earnings management as 
opportunistic (Subramanyam, 1996). 
 
Scholars perceive earnings management to be desirable when managers signal private 
information, that is, they signal their superior forecasting ability on future cash flows using 
the flexibility contained in the choice of accounting (Demski, 1998; Francis et al., 2008b; 
Ronen & Yaari, 2008).  
 
Researchers define earnings management as opportunistic when reported earnings are 
manipulated via biased accrual decisions, structuring of transactions, or misclassifying the 
accounts by managers to maximise their self-interest, and have the potential to mislead some 
stakeholders regarding the potential underlying economic performance of a firm or to affect 
contractual outcomes (e.g., Akers et al., 2007; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Studies found 
that earnings management directly influences the overall integrity of financial reporting and 
have significantly adverse impact on the allocation of resources throughout firms (Dechow et 
al. 1995; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Beneish & Vargus, 2002; Schipper & Vincent, 2003).  
 
Extant literature has found three types of opportunistic earnings management mechanisms; 
real activities earnings management, accruals earnings management, and non-statutory 
earnings management. These three earnings management mechanisms are discussed as 





Real activities earnings management 
Real activities earnings management is defined as management actions that deviate from 
normal business practices, stimulated by their intention to misguide at least some 
stakeholders to believe that certain financial reporting objectives have been met in the normal 
course of operations (Roychowdhury, 2006). The earnings management of actual activities is 
designed to alter reported earnings in a specific direction, by transforming the timing or 
structuring of an investment, operating or financing a transaction, and which has suboptimal 
business consequences. For example, managers could decrease  R&D, advertisement, and 
maintenance expenditures to inflate earnings (Badertscher, 2011; Roychowdhury, 2006). 
 
Accruals earnings management  
Accruals refer to the gap between cash flow and earnings that arise from differences between 
the timing of the accounting recognition and that of cash flows. Accruals require 
assumptions, management judgments, and estimates about the future realisation of earnings 
into cash flows which might be affected by biases during estimation, or estimators’ 
judgments that lead to misrepresentation of financial phenomena to distort a firms’ true 
economic value (Mohammady, 2010; Sloan, 1996; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Schipper & 
Vincent, 2003).  
 
Accruals earnings management means the purposeful transferring of accruals in a particular 
direction to manage earnings by changing the methods of accounting or estimates when 
showing a given transaction in  financial statements (Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012).  For 
instance, changing the approach to depreciation for fixed assets and estimating for doubtful 





Non-statutory earnings management 
Non-statutory earnings management is reporting where managers deliberately misclassify 
items to mislead investors; as in when managers adjust revenue or expenses to alter financial 
reports (McVay et al., 2006). Prior researchers used restatements reported in SEC Filing 
Library, in Lexis-Nexis News Library, (e.g., Palmrose et al., 2004) and in the GAO Financial 
Statement Restatement Database (e.g., Desai et al., 2006) as a proxy for non-statutory 
earnings management. Studies found that restated earnings can change the market’s decision 
about firm value (Palmrose et al., 2004; Lev et al., 2008), however, firms with restatements 
are associated with a very high turnover of managers (Hennes et al., 2008; Desai et al., 2006), 
a high turnover of directors (Srinivasan, 2005), high litigation risk (Palmrose & Scholz, 2004) 
and lawsuits (Lev et al., 2008). More recently, researchers have found that managers may use 
their discretion to define non-statutory earnings opportunistically to shift some actual 
recurring expenses to non-recurring exclusions, resulting in a firm with favourable non-
statutory earnings (e.g., pro forma earnings) (e.g., Doyle et al., 2003; Bowen et al., 2005; 
Doyle et al., 2013; McVay et al., 2006). Comparing to real activities and accruals-based 
earnings, opportunistically defining the non-statutory earnings (shifting recurring expenses to 
non-recurring items to make non-statutory earnings higher than statutory earnings) are 
perceived as less detectable earnings management technique by managers, because non-
statutory earnings are not audited. Moreover, unlike accruals earnings management and real 
activities earnings management, bottom-line net income is unaffected opportunistic non-
statutory earnings disclosure is used (Fan et al., 2010). Studies have found that when firms 
have limited abilities to engage in accruals or/and real activities earnings management, they 
are more likely to disclose non-statutory earnings opportunistically (Black et al., 2014; Doyle 
et al. 2013; Elshafie et al. 2010). Opportunistic underlying earnings reporting was examined 




3.2.2 The motivations for opportunistic earnings management  
Accounting literature, as summarised by Healy & Wahlen (1999) and Graham et al. (2005), 
has offered a number of motivations to explain why managers might exercise accounting 
discretion to achieve their desirable outcomes; they are categorised as: market valuation 
driven motivations, contracting motivations, regulatory motivations. This paper discusses 
these motivations as follows.   
 
 
3.2.2.1 Market valuation driven motivations 
Studies shows that markets are concerned about earnings benchmarks, so firms that fail to 
meet market expectations would experience large declines in stock prices on the date that 
earnings are announced (Skinner & Sloan, 2002). Pressures from the stock market induce 
managers to manipulate earnings to meet market expectations. The literature review 
regarding earnings management and meeting earnings benchmark has been discussed in 
section (2.3.4.3). The present evidence of survey complies with the importance of stock price 
incentives to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. Graham et al. (2005) have found that over 
80% of CEOs consider that meeting benchmarks establishes their credibility with the capital 
market. They also believe that meeting benchmarks could deliver prospects of future growth 
to investors to sustain or enhance the stock price of the firm. Other studies of market 
valuation motivations on earnings management have examined the equity offering research 
area and found that firms are likely to manage earnings upward using income-increasing 
accruals to enhance short-term firm performance when approaching equity offers (e.g., 
Shivakumar, 2000; Teoh, 1998a; b). Adams et al. (2009) examined the relationship between 
earnings management and initial public offerings (IPO) for demutualising thrift in the 




insiders are ‘net buyers’ of IPO shares in a demutualising thrift, so management has an 
incentive to minimise earnings downward so that insiders and directors could enhance their 
proportional ownership in the firm at the lowest price.  
 
The most recent studies have found that overvaluation equity induces managers to use 
earnings management; a detailed explanation of this finding is discussed in the theoretical 
framework and development of hypotheses in section 3.3.3 of this chapter. 
 
 
3.2.2.2 Contracting motivations  
Accounting data have been utilised to help monitor and regulate contracts such as 
management compensation contracts and lending contracts between a firm and its 
stakeholders (Dechow, 2004; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Schipper & Vincent, 2003). These 
contracts generate incentives for earnings management (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Watts & 
Zimmerman 1986). The motivation for management compensation contracts and lending 
contracts are discussed below: 
 
Management compensation contracts  
Several papers argue that managers exercise accounting discretion to maximise the present 
value of their bonus compensation. Graham’s (2005) study presented survey evidence that 
CFOs consider compensation to be a key factor for implementing discretion in accounting, 
while other studies found that managers with high stock-based compensation tend to conduct 
earnings management using income-increasing discretionary accruals to achieve their bonus 
levels (e.g., Baker et al., 2009; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Baker et al. (2009) examined 
optional grants and accruals earnings management around grant dates and found that 




options. Achilles et al. (2013) applied a between-subjects design experimental study to 
examine how compensation and motivation affect earnings management behaviour at an 
individual level, and found that when compensation is associated with firm performance, 
managers make decisions to increase current earnings when current earnings are below 
analysts’ forecasts. Brockman et al. (2010) examined voluntary disclosures around the 
exercise of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) stock options and found there was considerable 
growth in the magnitude and frequency of announcing good or bad news in the pre-exercise 
period when CEOs adopt the strategies of exercise-and-sell (exercise-and-hold). The authors 
concluded that  management relies on the intended disposition of the exercised share options. 
When CEOs intend to sell shares of exercised options, they try to enhance stock prices in the 
pre-exercise period, but when they intend to hold the shares, they have a tax incentive to 
reduce stock prices in the pre-exercise period. 
 
Lending contracts 
Debt contract is an important theme in financial accounting study because lenders usually 
utilise accounting numbers to regulate firm activities by requiring that the objectives of a 
particular performance must be met or impose limits to allow for financing and investing 
activities. The assumption is that debt covenants motivate managers to increase earnings by 
either decreasing the restrictiveness of accounting-based constraints in debt agreements, or to 
prevent the cost of covenant violations (Graham, 2005).  
 
Studies for opportunistic earnings management in literature on lending covenants found that 
firms close to their debt covenant are more likely to change accounting estimates using 
accruals to prevent the debt covenant from being violated. For example, DeFond & 




year before the covenant was violated, which suggests that earnings management are made 
by firms who are close to their debt covenants. Franz et al. (2014) examined the influence of 
differential incentives from proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management 
and found that firms close to violation or in technical default of their debt covenants tend to 
participate in higher levels of accruals earnings management, real activities earnings 
management, and total earnings management (i.e., sum of accruals earnings management and 
real activities earnings management) than firms that are far away from violation. The study 
also documented that the earnings management implications of debt covenant violation are 
observed primarily for firms nearer financial distress and firms that do not meet analyst 
forecasts. Graham et al. (2005) found that private firms are more likely to participate in 
earnings management to avoid violating a debt covenant. By examining a large sample of 
private debt covenants, Dichev & Skinner (2002) found a significantly larger proportion of 
firms that were slightly above the violation threshold of covenant than below, which implies 
that managers take actions that are consistent with avoiding covenant default.  
 
The studies discussed above generally imply that lending contracts and management 
compensation contracts induce some managers to manage earnings so as to enhance the 
bonus levels and reduce the potential violation of contracts.  
 
 
3.2.2.3 Regulatory considerations 
Pressure from affiliated parties arising from either request or opinion, might entice managers 
to manage earnings (Chen & Tsai, 2010), and many studies found that regulations are 
associated with accounting choices. Tax regulations are commonly studied in earnings 
management literature (Dechow et al., 2010), and researchers found that firms using income-




in response to changes in tax regulations  (e.g., Lim & Matolcsy, 1999; Monem, 2003; 
Wilson & Shailer, 2007). For example, Wilson & Shailer (2007) investigated the earnings 
management behaviour of a large Australian brewing firm (Tooth & Co limited) between 
1910 and 1965, and found that managers used abnormal income-decreasing accruals in 
response to changes in the rate of excise levied on beer production in the periods surrounding 
regulatory enquiries and public referenda, that threatened firm profitability. Another 
commonly studied regulation in earnings management literature is regulatory capital, known 
as capital requirements (Dechow et al., 2010). Many researchers have examined the capital 
requirements in the insurance and banking industries (e.g., Adiel, 1996; Beatty et al., 1995; 
Collins et al., 1995; Petroni, 1992), and found in the insurance industries for instance, that 
insurance firms attempt to understate reserves of claim loss and engage in transactions of 
reinsurance (e.g., Adiel, 1996; Petroni, 1992). Research into the banking industry found that 
when banks are close to holding the minimum requirements of capital they tend to overstate 
their loan loss provisions and understate their loan write-offs (e.g., Beatty et al., 1995; 
Collins et al., 1995). 
 
Central to all these studies of earnings management is the presumption that managers, given 
their different incentives, use their reporting discretion opportunistically rather than to 




3.2.3 Managers’ decisions on using multiple earnings management mechanisms 
A manager’s decision to use different earnings management techniques has been examined in 
several studies. Graham et al. (2005) present evidence to show that managers prefer to apply 




that 80% of surveyed CEOs reduced discretionary expense on research and development, and 
maintenance and advertisement to meet earnings targets, so the authors concluded that this is 
true because real management activities are less likely to be scrutinised by regulators and 
auditors, and the probability of not being detected is high even though the consequences of 
such activities could destroy the long-term economic performance of firms. The adverse 
impacts of real activities earnings management on long-term economic performance are 
supported by several studies. For example, Mizik (2010) compared the total financial 
consequences of real activities earnings management and accruals earnings management by 
utilising a sample of U.S. listed firms between 1986 and 2005, and found that real activities 
earnings management, not accruals earnings management, would have more adverse 
influences on future financial performance and have a long-term net negative impact on firm 
value. The author also found that the stock market cannot accurately value marketing and 
innovation activity when confronted with potential real activities management. Alhadab et al. 
(2015) examined whether managers participate in accruals and real activities earnings 
management around the IPO, and used a sample of 570 U.K. firms that went public from 
1998 to 2008, to analyse the consequences of accruals and real activities earnings 
management on the probability of IPO failure and survivability in the following periods.  
Their results suggested that IPO firms in the U.K. did participate in actual earnings 
management or real activities earnings management in the year of IPO, and IPO firms with 
high levels of accrual or real activities earnings management during IPO year had more 
probability of IPO failure and lower survival rates in following periods, where real activities 
earnings management has more severe consequences. But the researches discussed above did 
not directly examine the relationship between accruals earnings management and real 






3.2.3.1 Substitution association  
There are many examples in literature of managers using different earnings management 
techniques for their self-interest, mainly because the benefits and costs of each earnings 
management are different, so they trade off different earnings management based on the costs 
and benefits attached.   
 
Cohen & Zarowin (2010) used U.S. data from 1987 to 2006 to examine managers’ decisions 
on using real and accruals earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) and the consequences of two earnings managements on firms’ future operating 
performance, and found that managers apply real activities and accrual-based earnings 
management around SEOs such that their decisions on trading off real activities earnings 
management and accruals earnings management are based on the costs attached. When the 
cost of accruals earnings management is high (e.g., high scrutiny from outsiders and high 
litigation risk), managers tend to utilise real earnings management. Studies also find that the 
reduction in post-SEOs performance due to the influence of real activities management on 
firms’ future operating performance is more severe than from accruals management. Zang 
(2012) used a large sample of U.S. firms from 1987 to 2008 to investigate how managers 
make decisions on trading off real activities earnings management and accruals earnings 
management in managing earnings, and found they used two earnings management strategies 
alternatively, based on their relative costs, and then adjusted the level of accruals earnings 
management according to the level of real activities earnings management realised. If firms 
operate in an environment where manipulating real activities is costly due to their less than 
healthy financial condition, less competitive status in the industry, higher marginal tax rates, 
and a higher level of scrutiny from institutional investors, then managers tend to utilise 




accounting practice is constrained because of heightened regulatory scrutiny, previous 
periods of accruals earnings management, and flexible balance sheets, then the converse is 
true. The author concluded that the amount of accruals earnings management increases 
(decreases) when the outcome of real activities earnings management turns out to be too low 
(high), showing that managers substitute the two strategies directly. Cohen et al. (2008) 
examined the changes in accruals and real activities earnings management in the pre- and 
post- SOX periods, and also investigated whether firms make a substitution between real and 
accruals earnings management after SOX periods. They found that overall earnings 
management (i.e., sum of real activities earning management and accruals earnings 
management) increased over the time of the SOX passage, but afterwards the level of total 
earnings management returned to the pre-SOX trend line. Their study also found that when 
the level of accruals earnings management declined, the level of real activities earnings 
management grew dramatically after the passage of SOX, which implies that managers 
changed from utilising accruals earnings management to real activities earnings management 
after SOX. The authors concluded that the phenomenon that transformed away from accruals 
basis to real earnings management in the post-SOX period implied that in the post-SOX 
period following highly publicised scandals of accounting, the need to prevent accruals 
earnings management from being detected is greater than in previous periods, forcing 
managers to shift from accruals to real earnings management. Achleitner et al. (2014) 
investigated managers using real earnings management and accruals earnings management in 
German listed family firms from 1998 to 2008, and found that unlike non-family firms, 
family firms used more income-decreasing accruals earnings management practices, and 
were less engaged in real activities earnings management. The authors also found that family 
firms applied real activities earnings management and accruals earnings management 




(2011) examined how the degree and duration of overvaluation influenced managements’ 
decision to use three different earnings management techniques (accruals earnings 
management, real activities earnings management and non-statutory earnings management), 
and found that firms used these alternatively and concluded that overvaluation is an important 
determining factor in managements’ earnings management decisions.  
 
There are three papers in extant literature that investigated managers using accruals earnings 
management and non-statutory earnings disclosures. Elshafie et al. (2010) was the first study 
to examine the relationship between investor perception management by reporting 
opportunistic pro forma earnings (measured by the difference between GAAP EPS and Pro 
forma EPS) and earnings management through real activities or by accruals. They found that 
managers reported pro forma earnings opportunistically if they failed to meet their earnings 
targets or had limited abilities to manage earnings. They also found that the relevant value of 
pro forma earnings is always higher than statutory earnings regardless of whether firms are 
involved in high or low accruals earnings management. These results suggest that when 
managers do not meet earnings targets or have limited ability to manipulate within-statutory 
earnings, they are more likely to report aggressive pro forma earnings to influence the 
perception of investors. Doyle et al. (2013) investigated whether managers utilise pro forma 
earnings to meet earnings targets and whether opportunistic disclosure of pro forma earnings 
(measured by income-increasing exclusions) is a substitute for accruals and real activities 
earnings management. They presented evidence that managers use pro forma earnings 
management to meet earnings targets, and when managers have limited ability to use earnings 
management they are more likely to opportunistically define pro forma earnings. Investors, 
however, discount positive earnings surprises when accompanied by opportunistic pro forma 




income-increasing exclusions made by managers. Black et al. (2014) investigated the trade-
off strategies of managers using different earnings managements and how the market reacts 
to them, and found that firms with less current accruals earnings management and less current 
real activities earnings management are more likely to disclose pro forma earnings and 
disclose pro forma earnings opportunistically. Similar to Doyle et al. (2013)’ study, market 
reactions suggest that investors understand managers’ trade-off strategies and react negatively 
on pro forma earnings. These three papers presented the evidence that managers apply 
accruals earnings management and non-statutory earnings management alternatively, 
however, none of them examined whether the equity overvaluation influences a manager’s 
decision to use different earnings management mechanisms.  
 
 
3.2.3.2 Complementary association 
Other studies suggest that managers use earnings management mechanisms that are 
complementary. Indeed, researchers argue that the reporting environment is an important 
factor in the decision to use earnings management mechanisms, and found that managers are 
more likely to use different earnings management mechanisms in a complementary way in 
countries with a relatively low accounting disclosure environment and litigation costs.  
 
Chen et al. (2012) examined whether real activities and accruals earnings management played 
mutually complementary roles in Taiwanese earnings reporting and found that real activities 
earnings management is positively associated with accruals earnings management. This result 
supports the fact that accruals and real activities earnings management play important roles in 
concurrently and strategically meeting or beating firm’s earnings in a relatively low 
accounting disclosure environment and low litigation cost settings. Similarly, Sanjaya & 




activities earnings management in the context of Indonesia, and found that real activities 
earnings management is significantly and positively related to accrual earnings management. 
This confirmed Chen et al.’s (2012) study that in a country with relatively low accounting 
disclosure environment and low litigation cost settings, managers use accruals and real 
activities earnings management to managing firm performance.  
 
Literature indicates that managers use different earnings techniques either substitutionally or 
complementary, while literature containing managers’ decisions to use multiple earnings 
management mechanisms is summarised in Appendix section 1.2. 
 
 
3.3 Theoretical framework and development of hypotheses   
3.3.1 Definition of agency theory of overvalued equity  
Agency theory of overvalued equity was introduced by Jensen (2005), who defined equity as 
being overvalued when a firm’s stock price is higher than its underlying value and company 
cannot, except by pure luck, deliver a performance that justifies its value. He proposed an 
agency theory of overvalued equity by conjecturing that when a firm’s stock price becomes 
overvalued, the potential for conflicts of interest between owners and managers grows. Here, 
managers of overvalued firms not only refuse any market correction of overvalued stock 
prices, they actually tend to extend overvaluation by engaging in earnings management that 
increases reported earnings. Therefore, stock valuations that are too high induce managers to 
engage in earnings management in order to maintain this upward trend in earnings and stock 






3.3.2 Key concepts of agency theory of overvalued equity 
As the agency theory of overvalued equity originates from agency theory, so the key concepts 
of agency theory discussed in section 2.3.4 in chapter two hold true in the agency theory of 
overvalued equity. However, in the previous article on agency theory, and others since then 
(e.g, Jensen & Meckling, 1976), literature viewed markets as potent forces to help control 
agency costs, so the contribution made by the agency theory of overvalued equity is to 
describe how markets can sometimes create and exacerbate conflicts of interest between 
owners and managers rather than resolve them (Jensen, 2005). In Jensen’s (2005) explanation 
of the agency theory of equity overvaluation, the agency costs of overvalued equity expanded 
the range of costly conflicts of interest that the traditional agency model can handle, 
particularly market and managerial optimism, and the forces that allow or even encourage 
markets to become enablers of managerial behaviour that destroys value. He asserts that to 
avoid disappointing investors, managers of firms with overvalued equity participate in 
various actions including making acquisitions, excessive internal expenses, earnings 
management, and even fraud to assure investor expectations of future growth. With these 
actions, managers can trick the market for some time via the delusion of growth, and the 
more overvalued the equity, the greater the incentive to maintain such an overvaluation 
because managers’ wealth is connected with the firm’s stock price (Marciukaityte & Varma, 
2008; Coulton et al., 2014). In essence, management will create the value the market expects, 
and then fools it for some time by providing an illusion of growth. Jensen (2005) suggests 
that these actions reflect agency costs that arise from overvalued equity. Unlike the original 
agency theory that has some solutions to agency costs (e.g., bonding and monitoring costs), 





Overvalued firms can suffer negative consequences because their managers might be 
encouraged to act in ways that are detrimental to long-term value, so as a firm becomes more 
overvalued, the stress to meet earnings targets grows, and managers might strengthen market 
optimism by showing their firms as favourably as possible. Therefore, when share prices are 
too high, managers could resort to upward earnings management if they want to retain an 
excessive share price. However share prices can increase temporarily (Badertscher, 2011), so 
when participants in the market notice that a firm’s lofty value is an illusion, there is a 
dramatic decline in firm value due to a correction of earlier overvaluation and a subsequent 




3.3.3 Application of agency theory of overvaluation in literature  
There are a number of studies that directly test Jensen’s overvaluation hypothesis; for 
instance, Houmes & Skantz (2010) documented evidence that overvalued equity is an 
incentive for a manager’s share option compensation, regardless of other reasons for 
overvaluation. Over a period of time, the price of overvalued equity should revert towards its 
‘true’ value as information about a firm’s fundamentals is revealed. The overvaluation used 
in their study was measured by quartile positive abnormal returns at the beginning of the year 
and positive price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios at the beginning of the year of the entire sample. 
Chi & Gupta (2009) was the first paper to investigate the association between overvaluation 
and accruals management and to examine how overvaluation-induced earnings management 
affects a firm’s future performance, by using a sample of U.S. data from 1964 to 2003. 
Overvaluation was measured using quartiles of book-value ratios. The authors found that 




income-increasing earnings management and overvaluation-induced income-increasing 
earnings management was negatively associated with the operating performance and future 
abnormal stock returns. Moreover, this negative relationship became more pronounced as 
prior overvaluations intensify. The results suggest that overvaluation intensifies accruals 
management, which confirms Jensen’s conjecture that equity overvaluation induces managers 
to manage the earnings. Habib et al. (2013) examined the relationship between overvalued 
equity firms and audit fees in U.S. context using three proxies for overvaluation (positive P/E 
ratios at the beginning of the year; positive price-to-book (P/B) ratios at the beginning of the 
year; positive abnormal returns at the beginning of the year). Their results show that auditors 
charge higher audit fees for customers posing aggressive earnings management because of 
incentives of overvaluation. Marciukaityte & Varma (2008) examined the agency costs of 
overvaulting equity in earnings management by investigating a sample of 526 firms that 
restated their earnings from 1990 to 2001. The study found that a considerable overvaluation 
of equity pushes managers to manage earnings, but when investors notice earnings 
restatements, they re-evaluate overvalued firms to correct them for misstating the 
overvaluation and a loss of confidence in the managers. Extending Marciukaityte & Varma’s 
(2008) study, Baderstcher (2011) focused on the degree and duration of overvaluation on the 
‘evolution’ of earnings management, from accruals management to manipulating real 
activities to non-GAAP earnings management. The author examined the association between 
overvalued equity and management’s use of alternative within-statutory earnings 
management and non-statutory earnings management, where within-statutory earnings 
management was measured by accruals earnings management and real activities earnings 
management. Non-statutory earnings management was measured by firms whose 
restatements raise questions about the quality of financial reporting. The study found that the 




management, and furthermore, managers engage in accruals earnings management in the 
early stage of overvaluation; they then resort to real activities earnings management to sustain 
their overvaluation; at later stage of overvaluation, managers are more likely to engage in 
non-GAAP earnings management. These results suggest that equity overvaluation plays a 
significant role in managers choosing to use alternative earnings management mechanisms. 
Coulton et al. (2014) examined the extent to which having overvalued equity motivates firms 
to beat earnings benchmarks and whether beating the benchmark can be interpreted as 
income-increasing earnings management, by using a sample of listed ASX non-financial 
firms over the period from 1996 to 2007. Their study suggests that overvaluation-related 
incentives encouraging earnings management, overvalued benchmark beaters have higher 
levels of abnormal accruals than other firms that beat benchmarks.   
 
 
3.3.4 Development of hypotheses  
Jensen (2005) proposed that the agency costs of overvalued equity stems from manager’s 
who cannot, except by pure luck, produce an earnings performance to maintain an overvalued 
stock price without participating in earnings management techniques. Managers manage 
earnings so they don’t have to report a firm’s true value as being lower than expected 
earnings, and be severely punished by the market (Skinner & Sloan, 2002). According to the 
agency theory of overvalued equity, managers of overvalued firms not only reject market 
correction of overvalued stock prices, they also tend to sustain overvaluation by engaging in 
earnings management that increases reported earnings because overvaluation is an instant 
step towards increasing their welfare via incentives such as bonuses and stock options that are 
usually connected with firm performance (Badertscher, 2011). The underlying assumption of 




overvaluation induces towards earnings management and the duration of overvaluation leads 
to managers’ using trade-off different earnings management techniques.  
 
There are a myriad of earnings management choices that managers can use to disguise true 
economic performance in order to sustain overvaluation. Indeed, the flexibility of accounting 
reporting policy provides opportunities for managers to engage in earnings management that 
makes the firm appear less risky or more profitable than it really is (Fields et al., 2001; 
Graham et al., 2005), so when deciding which type of earnings management to utilise, 
managers must consider the expected costs and benefits of alternative earnings management 
mechanisms. Each accounting choice has its costs and benefits, but the net incentives 
(benefits minus costs) will ultimately determine management’s choice of alternative earnings 
management mechanisms (Palmrose et al., 2004; Desai et al., 2006).  
  
Accruals earnings management is a popular choice because it has no first-order effect on cash 
flows, it can be completed at end of a period once the amount of pre-accrual management 
earnings is known, and it is less likely to destroy long-term firm value (Badertscher, 2011; 
Doukakis, 2014; Gunny, 2010). However, accruals earnings management has limitations. 
First, aggressive choices about accruals are at a higher risk of regulatory litigation and 
scrutiny because accrual accounting choices are subject to auditor scrutiny, and high levels of 
accrual manipulation tend to be discovered and detected by auditors and regulators (Graham 
et al., 2005), especially for public listed firms. Second, the reversing nature of accruals 
earnings management can be problematic because a firm must conquer the potential reversal 
of last year’s accruals earnings management in order to influence the current year’s earnings 
(Badertscher, 2011). Due to the reversing nature of accruals, a firm’s business operations and 




management. Studies argue that firms that used accrual income management extensively in 
previous years tend to shift to manage other earnings management techniques in the current 
period, especially if they have a continued motivation to manage earnings (Gunny, 2010; 
Alhadab et al., 2015).  
 
Opportunistic underlying earnings reporting is less likely to be identified by stakeholders than 
accruals earnings management because it is more likely to go undetected and will not be 
audited. From a valuation perspective, if the probability of detecting an earnings management 
technique is low, it may be less costly than other earnings management techniques 
(Badertscher et al., 2012). Another advantage of opportunistic underlying earnings reporting 
is that it enables management to manage earnings by large amounts without reversing, thus 
enabling management to achieve specific benchmarks and sustain overvalued equity (Black 
et al. 2014; Badertscher, 2011). However, opportunistic underlying earnings management is 
not without costs. The studied have found that the opportunistic non-statutory earnings 
management is most egregious forms of earnings management because of severe share prices 
decline when investors detect the non-statutory earnings management and the reputational 
costs that managers’ carry in managerial labour markets (Palmrose et al., 2004; Graham et al., 
2005; Desai et al., 2006; Mizik & Jacobson, 2007).  
 
Along with the agency theory of overvalued equity conjecture, this paper posits that firms 
with overvalued equity are more likely to engage in earnings management (either accruals 
earnings management or opportunistic underlying earnings reporting). Moreover, this paper 
assumes that duration of overvaluation induces managers to use different earnings 
management mechanisms. Specifically, in the early stage of overvaluation, managers are 




has limitations, this paper assumes that the longer a firm is overvalued, the greater the 
incentive to disclose underlying earnings and report them in an opportunistic manner to 
sustain the overvalued equity. Therefore, the following hypotheses are presented: 
 
H5: Overvalued equity firms are more likely to engage in earnings management (either 
accruals earnings management or opportunistic underlying earnings reporting).  
 
H6: The longer firms are overvalued, the more likely it is that managers will disclose 
underlying earnings opportunistically.  
 
Prior research has indicated that once a firm becomes constrained in its ability to manage 
earnings, it either stops or engages in a different type of earnings management (Ettredge et 
al., 2010; Badertscher et al., 2011). In order to provide further evidence on how earnings 
management choices interact as the duration of overvaluation increases, this study examines a 
subset of firms that are likely to be constrained in their ability to manage earnings through 
accruals. That is, if the duration of overvaluation forces managers to engage in earnings 
management, as suggested by Jensen (2005), then the subset of constrained accrual 
management firms will not use accruals earnings management and will probably only engage 
in opportunistic underlying earnings management. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
made: 
 
H7: Accruals earnings management constrained firms only disclose underlying earnings and 






3.4 Research design  
3.4.1 Measurement of accruals earnings management  
Accruals quality  
The quality of accruals is very important in determining the reliability of earnings 
information for users because it takes the view that high quality earnings map more closely 
into cash flows (Harris et al., 2000). Dechow & Dichev (2002) viewed the accruals matching 
function to cash flows as being of very important because accruals expect future cash 
collections/payments and reverse them when cash previously recognised in accruals is 
received/paid. Thus, Dechow & Dichev (2002) proposed and tested the quality of accruals 
based on the observations that the total current working capital accrual earnings maps into 
operating cash flows over the last period, the current period, and the next period. The 
unexplained portion of the variation in working capital accruals is an inverse measure of 
accruals quality (a larger unexplained portion indicates poorer quality), while the high 
unexplained portion of variations in working capital accruals error, indicates low quality 
accruals (Francis et al., 2005).  
 
The measure of accruals quality used in this paper is based on Dechow & Dichev’s (2002) 
measure where the unexplained portion of the variation in working capital accruals is 
measured as the standard deviation in the residuals using a 5-year rolling window that ends in 
year 2012 for firm j, year t in the following multivariate equation (7). 
 
TCAj,t = α0 + α1CFOj,t-1 + α2CFOj,t + α3CFOj,t+1 + vj,t  (7) 
Where: j-firm observations; t-years from 2005 to 2012; TCAj,t is firm j’s current accruals in 




year t; CFOj,t is cash flow from operations in year t, is calculated as earnings before tax (Ej,t) 
less total accruals (TAj,t)
17
, scaled by the total assets at the beginning of year t; vj,t is residuals 
from Equation (7) representing accrual quality (AQj,t). 
 
Innate factors of firms and discretional accruals earnings management  
Accruals quality is jointly determined by the relevance of underlying financial performance 
to decisions made, and by the ability of the accounting system to measure performance 
(Dechow, 2004; Dechow et al., 2010; Francis et al., 2006). Therefore, accruals quality is 
affected by two factors: those that reflect the innate features of firms and those that reflect 
discretionary sources. Innate features are derived from business models, and the operating 
risk and operating environments. Previous studies showed that innate factors accounted for 
around 50% of variations in the earnings quality metric (e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Francis et 
al., 2006; Francis et al., 2008a). Discretionary sources stem from the process of financial 
reporting and include the quality of the information systems, managerial financial reporting 
implementation decisions, judgments and estimates, monitoring, governance, and regulatory 
scrutinies (Dechow, 2004; Dechow et al., 2010; Francis et al., 2006; Francis et al., 2008a; 
Francis et al., 2005). Researchers consider innate factors as being slow to change relative to 
factors that affect the quality of discretionary earnings; that is, they are perceived as 
predetermined at any given reporting date, but are susceptible to modification over time 
(Francis et al., 2006; Dechow et al., 2010). 
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 TAj,t = ΔCAj,t - ΔCLj,t -ΔCashj,t + ΔSTDj,t-DEPNj,t ; ΔCAj,t  = firm j’s change in current assets between year t-1 and t, 
scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; ΔCLj,t = firm j’s change in current liabilities between year t-1 and t, scaled 
by total assets at the beginning of year t; ΔCashj,t = firm j’s change in cash between year t-1 and t, scaled by total assets at 
the beginning of year t; ΔSTDj,t = firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities between year t-1 and t, scaled by total assets at 
the beginning of year t; DEPj,t = firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense in year t, scaled by total assets at the 





To separate the innate factors and discretionary accruals components (i.e., accruals earnings 
management) (AMj,t) from accruals quality (AQj,t), firm size (Sizej,t), standard deviation of 
cash flow from operations (Cfoj,t), standard deviation of sales (Salesj,t), and length log 
operating cycle (Opcyclej,t), the incidence of earnings losses (NegEarnj,t) and earnings 
variability (SDEj,t) are selected as innate factors
18
. Those six innate factors are regressed on 
accruals quality (AQj,t) as follows: 
 
AQj,t = a0 + a1Sizej,t + a2Opcyclej,t + a3NegEarnj,t + a4Cfoj,t + a5Salesj,t + a5SDEj,t +ej,t  (8) 
 
Where : j-firm observations, t-years from 2009 to 2012; AQj,t is the standard deviation of 
residuals (vj,t ) from Equation (7) for firm j, in year t; Sizej,t is natural logarithm of the total 
assets for firm j, at the beginning of year t; Opcyclej,t is natural logarithm of days of accounts 
receivable plus days of inventory for firm j, in year t; Cfoj,t is standard deviation of cash flows 
from operations scaled by beginning total assets, computed using a 5-year rolling window 
ended in year 2012 for firm j, year t; Salesj,t is standard deviation of sales revenue scaled by 
beginning total assets, computed using a 5-year rolling window ended in 2012 for firm j, year 
t; NegEarnj,t is firm’s proportion of losses over the prior 5 years for firm j, in year t. SDEj,t is 
measured by standard deviation earnings before tax using a 5-year rolling window ending in 
2012 for firm j, year t. Consistent with Francis et al. (2005), Equation (8) is measured by 
cross-sectional by industry
19
 for each year. Since the cross-sectional models require at least 
10 firms in one industry (Aldamen & Duncan, 2013), this study combined the two smallest 
industry groups into one group and included the software industry in the health care industry, 
                                                          
18 Following Francis et al.’s (2005) study, this paper includes firm size, standard deviation of cash flow from operations, 
standard deviation of sales, natural logarithm of operating cycle, and incidence of earnings losses affecting accruals quality 
as firms’ innate factors. Prior studies have found that earnings variability is highly significantly related to accruals quality 
and suggest that the greater variability in earnings lower accruals quality (Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2004; 
2005). Therefore, earnings variability is included as innate factor affecting accruals quality rather used as general control 
variable as paper one did.  
19




giving a total of six industries for each year. The industry type is based on GICS industry 
sector. 8 industries were included in the sample: energy, materials, industrials, consumer 
discretionary, health care, software, telecommunication services, and utilities. The 
telecommunication services (6 firms) and the utilities (6 firms) were combined into one 
group. Software was included in the health care category because they all belong to high-tech 
industries (3 firms) for the purpose of measuring cross-sectional Equation (8). This paper 
follows Aldamen & Duncan’s (2013) measurement of industry type. In Aldamen & Duncan 
(2013)’s study, the telecommunication services and utilities were combined into one industry 
group to measure the cross-sectional model. AMj,t is the absolute value of residuals (ej,t) of 
Equation (8) presenting the discretional accruals earnings management for firm j, in year t. 
The predicted values from Equation (8) are the estimated accruals innate factors. This paper 
also attempts to examine the influence of income-increasing accruals earnings management 
on overvaluation and expects that when managers are less likely to use income-increasing 
accruals earnings management they tend to use income-increasing underlying exclusions to 
overvalue firms’ equity. Thus, following previous studies (e.g., Baber et al., 2011; Laksmana 
& Yang, 2014), this paper measures the income-increasing accruals earnings management 
(InAMj,t) by dummy variable that the positive residuals (ej,t) of Equation (8) are coded as ‘1’, 
‘0’ otherwise.  
 
 
3.4.2 Measurement of equity overvaluation 
Following Habib et al.’s (2013) study, this paper measures the value of equity using positive 
P/E ratios and P/B ratios at the beginning of the year as proxy for equity overvaluation
20
. The 
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 Because empirical evidence supports that equity overvaluation is positive related to the subsequent income-increasing 
earnings management (Chi & Gupta, 2009) and highly valued firms tend to use discretionary accruals to manage earnings 




P/E ratio was traditionally used to value firms because P/E valuation is basically a substitute 
for the well-established discounted earnings model. Voluminous studies have supported 
evidence that P/E ratios can be used for equity valuation (e.g., Beaver, 1968; Easton & 
Harris, 1991), but the applicability of P/E ratios in valuation has been challenged by 
practitioners and academics in recent decades (e.g., Kim & Ritter, 1999; How & Howe, 
2001). Since transitory earnings account for a large part of profits and an increasing number 
of firms engage in earnings management, the usefulness of earnings in valuation declines  
because of issues connected with P/E ratios (Collins et al., 1997; Collins et al., 1999), where 
the P/B ratios have become an increasingly important valuation price-multiple. The value 
relevance of equity’s book value is well documented (Collins et al., 1997; Brief & Zarowin, 
1999), because according to Brief & Zarowin (1999), when the value relevance of equity’s 
book value is compared to dividends and earnings, equity’s book value had the highest 
explanatory power. The book value of equity has been perceived as better equity valuation 
over earnings valuation because it is a relatively more steady measure that produces a less 
noisy estimate of long-term firm value (Damodaran, 1996). However, since different firms 
identify different and various numbers of intangible assets on their books, the price-multiple 
calculated using the book value of equity might not be applied to firms with different 
proportions of unrecognised intangible assets (How et al., 2007, p.106). Since the P/E ratios 
and P/B ratios have limitations, the valuation of equity is measured by the average of P/E 
ratios and P/B ratios in this paper. Using aggregative measurement (PBPEj,t) by averaging the 
two is appropriate because P/E ratios and P/B ratios present one factor (see, Table 12 panel B 
factor analysis). This research design is framed to be consistent with Jensen’s (2005) view 
that overvaluation drives managers to manipulate earnings. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
study, uses the ratios at the beginning of year t. Moreover, as this paper asserts that overvaluation induces earnings 





In order to identify overvalued firms, firms are ranked based on the PBPEj,t ratios for each 
year, where firms in the highest quartile rank21 of PBPEj,t indicate they are overvalued. To 
capture the notion of sustained overvaluation or duration of overvaluation, this paper 
identifies firms that have been in the top quartile of PBPEj,t for 0 (Over0j,t), 1(Over1j,t), 
2(Over2j,t), 3(Over3j,t) consecutive years. The P/E and P/B ratios were collected from the 
Datanalysis database.    
 
3.4.3 Empirical models for testing H5 & H6 
The models for testing H5 and H6 are designed as following:
 22
 
Earnings managementj,t=a0+ b1Overj,t+c1Controlsj,t+Year effects+Industry effects +ej,t      (9) 
Earnings managementj,t=a0+∑b0-3Over(i)j,t+c1Controlsj,t+Year effects +Industry effects +ej,t    (10) 
Where: j-firm observations, t-years from 2009 to 2012.  
Dependent variables: Earnings managementj,t is either underlying earnings disclosure or 
accruals earnings management. Underlying earnings disclosures are represented by UEj,t and 
InExj,t. UEj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm discloses a underlying earnings in 
year t, and zero otherwise; InExj,t is income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions 
measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm discloses a underlying earnings number 
that is greater than the statutory earnings in year t, and zero otherwise. Accruals earnings 
management is measured by AMj,t and InAMj,t. AMj,t is the absolute value of discretional 
accruals earnings management measured by the cross-sectional residuals (ej,t) of Equation (8) 
for firm j, year t. InAMj,t is income-increasing earnings management, where equals 1 if 
residuals (ej,t) of Equation (8) is positive, 0 otherwise.  
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  Unlike Badertscher’s (2011), this paper uses quartile value rather than quintile value due to the small sample size. Therefore, following 
Habib et al.’s (2013) study, this paper measures overvalued equity using quartile values of PBPE. 
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Interested variables: Overj,t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm is in the top quartile 
of PBPEj,t  in year t, and 0 otherwise. Over(i)j,t is dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm has 
been in the top quartile of PBPEj,t for (i) consecutive years, and 0 otherwise. Specifically, 
Over0j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued once during the sample years from 2009 to 2012, and 
0 otherwise. Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued by one consecutive year during the 
sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued two consecutive years 
during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued for three 
consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
3.4.4 Control variables for equity overvaluation and earnings management  
 
Following the literature, this paper includes several control variables that influenced the 
likelihood of firm overvaluation and earnings management.  
 
Accruals-specific controls: following prior studies (e.g., Badertscher, 2011; Cohen & 
Zarowin, 2010; Black et al., 2014), this paper includes a dummy variable Litigationj,t which 
equals 1 if j firm is in a high litigation risk industry
23
 to capture the litigation penalties. This 
paper includes Litigationj,t as a specific control variable because accrual earnings 
management is more likely than opportunistic underlying earnings reporting to be detected 
and punished, so greater perceived litigation penalties should decrease the tendency for 
accruals earnings management. Another specific control variable for accruals widely 
recorded in accounting literature is the Big4 auditors. Following prior studies (e.g., Doukakis, 
2014; Badertscher, 2011; Black et al., 2014), this paper includes Big4j,t as a specific control 
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 Following Barton & Simko (2002) and Cohen & Zarowin (2010)’s studies, high litigation industries are pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, 
Software & Services industries. The pharmaceutical/biotechnology is a sub group of health care sector. The author relooked at the industry 




variable that is measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s auditor comes from 
Big 4 audit companies, and 0 otherwise. This variable is included because prior literature 
suggests that auditors play a monitoring role and the presence of a Big 4 auditor restricts 
accrual earnings management practices (Francis & Wang, 2008). This paper expects that 
increased scrutiny enhances the probability of discovering accrual earnings management, but 
it should not affect a manager’s decision to opportunistically disclose underlying earnings 
because it typically falls outside an auditor’s responsibility.  
 
Underlying earnings-specific controls: prior research indicates that meeting the earnings 
targets and avoiding the current statutory losses are a useful tool to explain pro forma 
earnings disclosures and suggest that mangers have strong incentives to manipulate non-
statutory earnings when firms miss their earnings target or make current statutory earnings 
losses (e.g., Black & Christensen, 2009; Barth et al., 2012; Hitz, 2010; Isidro & Marques, 
2014; Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al., 2010). Paper one (i.e., chapter two) of this thesis also 
confirmed this assertion, so this paper includes the dummy variable Lossj,t  which equals 1 if j 
firm make current statutory earnings loss in year t, and 0 otherwise, while the dummy 
variable Meetj,t which equals 1 if j firm’s current statutory earnings is greater than or equal to 
previous statutory earnings, and 0 otherwise.  
 
General control variables were discussed in section (2.4.4) of this thesis, but for the sake of 
brevity it does not present detailed explanations of the general control variables used here 
again. Leverage ratio (Leveragej,t) (e.g., Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 
1994; Doukakis, 2014; Francis & Wang, 2008); firms’ growth (MtoBj,t & SalesGj,t) (e.g., 
Myers, 1977; Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Lougee & Marquardt, 2004; Doyle et al., 2013; Black et 




1994; Balsam et al., 1995; Doyle et al., 2007a; Doyle et al., 2013; Frankel et al., 2011; 
Doukakis, 2014); Capital intensity (Capitalj,t) (e.g., Baginski et al., 1999; Lev, 1983; Francis 
et al., 2004); Balance sheet bloat (NOAj,t) have been included as general control variables for 
Equation (9) and Equation (10). The measurement of firm size has been replaced by 
Mktcapj,t, which is measured by the natural logarithm of market capitalisation at the 
beginning of year t. This paper uses market capitalisation to measure firm size rather than the 
total assets because market capitalisation is a more precise proxy for firm size in the context 
of overvaluation (Doukakis, 2014). 
 
This study includes underlying earnings disclosure (accruals earnings management) as 
control variables because previous literature indicated that accrual earnings management and 
non-statutory earnings disclosures are substitute mechanisms of earnings management (Black 
et al., 2014; Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al., 2010), that is, if the dependent variable is 
accruals earnings management (AMj,t and InAMj,t), then it controls for the underlying 
earnings disclosures (UEj,t and InExj,t), and the contrary applies because firms may follow an 
overall earnings management strategy and utilise a mix of underlying earnings disclosure and 
accruals earnings management tools, or they can choose between the two earnings 
management mechanisms and apply the one that is least expensive for them (Cohen et al., 
2008; Doukakis, 2014). 
 
Year and industry effects are included as control variables. For year effects, 3 dummy 
variables are generated (year 2010=1, and others zero; year 2011=1, and others zero; year 
2012=1, and others zero) to control for the unobservable confounding variables that differ 
from time to time, but are constant across the industries. Year 2009 was dropped by Stata 




be consistent with the Equation (8) to measure accruals earnings management, 5 dummy 
variables are generated (energy=1, and others zero; materials =1, and others zero; 
industrials=1, and others zero; health care or software & services =1, and others zero; =1, 
telecommunication or utilities=1, and others zero) to control for the unobservable 
confounding variables that differ across industries, but are constant over time. Consumer 
discretionary was dropped by Stata software because the fixed-effects model includes a 
constant, and it follows Aldamen & Duncan’s (2013) measurement of industry type. In 
Aldamen & Duncan (2013)’s study, the telecommunication services and utilities were 
combined into one industry group to measure the cross-sectional model, while the software 
was combined with the health care category because they all belong to high-tech industries. 
 
 
3.4.5 Limited ability using accruals earnings management (H7) 
Given that an overvalued firm has decided to manage reported earnings, this paper now seeks 
to find whether the constraints of using accruals earnings management would induce 
managers to disclose underlying earnings and disclose them in an opportunistic manner. Due 
to the constrained flexibility of accruals, the ability of managers to manage accruals upwards 
in the current period is limited by accrual management activities in previous periods. This 
paper follows prior studies (e.g., Barton & Simko, 2002; Zang, 2012; Badertscher, 2011) 
where net operating assets (NOAj,t) is used as a proxy for the extent of accruals management 
in previous periods to represent a firm’s ability to manage earnings using accruals. If the net 
operating assets at the beginning of the year are high, then managers’ abilities to use accruals 
to manipulate earnings are reduced in the current year because the balance sheet and income 
statement are articulated, and therefore abnormal accruals shown in past earnings can also be 




management in previous times (Black et al., 2014; Zang, 2012; Barton & Simko, 2002). 
Since the underlying earnings exclusions do not include a practical accounting system entry 
(there are no debits and credits adjustments required), therefore, opportunistic underlying 
earnings reporting is not necessarily constrained by the balance sheet, as accruals would be 
(Doyle et al., 2013).  
In order to investigate H7, this paper focuses on a subsample of firms that are constrained in 
their ability to engage in further accruals management. The constrained accruals earnings 
management ability is measured by net operating assets (NOAj,t). The high values of NOAj,t 
represent low ability to manipulate earnings using accruals in the current year. Specifically, 
each year is ranked on NOAj,t and then the upper median
24
 of NOAj,t is selected as a proxy of 
accruals constrains firms; this allows for an examination of whether overvalued firms that 
lack flexibility overstate earnings through accruals but do not engage in accruals earnings 
management, or whether they only disclose underlying earnings and engage in opportunistic 
underlying earnings reporting for the duration of overvaluation.  
 
3.5 Analyses and Results  
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics of variables for paper two 
Table 11 documents descriptive statistics of the variables for earnings management and 
equity overvaluation variables and shows the differences between the top and bottom 
quartiles. For the four earnings management mechanisms (AMj,t, InAMj,t, UEj,t and InExj,t), 
the mean (median) of AMj,t is 0.467 (0.183), with an interquartile range of (0.076) to (0.425). 
The mean amount of UEj,t is high (0.523) compared to the three other earnings management 
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 Unlike Badertscher’s (2011) study, median value is selected as benchmark rather than quintile because of the limitation of the sample size 




mechanisms. The median of InAMj,t (0.000) is lower than the median of InExj,t (1.000), 
which means that sample firms are more likely to use income-increasing underlying earnings 
exclusions than income-increasing accruals earnings management. Looking at the 
overvaluation variables, the mean and median of P/Ej,t (0.218 and 0.145, respectively) are 
higher than the mean and median of P/Bj,t (0.046 and 0.020, respectively), but the number of 
observations of P/Ej,t (471) is much lower than the number of observations of P/Bj,t (561). 
The mean (median) of PBPEj,t is 0.133 (0.085), with an interquartile range of (0.064) to 
(0.119). This paper also presents the descriptive statistics of PBPEj,t for each individual year. 
Compared to the three other years, PBPEj,2009 had data with the most variations, with a 



















Table 11: Descriptive statistics for earnings management and equity overvaluation 
variables 
Variable Obs Mean LowQ Median TopQ Std. Dev. 
AQj,t 566 0.195 0.046 0.085 0.196 0.267 
AMj,t 566 0.467 0.076 0.183 0.425 1.309 
InAMj,t 566 0.472 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
UEj,t 566 0.523 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.500 
InExj,t 566 0.360 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.481 
P/Ej,t 471 0.218 0.110 0.145 0.190 0.365 
P/Bj,t 561 0.046 0.012 0.020 0.037 0.197 
PBPEj,t 469 0.133 0.064 0.085 0.119 0.264 
PBPEj,2009 107 0.122 0.064 0.082 0.115 0.221 
PBPEj,2010 114 0.117 0.057 0.073 0.112 0.166 
PBPEj,2011 123 0.115 0.072 0.090 0.129 0.081 
PBPEj,2012 125 0.097 0.070 0.086 0.112 0.044 
Note: AQj,t is accruals quality measured by the standard deviation of five-year windows rolling of residuals of Equation (7) for firm j, in 
year t. AMj,t is absolute ‘abnormal’ accruals measured by residuals of Equation (8) for firm j, in year t. InAMj,t is positive of ‘abnormal’ 
accruals (the positive of residuals (ej,t) of Equation (8)), which represents income-increasing accruals earnings management for firm j, in 
year t. UEj,t is dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm disclose underlying earnings in year t, 0 otherwise. InExj,t is dummy variable which 
equals 1 if j firm disclose underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings in year t, 0 otherwise. P/Ej,t is price to earnings ratio for j firm 
at the beginning of year t which is collected from DatAnalysis database. P/Bj,t is price to book ratio for j firm at the beginning of year t 
which is collected from DatAnalysis database. PBPEj,t is average of P/Ej,t and P/Bj,t. PBPEj,2009 is average of P/Ej,t and P/Bj,t for firm j  at the 
beginning of year 2009. PBPEj,2010 is average of P/Ej,t and P/Bj,t for firm j at the beginning of year 2010. PBPEj,2011 is average of P/Ej,t and 
P/Bj,t for firm j at the beginning of year 2011. PBPEj,2012 is average of P/Ej,t and P/Bj,t for firm j at the beginning of year 2012. 
 
 
3.5.2 Pearson and Spearman correlations and factor analysis of variables for paper two 
Table 12 and panel A shows the pearson and spearman correlations of key variables for 
earnings management and equity overvaluation. Since the correlations of general control 
variables have already been presented in section (2.5.3) of chapter two, the correlations of 
general control variables will not be repeated again here. The AMj,t and UEj,t is significantly 
and negatively correlated with a spearman correlation of -0.168, a p-value of 0.000 and a 
pearson correlation of -0.171, and a p-value of 0.000, respectively. The InExj,t is significantly 
and negatively correlated to AMj,t and InAMj,t under spearman and pearson correlations. 
These results are consistent with prior studies (Black et al., 2014; Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie 




reporting are substitutionary earnings management mechanisms. Moving on to the 
correlations between earnings management mechanisms and overvaluation measurements, 
the correlations of AMj,t and InAMj,t are significantly and positively correlated to Over0j,t 
under a pearson correlation test (correlation=0.126, p-value=0.006) and (correlation=0.159, 
p-value=0.001), respectively. The correlations of UEj,t and InExj,t are significantly positive 
correlated to Over2j,t under pearson and spearman correlations. These relationships indicate 
that when a firm is overvalued once in the early stage, it is more likely to apply discretional 
accruals earnings management and income-increasing accruals earnings management. If the 
duration of equity overvaluation continues, firms then resort to underlying earnings 
disclosure and disclose underlying earnings opportunistically (income-increasing underlying 
earnings exclusions) to sustain the overvaluation. Table 12 and panel B presents the factor 
analysis for measuring overvaluation, and indicates that P/E ratios and P/B ratios represent 
one factor, so it is appropriate to combine the two measurement ratios into one variable 















Table 12: Pearson and Spearman correlations for earnings management and equity 
overvaluation variables and factor analysis for equity overvaluation variables 
Table 12 Panel A: Pearson and spearman correlations for variables 
 
AMj,t InAMj,t UEj,t InExj,t Overj,t Over0j,t Over1j,t Over2j,t Over3j,t 
AMj,t 1.000 0.077
* -0.171*** -0.132*** 0.048 0.126*** -0.002 -0.041 -0.019 
  
(0.067) (0.000) (0.002) (0.297) (0.006) (0.962) (0.371) (0.680) 
InAMj,t -0.059 1.000 -0.033 -0.127




(0.436) (0.003) (0.452) (0.001) (0.713) (0.002) (0.038) 
UEj,t -0.168




(0.000) (0.286) (0.420) (0.426) (0.000) (0.064) 
InExj,t -0.134
*** -0.151*** 0.690*** 1.000 0.052 -0.088* -0.009 0.226*** -0.041 
 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.262) (0.057) (0.840) (0.000) (0.371) 
Overj,t 0.036 -0.035 0.049 0.052 1.000 0.394
*** 0.400*** 0.443*** 0.479*** 
 
(0.434) (0.452) (0.286) (0.262) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Over0j,t 0.058 0.159
*** -0.037 -0.088* 0.394*** 1.000 -0.077* -0.085* -0.095** 
 
(0.211) (0.001) (0.420) (0.057) (0.000) 
 
(0.096) (0.065) (0.040) 
Over1j,t 0.010 0.017 0.037 -0.009 0.400
*** -0.077* 1.000 -0.057 -0.070 
 




*** 0.201*** 0.226*** 0.443*** -0.085* -0.057 1.000 -0.034 
 




** -0.086* -0.041 0.479*** -0.095** -0.070 -0.034 1.000 
 
(0.307) (0.038) (0.064) (0.371) (0.000) (0.040) (0.131) (0.469) 
 
p-value in parentheses 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Pearson (above) and spearman (bellow) correlations 
Note: Overj,t is dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm is in the top quartile of PBPEj,t  in year t, 0 otherwise. Over0j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued once during the sample years from 2009 to 2012, and 0 otherwise. Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued one consecutive year 
during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 
otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued three consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Table 12 Panel B: Factor analysis for overvaluation variables 
Factor   Eigenvalue Difference  Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 1.024 1.257 1.296 1.296 
Factor2 -0.233 0.000 -0.296 1.000 
Number of obs 469 
   
Retained factors 1 
   
Number of params 1 




Table 12 Panel B: Factor analysis for overvaluation variables (continued) 
chi2(1) 234.97 
   
Prob>chi2 0 
   
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
  
Variable Factor1  Uniqueness 
  
P/B ratios 0.7154 0.4882 
  
P/E ratios 0.7154 0.4882 
  
 
3.5.3 Regression results  
3.5.3.1 Results for overvalued firms induce earnings management (H5) 
Table 13 and panel A represents the regressions of accruals quality on innate factors for the 
sample period. These results generally consist of prior researches (Dechow & Dichev, 2002, 
Francis et al., 2004; 2005) where all the innate factors are significantly related to AQj,t except 
Opcyclej,t and Cfoj,t. SDEj,t, Salesj,t and NegEarnj,t are significantly positive associated with 
AQj,t, (coefficient=0.128, p-value=0.008), (coefficient=0.038, p-value=0.011) and 
(coefficient=0.146, p-value=0.000) respectively, while Sizej,t is negatively and significantly 
related to AQj,t (coefficient=-0.036, p-value=0.000). 
 
Table 13 panel B provides the results of H5 by using year industry fixed-effects regression 
with AMj,t and UEj,t as dependent variables. Since this paper only includes positive P/E ratios 
and positive P/B ratios and accruals earnings management needs 5-years of rolling window 
data, it leads to decrease in sample size to 469 firm-year observations. Model 17 is tested 
using year industry fixed-effects panel model with AMj,t as the dependent variable, while 
model 18 is measured by year industry fixed-effects logit model with UEj,t as the dependent 
variable. The results show that the Overj,t is positively and significantly associated with UEj,t 




generally more likely to engage in underlying earnings disclosures, not accruals earnings 
management. The result also provides evidence that AMj,t is significantly and negatively 
related to UEj,t with a coefficient of -0.334, the p-value=0.006 in model 17 and the coefficient 
of -0.655, p-value=0.003 in model 18, respectively, indicating that when firms have low 
levels of accruals earnings management, they are more likely to disclose underlying earnings. 
Table 13 panel C provides the results of H5 by using year industry fixed-effects logit 
regressions with InAMj,t (model 19) and InExj,t (model 20) as dependent variables. Panel C 
provides similar results to panel B where Overj,t is positively and significantly related to 
InExj,t (coefficient=1.143, p-value=0.000) rather than InAM, indicating that overvalued firms 
are more likely to engage in income-increasing underlying earnings disclosures and not 
income-increasing accruals earnings management. The significantly negative relationship 
between InExj,t and InAMj,t found in table 13 panel C in models 19 and 20 suggests that 
managers apply income increasing underlying exclusions and income-increasing accruals 
earnings management alternatively. These results are consistent with H5 that overvalued 
firms induce earnings management; that is, they apply underlying earnings disclosure and 
disclose them opportunistically rather than using accruals earnings management in general. 
These results also suggest that when managers have low levels of accruals earnings 
management and low levels of income-increasing accruals earnings management, they are 
more likely to disclose underlying earnings opportunistically. In other words the underlying 
earnings disclosure and opportunistic underlying earnings discourse are used by managers as 








Table 13: Regression results for equity overvaluation and earnings management (H5) 
Table 13 Panel A: the regression results of accruals quality on innate factors 
AQj,t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
NegEarnj,t 0.146
*** 0.038 3.830 0.000 0.071 0.221 
Salesj,t 0.038
** 0.015 2.560 0.011 0.009 0.068 
Sizej,t -0.036
*** 0.006 -5.480 0.000 -0.048 -0.023 
SDEj,t 0.128
*** 0.048 2.640 0.008 0.033 0.222 
Cfoj,t 0.012 0.021 0.560 0.573 -0.029 0.052 
Opcyclej,t 0.003 0.017 0.180 0.858 -0.031 0.037 
_cons 0.383*** 0.061 6.250 0.000 0.263 0.503 
Number of obs. 566 
     
R-squared 21.53% 
     
Table 13 Panel B: the regression results for H5 with AMj,t and UEj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 17 with AMj,t as dependent variable Model 18 with UEj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Overj,t 0.101 0.148 0.680 0.494 1.044
*** 0.298 3.510 0.000 
AM specific 
        
Big4j,t -0.117 0.252 -0.470 0.642 
    
Litigationj,t 0.364 0.363 1.000 0.317 
    
UE specific 
        
Meetj,t 
    
0.096 0.255 0.380 0.707 
Lossj,t 
    
1.329*** 0.438 3.030 0.002 
General controls 
        
UEj,t -0.334
*** 0.121 -2.750 0.006 
    
AMj,t 
    
-0.655*** 0.222 -2.950 0.003 
Leveragej,t 0.832
*** 0.207 4.010 0.000 1.380** 0.654 2.110 0.035 
SalesGj,t -0.489
** 0.230 -2.130 0.034 -1.121** 0.503 -2.230 0.026 
MtoBj,t -0.004 0.084 -0.050 0.958 -0.690
*** 0.187 -3.690 0.000 
Mktcapj,t -0.051 0.045 -1.130 0.260 0.463
*** 0.091 5.080 0.000 
NOAj,t -0.044 0.088 -0.500 0.616 0.233 0.247 0.940 0.345 
ROEj,t 0.104 0.481 0.220 0.829 1.976
* 1.077 1.830 0.067 
Capitalj,t -0.144 0.118 -1.220 0.223 0.402
* 0.242 1.660 0.096 




Table 13 Panel B: the regression results for H5 with AMj,t and UEj,t as dependent variables (continued) 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Industry effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Number of obs. 469 
   
469 






   
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Table 13: Regression results for equity overvaluation and earnings management (H5) 
(continued) 
Table 13 Panel C: the regression results for H5 with InAMj,t and InExj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 19 with InAMj,t as dependent variable Model 20 with InExj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Overj,t -0.262 0.275 -0.950 0.340 1.143
*** 0.296 3.860 0.000 
AM specific 
        
Big4j,t -1.029
** 0.473 -2.180 0.029 
    
Litigationj,t 0.511 0.697 0.730 0.464 
    
UE specific 
        
Meetj,t 
    
-0.098 0.248 -0.400 0.692 
Lossj,t 
    
1.802*** 0.389 4.640 0.000 
General controls 
        
InEj,t -0.679
*** 0.218 -3.120 0.002 
    
InAMj,t 
    
-0.748*** 0.223 -3.360 0.001 
Leveragej,t 0.306 0.394 0.780 0.438 0.956
* 0.517 1.850 0.065 
SalesGj,t -0.099 0.425 -0.230 0.816 -0.641 0.500 -1.280 0.200 
MtoBj,t -0.321
** 0.156 -2.050 0.040 -0.588*** 0.161 -3.640 0.000 
Mktcapj,t 0.102 0.081 1.270 0.205 0.297
*** 0.086 3.480 0.001 
NOAj,t 0.117 0.171 0.680 0.495 0.197 0.185 1.060 0.288 
ROEj,t 1.930
** 0.927 2.080 0.037 1.392 0.917 1.520 0.129 
Capitalj,t -0.348 0.224 -1.550 0.121 0.763
*** 0.238 3.210 0.001 
_cons 1.206 0.994 1.210 0.225 -4.536*** 1.053 -4.310 0.000 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Industry effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Number of obs. 469 
   
469 




   
15.33% 




Table 13: Regression results for equity overvaluation and earnings management (H5) 
(continued) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: Sizej,t is natural logarithm of the total assets for firm j, at the beginning of year t; Opcyclej,t is natural logarithm of days of accounts 
receivable plus days of inventory for firm j, in year t; Cfoj,t is standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by beginning total 
assets, computed using a 5-year rolling window ended in year 2012 for firm j, year t; Salesj,t is standard deviation of sales revenue scaled by 
beginning total assets, computed using a 5-year rolling window ended in 2012 for firm j, year t; NegEarnj,t is firm’s proportion of losses over 
the prior 5 years for firm j, year t. Big4j,t equals 1 if j firm is audited by Big 4 auditors, 0 otherwise. SDEj,t  is measured by standard deviation 
of earnings before tax using a 5-year rolling window ending in 2012 for firm j, year t. Litigationj,t equals 1 if j firm is in one of 
pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, Software and Services industries, 0 otherwise. Meetj,t is dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s earnings 
before tax in year t is greater or equal to earnings before tax in year t-1, and zero otherwise. Lossj,t  is dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm 
report statutory earnings in year t, 0 otherwise. MtoBj,t is measured by the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity for 
firm j, in year t. ROEj,t is earnings before tax divided by average shareholders’ equity for firm j, in year t. Leveragej,t is measured by short-
term and long-term debt divided by total assets for firm j, in year t. NOAj,t is measured by shareholders’ equity less cash and cash equivalent 
plus total debt divided by lagged sales for firm j, at the beginning of the year t. SalesGj,t is  the sales for firm j, year t minus the sales for firm 
j, in year t-1, then divided by  the sales for firm j, in year t. MktCapj,t is measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the 
firm at the beginning of year t for firm j. Capitalj,t is capital intensity measured by the ratio of net book value of PPE to total assets for firm j, 
in year t. 
 
 
3.5.3.2 Results for the duration of overvaluation and earnings management mechanisms (H6) 
Table 14 Panel A shows the results of H6 using the year industry fixed-effects regression 
models with AMj,t and UEj,t as dependent variables. Model 21 is tested using the year industry 
fixed-effects panel model with AMj,t as the dependent variable, while model 22 is measured 
by the year industry fixed-effects logit model with UEj,t as the dependent variable. The result 
of model 21 shows that only Over0j,t is significantly positive related to AMj,t 
(coefficient=0.455, p-value=0.052), while the result of model 22 shows that Over1j,t and 
Over2j,t are significantly positively related to UEj,t (coefficient=0.985, p-value=0.048) and 
(coefficient=2.748, p-value=0.000), respectively. The coefficient on Over2j,t is greater than 
Over1j,t which suggests that the longer a firm is overvalued the more likely it is to disclose 
underlying earnings. It appears that overvalued firms use accruals earnings management once 
for the first year and then it level off. By commencing overvaluation for one consecutive 
year, firms begin to engage in underlying earnings disclosure. Table 14 Panel B shows the 
results of H6 by using year industry fixed-effects regression models with InAMj,t and InExj,t 
as the dependent variables. Model 23 and model 24 are tested using year industry fixed-




of model 23 show that Over0j,t is positively and significantly related to InAMj,t 
(coefficient=0.927, p-value=0.056), while Over2j,t and Over3j,t are significantly negatively 
associated with InAMj,t (Coefficient=-1.169, p-value=0.011), (Coefficient=-0.788, p-
value=0.050), respectively. These results suggest that in the early stage of overvaluation, 
firms are more likely to engage in income-increasing accruals earnings management, at the 
later stage of overvaluation, and managers are less likely to use income-increasing accruals 
earnings management. This could be explained by the reversing nature of accruals earnings 
management where managers’ abilities to use income-increasing accruals earnings 
management have decreased. Table 14 panel B model 24 presents evidence that InExj,t is 
positively and significantly associated with Over1j,t (Coefficient=0.848, p-value=0.065), 
Over2j,t (Coefficient=2.444, p-value=0.000), Over3j,t (Coefficient=0.740, p-value=0.084), and 
therefore after a firm has been overvalued once at an early stage using income-increasing 
earnings management, firms sustain their overvaluation by engaging in opportunistic 
underlying earnings reporting to define underlying earnings as being higher than statutory 
earnings. This result, coupled with the finding in panel A of table 14, suggests that after an 
extended period overvaluation, firms are unable to engage in further accruals earnings 
management and therefore resort to opportunistically reporting underlying earnings. These 









Table 14: Regression results for during of equity overvaluation and managers’ choices 
of using alternative earnings management (H6) 
Table 14 Panel A: the regression results for H6 with AMj,t and UEj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 21 with AMj,t as dependent variable Model 22with UEj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Over0j,t 0.455
* 0.233 1.950 0.052 0.469 0.461 1.020 0.309 
Over1j,t -0.081 0.237 -0.340 0.733 0.985
** 0.499 1.970 0.048 
Over2j,t -0.100 0.219 -0.460 0.648 2.748
*** 0.647 4.240 0.000 
Over3j,t -0.128 0.210 -0.610 0.543 0.517 0.418 1.240 0.216 
AM specific 
        
Big4j,t -0.084 0.254 -0.330 0.742 
    
Litigationj,t 0.434 0.371 1.170 0.242 
    
UE specific 
        
Meetj,t 
    
0.122 0.261 0.470 0.641 
Lossj,t 
    
1.350*** 0.454 2.980 0.003 
General controls 
        
UEj,t -0.305
** 0.122 -2.490 0.013 
    
AMj,t 
    
-0.614*** 0.218 -2.820 0.005 
Leveragej,t 0.827
*** 0.207 4.010 0.000 1.345** 0.637 2.110 0.035 
SalesGj,t -0.515
** 0.230 -2.240 0.026 -1.216** 0.499 -2.440 0.015 
MtoBj,t 0.019 0.085 0.220 0.827 -0.659
*** 0.188 -3.500 0.000 
Mktcapj,t -0.065 0.045 -1.440 0.151 0.468
*** 0.093 5.020 0.000 
NOAj,t -0.053 0.088 -0.600 0.547 0.310 0.261 1.190 0.234 
ROEj,t 0.101 0.485 0.210 0.835 2.242
** 1.085 2.070 0.039 
Capitalj,t -0.182 0.121 -1.500 0.133 0.394 0.264 1.490 0.135 
_cons 1.320** 0.550 2.400 0.017 -4.494*** 1.144 -3.930 0.000 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Industry effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Number of obs. 469 
   
469 






   





Table 14: Regression results for equity overvaluation and alternative earnings 
management (H6) (continued) 
Table 14 Panel B: the regression results for H6 with InAMj,t and InExj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 23with InAMj,t as dependent variable Model 24with InExj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Over0j,t 0.927
* 0.486 1.910 0.056 0.291 0.499 0.580 0.559 
Over1j,t -0.340 0.434 -0.780 0.433 0.848
* 0.460 1.840 0.065 
Over2j,t -1.169
** 0.458 -2.550 0.011 2.444*** 0.487 5.020 0.000 
Over3j,t -0.788
** 0.402 -1.960 0.050 0.740* 0.428 1.730 0.084 
AM 
specific 
        
Big4j,t -1.069
** 0.495 -2.160 0.031 
    
Litigationj,t 0.822 0.723 1.140 0.256 
    
UE specific 
        
Meetj,t 
    
-0.024 0.254 -0.090 0.925 
Lossj,t 
    
1.863*** 0.403 4.630 0.000 
General 
controls 
        
InExj,t -0.560
** 0.223 -2.520 0.012 
    
InAMj,t 
    
-0.626*** 0.229 -2.730 0.006 
Leveragej,t 0.315 0.402 0.780 0.434 0.961
* 0.523 1.840 0.066 
SalesGj,t -0.227 0.439 -0.520 0.605 -0.662 0.496 -1.330 0.182 
MtoBj,t -0.259 0.159 -1.620 0.104 -0.578
*** 0.166 -3.490 0.000 
Mktcapj,t 0.068 0.082 0.830 0.405 0.305
*** 0.088 3.460 0.001 
NOAj,t 0.071 0.164 0.430 0.665 0.264 0.206 1.280 0.200 
ROEj,t 1.755
* 0.939 1.870 0.061 1.652* 0.934 1.770 0.077 
Capitalj,t -0.468
* 0.243 -1.930 0.054 0.823*** 0.254 3.230 0.001 
_cons 1.719 1.061 1.620 0.105 -4.873*** 1.113 -4.380 0.000 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 




   
YES 




   
469 




   
17.83% 
   




3.5.3.3 Results for limited ability using accruals earnings management (H7) 
To test H7 where overvalued firms have limited abilities to manipulate earnings using 
accruals they only engage in opportunistic underlying earnings reporting, this paper examines 
the subset sample which only includes the sample in the upper median of NOAj,t
25
. Table 15 
panel A shows the results of H7 by using the year industry regression models with AMj,t and 
UEj,t as the dependent variables. Model 25 is tested using the year industry fixed-effects 
panel model with AMj,t as the dependent variable and model 26 is tested using the year 
industry fixed-effects logit model with UEj,t as the dependent variable. Table 15 panel B 
shows the results of H7 using the year industry fixed-effects logit regression models with 
InAMj,t (model 27) and InExj,t (model 28) as dependent variables. By confirming the H7 
prediction, this paper finds that firms with limited accruals earnings management options do 
not engage in accruals earnings management, and as the duration of overvaluation increases, 
they engage in underlying earnings disclosures and report them opportunistically to maintain 
overvaluation. Specifically, none of overvaluation measures are significantly related to AMj,t, 
while the coefficients on Over1j,t and Over2j,t are significantly and positively associated with 
UEj,t (coefficient=1.260, p-value=0.063) and (coefficient=4.280, p-value=0.002) respectively, 
as found in model 26. Model 27 finds that Over2j,t is significantly and negatively associated 
with InAMj,t (coefficient=-2.344, p-value=0.012), while model 28 finds that a positive 
Over2j,t is related to InExj,t (coefficient=3.290, p-value=0.000). The results of table 15 suggest 
that if accruals-constrained firms find it hard to apply accruals earnings management, they 
only disclose underlying earnings and disclose them opportunistically to sustain the 
overvaluation.   
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Table 15: Regression results for limited ability of using accruals earnings management 
(H7) 
Table 15 Panel A: the regression results for H7 with AMj,t and UEj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 25 with AMj,t as dependent variable Model 26 with UEj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Over0j,t -0.216 0.229 -0.940 0.347 0.603 0.765 0.790 0.431 
Over1j,t -0.121 0.186 -0.650 0.516 1.260
* 0.677 1.860 0.063 
Over2j,t -0.082 0.224 -0.370 0.713 4.280
*** 1.399 3.060 0.002 
Over3j,t -0.189 0.199 -0.950 0.343 1.085 0.691 1.570 0.116 
AM specific 
        
Big4j,t -1.127
*** 0.270 -4.180 0.000 
    
Litigationj,t 0.374 0.310 1.210 0.229 
    
UE specific 
        
Meetj,t 
    
-0.092 0.398 -0.230 0.818 
Lossj,t 
    
2.655*** 0.902 2.940 0.003 
General controls 
        
UEj,t -0.077 0.110 -0.700 0.485 
    
AMj,t 
    
-0.498 0.403 -1.240 0.217 
Leveragej,t 0.044 0.157 0.280 0.780 1.213 1.177 1.030 0.303 
SalesGj,t -0.655
*** 0.226 -2.890 0.004 -1.093 0.889 -1.230 0.219 
MtoBj,t 0.081 0.076 1.080 0.283 -1.113
*** 0.339 -3.280 0.001 
Mktcapj,t -0.107
** 0.043 -2.490 0.013 0.632*** 0.158 3.990 0.000 
ROEj,t -0.560 0.622 -0.900 0.368 2.598 2.502 1.040 0.299 
Capitalj,t -0.114 0.109 -1.050 0.293 0.707 0.432 1.640 0.102 
_cons 2.543*** 0.540 4.710 0.000 1.213 1.177 1.030 0.303 
Year effects YES  
   
YES  
   
Industry effects YES  
   
YES  
   
Number of obs. 242 
   
242 















Table 15: Regression results for limited ability of using Accruals earnings management 
(H7) (continued) 
Table 15 Panel B: the regression results for H7 with InAMj,t and InExj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 27 with InAMj,t as dependent variable Model  28 with InExj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Over0j,t 0.784 0.739 1.060 0.289 1.086 0.797 1.360 0.173 
Over1j,t -0.237 0.559 -0.420 0.672 0.927 0.627 1.480 0.139 
Over2j,t -2.344
** 0.937 -2.500 0.012 3.290*** 0.886 3.720 0.000 
Over3j,t -0.568 0.631 -0.900 0.368 0.760 0.702 1.080 0.279 
AM specific 
        
Big4j,t -1.012 0.866 -1.170 0.243 
    
Litigationj,t 2.154
* 1.114 1.930 0.053 
    
UE specific 
        
Meetj,t 
    
0.324 0.390 0.830 0.405 
Lossj,t 
    
3.253*** 0.795 4.090 0.000 
General controls 
        
InExj,t -0.725
** 0.320 -2.260 0.024 
    
InAMj,t 
    
-0.449 0.339 -1.320 0.186 
Leveragej,t 1.007 0.978 1.030 0.303 1.012 1.017 0.990 0.320 
SalesGj,t -0.604 0.772 -0.780 0.434 0.180 0.849 0.210 0.832 
MtoBj,t 0.049 0.231 0.210 0.831 -0.820
*** 0.250 -3.270 0.001 
Mktcapj,t -0.020 0.127 -0.160 0.875 0.480
*** 0.147 3.260 0.001 
ROEj,t -0.786 1.950 -0.400 0.687 -0.347 2.104 -0.160 0.869 
Capitalj,t -0.510 0.371 -1.370 0.169 1.222
*** 0.414 2.950 0.003 
_cons. 2.490 1.741 1.430 0.153 -6.600*** 1.798 -3.670 0.000 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Industry effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Number of obs 242 
   
242 




   
25.71% 
   





3.6 Additional tests 
3.6.1 Alternative measurement of equity overvaluation  
The proxies for equity valuation used in this paper are based on a simple but powerful 
representation of the relation between stock price and accounting fundamentals (Habib et al., 
2013). To prove the main results of H6, this paper uses another more precise measurement of 
equity overvaluation. Jensen (2005) stated that a firm is overvalued when ‘a firm’s stock 
price is greater than its underlying value,’ i.e., it occurs when the ratio of stock price to 
underlying value exceeds 1. Following Badertscher (2011), this paper uses the Edwards & 
Bell (1961) and Ohlson (1995) (EBO) residual income approach to get an alternative 
overvaluation measure.  
 
The EBP model can be empirically estimated as follows: 










Bj,t+2    (11) 
 
Where: j is firm observations. t is years from 2009 to 2012. Vj,t represents a j firm’s intrinsic 
value in year t. Bj,t is the book value and FROE is the future return on equity. Since the year-
end book value depends on current-year return on equity (ROE), this paper uses a sequential 
process to estimate future ROEs. The cost of equity (rPEG) is measured by the PEG ratio 
method. This paper uses the implied cost of equity model to measure the cost of equity for 
listed firms where the implied cost of equity is a discount rate that equates current share 
prices to expected future payoffs. There are many empirical studies that apply implied cost of 
equity methods to calculate the cost of equity (Li et al., 2014; Easton, 2004; Gode & 
Mohanram, 2003; Gebhardt et al., 2001). Although different models use various approaches 
and assumptions for valuation, they are all based on estimating the current share prices and 




the others because the evaluation of expected return is more predictably and consistently 
associated with risk proxies such as size, beta, residual risk, leverage and growth (Li et al., 
2014; Botosan & Plumlee, 2005). Therefore, Easton’s (2004) model is used in this thesis, and 
is represented in equation (12). PEG is the price-earnings-growth ratio (PEG ratio), which is 
calculated by equation (13): 
Cost of Equity =√
1
𝑃𝐸𝐺×100
(12), where PEG = (P/E Ratio)/(Annual EPS Growth)  (13) 
The equity valuation is measured by P/V (price-to-value) ratios, which is calculated by 
dividing the stock price (P) by a firm’s intrinsic value (V). The P/V ratio is a good predictor 
of cross-sectional returns because P/V predicts cross-sectional returns and the book-to-market 
ratio (Frankel & Lee, 1998; Badertscher, 2011). To identify overvalued firms and measure 
the duration of overvaluation, each year’s P/V ratios of firms are ranked. Firms in the top 
quartile of P/V ratios are recorded as 1 to represent overvalued firms, and 0 otherwise. 
Over0j,t equals 1 if j firm is in the top quartile of P/V ratios once during the sample years from 
2009 to 2012, and 0 otherwise. Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is in the top quartile of P/V ratios for 
one consecutive year during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if j firm is in 
the top quartile of P/V ratios for two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 
otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm is in the top quartile of P/V ratios for three consecutive 
years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 16 presents the results of alternative overvaluation measures. Panel A of table 16 
shows the results of H6 with AMj,t  (model 29) and UEj,t (model 30) as dependent variables 
using the year industry fixed-effects regressions. Model 29 presents the results using the year 
industry fixed-effects panel regression with AMj,t as dependent variable, while model 30 




variable. Panel B of table 16 presents the results of H6 with InAMj,t (model 31) and InExj,t 
(model 32) as dependent variables using the year industry fixed-effects logit regressions. 
These results are generally similar to the main results, but are not as significant. Model 29 
presents that none of the four overvaluation measures are significantly related to AMj,t. 
Over3j,t is weakly and significantly and positively related to UEj,t (coefficient=1.544, p-
value=0.098) as found in model 30. The results of model 31 shows that Over3j,t is weakly 
significant and negatively related to InAM (coefficient=-1.947, p-value=0.096), while model 
32 finds that the Over1j,t and Over3j,t are significantly and positively related to InExj,t 
(coefficient=1.413, p-value=0.033) and (coefficient=1.750, p-value=0.037), respectively. 
Although this method is better at measuring equity overvaluation, it reduces the sample size 


















Table 16: Regression results for using alternative overvaluation measure (H6) 
Table 16 Panel A: the regression results for H6 using alternative overvaluation measurement with AMj,t and UEj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 29 with AMj,t as dependent variable Model 30 with UEj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Over0j,t -0.155 0.158 -0.980 0.327 0.617 0.377 1.630 0.102 
Over1j,t -0.165 0.270 -0.610 0.541 0.601 0.640 0.940 0.348 
Over2j,t -0.366 0.407 -0.900 0.370 -0.100 0.986 -0.100 0.920 
Over3j,t -0.248 0.370 -0.670 0.504 1.544
* 0.932 1.660 0.098 
AM specific 
        
Big4j,t -0.178 0.247 -0.720 0.473 
    
Litigationj,t 0.458 0.431 1.060 0.290 
    
UE specific 
        
Meetj,t 
    
0.296 0.506 0.590 0.558 
Lossj,t 
    
0.302 0.644 0.470 0.639 
General controls 
        
UEj,t -0.260
* 0.135 -1.930 0.055 
    
AMj,t 
    
-0.683** 0.302 -2.260 0.024 
Leveragej,t 1.212
*** 0.268 4.530 0.000 0.073 0.757 0.100 0.923 
SalesGj,t -0.529
** 0.235 -2.260 0.025 -0.298 0.593 -0.500 0.615 
MtoBj,t 0.096 0.085 1.130 0.258 -0.644
** 0.271 -2.380 0.017 
Mktcapj,t -0.043 0.047 -0.920 0.357 0.643
*** 0.135 4.780 0.000 
NOAj,t 0.121 0.097 1.260 0.209 0.304 0.256 1.180 0.236 
ROEj,t 0.342 0.348 0.980 0.327 2.359
* 1.353 1.740 0.081 
Capitalj,t -0.128 0.103 -1.240 0.215 0.285 0.303 0.940 0.346 
_cons 0.714 0.458 1.560 0.121 -5.486*** 1.574 -3.480 0.000 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Industry effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Number of obs. 269 
   
269 







   





Table 16: Regression results for using alternative overvaluation measure (H6) 
(continued) 
Table 16 Panel B: the regression results for H6 using alternative overvaluation measurement with InAMj,t and InExj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 31 with InAMj,t as dependent variable Model 32 with InExj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Over0j,t -0.544 0.354 -1.530 0.125 -0.083 0.387 -0.220 0.830 
Over1j,t -0.352 0.594 -0.590 0.553 1.413
** 0.662 2.140 0.033 
Over2j,t -0.320 0.884 -0.360 0.718 1.355 1.077 1.260 0.208 
Over3j,t -1.947
* 1.168 -1.670 0.096 1.750** 0.840 2.080 0.037 
AM specific 
        
Big4j,t -0.297 0.559 -0.530 0.596 
    
Litigationj,t 0.080 1.014 0.080 0.937 
    
UE specific 
        
Meetj,t 
    
-0.132 0.495 -0.270 0.790 
Lossj,t 
    
0.647 0.624 1.040 0.300 
General controls 
        
InExj,t -0.757
** 0.322 -2.350 0.019 
    
InAMj,t 
    
-0.780** 0.316 -2.470 0.014 
Leveragej,t -0.102 0.593 -0.170 0.863 -0.868 0.912 -0.950 0.341 
SalesGj,t 0.468 0.531 0.880 0.378 -0.271 0.623 -0.430 0.664 
MtoBj,t -0.326 0.218 -1.500 0.134 -0.554
** 0.249 -2.230 0.026 
Mktcapj,t 0.116 0.102 1.140 0.255 0.223
* 0.116 1.920 0.055 
NOAj,t 0.187 0.223 0.840 0.402 0.257 0.238 1.080 0.280 
ROEj,t 1.882
* 1.110 1.700 0.090 0.519 1.468 0.350 0.724 
Capitalj,t -0.180 0.248 -0.730 0.468 0.399 0.289 1.380 0.167 
_cons -0.396 1.029 -0.380 0.701 -2.957** 1.408 -2.100 0.036 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Industry effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Number of obs. 269 
   
269 




   
14.24% 
   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 






3.6.2 Alternative accruals earnings management measurements  
This section considers two other proxies for accruals earnings management; one is measured 
using the same method with Dechow & Dichev’s (2002) model, while the residuals of 
Equation (7)-AQj,t is measured by rolling a 10-year window standard deviation rather than a 
rolling 5-year window standard deviation. The second proxy for accruals earnings 
management is measured by the modified Jones model, modified by Dechow et al. (1995). 
Table 17 presents the pearson and spearman correlations for the different accruals earnings 
management measurements. AMj,t, AM10j,t, and MJj,t are positively and significantly 
correlated to each other. Moreover, InAMj,t, InAM10j,t, and InMJj,t are also positively and 
significantly correlated to each other, which suggests that the accruals earnings management 
measurements for the main tests are robust. 
Table 17: Pearson and spearman correlations for accruals earnings management 
variables 
 
AMj,t AM10j,t MJj,t InAMj,t InAM10j,t InMJj,t 
AMj,t 1.000 0.841
*** 0.271*** 0.077* 0.047 -0.031 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.067) (0.273) (0.467) 
AM10j,t 0.289




(0.000) (0.260) (0.106) (0.354) 
MJj,t 0.154




(0.000) (0.000) (0.349) 
InAMj,t -0.084
* -0.040 0.131*** 1.000 0.211*** 0.140*** 
 
(0.055) (0.367) (0.003) 
 
(0.000) (0.001) 
InAM10j,t -0.007 -0.059 0.175
*** 0.213*** 1.000 0.082* 
 
(0.879) (0.177) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.061) 
InMJj,t 0.015 0.038 0.031 0.122
*** 0.083* 1.000 
 
(0.737) (0.387) (0.477) (0.005) (0.057) 
 
 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Pearson (above) and spearman (bellow) correlations Note: AM10j,t is absolute ‘abnormal’ accruals ((ej,t) of Equation (8) where AQj,t is measured using 10 year-
rolling window of residuals (vj,t) of Equation (7) for firm j, year t. InAM10j,t is positive of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive residuals (ej,t) of  Equation (8)), which 
represents income-increasing accruals earnings management for firm j, in year t. MJj,t is absolute values of residuals (𝜀j,t) of Equation (14) representing the 
discretional accruals earnings management for firm j, in year t and InMJj,t is dummy variable that the positive values of residuals  (𝜀j,t) is coded as ‘1’ 




3.6.2.1 Dechow & Dichev’s (2002) model with a 10-year rolling window 
To eliminate concerns about whether the periods of rolling years would influence the 
measurement of accruals earnings management, this paper re-measures accruals quality using 
Dechow & Dichev’s (2002) model with 10-years rolling window standard deviations; and 
table 18 presents the results of these measurements. Since this paper only includes positive 
P/E ratios and positive P/B ratios and accruals earnings management needs 10-years of 
rolling window data, it leads to decrease in sample size to 452 firm-year observations. Panel 
A of table 18 shows the results of H6 with AM10j,t (model 33) and UEj,t (model 34) as 
dependent variables using the year industry fixed-effects regressions. Model 33 is tested 
using the year industry fixed-effects panel model with AM10j,t as the dependent variable, 
while model 34 is measured by the year industry fixed-effects logit model with UEj,t as the 
dependent variable. Panel B of table 18 presents the results of H6 with InAM10j,t (model 35) 
and InExj,t (model 36) as dependent variables using the year industry fixed-effects logit 
regressions. The results are similar to the main results, providing evidence that Over0j,t is 
significantly and positively associated with AM10j,t (coefficient=0.062, p-value=0.040), while 
Over2j,t is significantly and positively related to UEj,t (coefficient=2.514, p-value=0.000). By 
looking at the income-increasing earnings management mechanism, Over0j,t is significantly 
and positively associated with InAM10j,t (coefficient=2.965, p-value=0.000), while Over1j,t, 
Over2j,t, and Over3j,t are significantly and positively related to InExj,t (coefficient=0.957, p-
value=0.038), (coefficient=2.372, p-value=0.000), and (coefficient=0.858, p-value=0.049), 
respectively. These results suggest that overvalued firms use accruals earnings management 
once at an early stage of overvaluation, and then disclose underlying earnings and engage in 





Table 18: Regression results for using 10 year-rolling window of Dechow & Dichev’s 
(2002) model (H6) 
Table 18 Panel A: the regression results for H6 using10 year-rolling window of DD’s model with AM10j,t and UEj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 33 with AM10j,t as dependent variable Model 34 with UEj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Over0j,t 0.062
** 0.030 2.060 0.040 0.112 0.477 0.240 0.814 
Over1j,t -0.022 0.030 -0.740 0.461 0.801 0.497 1.610 0.107 
Over2j,t -0.020 0.028 -0.720 0.472 2.514
*** 0.629 4.000 0.000 
Over3j,t -0.005 0.027 -0.190 0.846 0.483 0.429 1.130 0.260 
AM specific 
        
Big4j,t -0.038 0.033 -1.140 0.254 
    
Litigationj,t 0.021 0.049 0.440 0.662 
    
UE specific 
        
Meetj,t 
    
0.154 0.265 0.580 0.563 
Lossj,t 
    
1.297*** 0.457 2.840 0.005 
General 
controls 
        
UEj,t -0.031
** 0.016 -1.990 0.047 
    
AM10j,t 
    
-6.154*** 2.047 -3.010 0.003 
Leveragej,t 0.100
*** 0.026 3.790 0.000 1.330** 0.644 2.070 0.039 
SalesGj,t -0.044 0.030 -1.500 0.136 -1.184
** 0.517 -2.290 0.022 
MtoBj,t 0.006 0.011 0.550 0.580 -0.678
*** 0.202 -3.350 0.001 
Mktcapj,t -0.017
*** 0.006 -2.900 0.004 0.378*** 0.096 3.920 0.000 
NOAj,t -0.003 0.011 -0.250 0.803 0.461
* 0.273 1.690 0.091 
ROEj,t -0.043 0.063 -0.680 0.495 2.156
* 1.145 1.880 0.060 
Capitalj,t -0.030
* 0.016 -1.860 0.063 0.299 0.275 1.090 0.277 
_cons 0.277*** 0.071 3.890 0.000 -3.619*** 1.190 -3.040 0.002 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 




   
YES 




   
452 






   




Table 18: Regression results for using 10 year-rolling window of Dechow & Dichev’s 
(2002) model (H6) (continued) 
Table 18 Panel B: the regression results for H6 using10 year-rolling window of DD’s model with InAM10j,t and InExj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 35 with InAM10j,t as dependent variable Model 36 with InExj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Over0j,t 2.965
*** 0.543 5.460 0.000 0.526 0.547 0.960 0.336 
Over1j,t 0.146 0.542 0.270 0.787 0.957
** 0.461 2.080 0.038 
Over2j,t -0.481 0.690 -0.700 0.486 2.372
*** 0.492 4.820 0.000 
Over3j,t 0.688 0.477 1.440 0.149 0.858
** 0.436 1.970 0.049 
AM specific 
        
Big4j,t -0.786 0.536 -1.470 0.143 
    
Litigationj,t -2.393
** 1.002 -2.390 0.017 
    
UE specific 
        
Meetj,t 
    
0.032 0.261 0.120 0.901 
Lossj,t 
    
1.891*** 0.428 4.420 0.000 
General controls 
        
InExj,t -1.093
*** 0.288 -3.800 0.000 
    
InAM10j,t 
    
-1.106*** 0.289 -3.820 0.000 
Leveragej,t -0.779 0.732 -1.060 0.287 0.858 0.541 1.590 0.113 
SalesGj,t -0.113 0.550 -0.210 0.837 -0.675 0.501 -1.350 0.178 
MtoBj,t -0.300 0.204 -1.470 0.141 -0.564
*** 0.171 -3.290 0.001 
Mktcapj,t 0.502
*** 0.103 4.890 0.000 0.361*** 0.092 3.930 0.000 
NOAj,t -0.242 0.248 -0.980 0.329 0.216 0.220 0.980 0.326 
ROEj,t 1.076 1.081 1.000 0.319 1.269 0.943 1.350 0.178 
Capitalj,t 0.400 0.287 1.400 0.163 0.924
*** 0.260 3.550 0.000 
_cons -4.102*** 1.233 -3.330 0.001 -5.398*** 1.140 -4.740 0.000 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Industry effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Number of obs. 452 
   
452 




   
19.31% 
   
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note: DD represents Dechow & Dichev. Overj,t is dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm is in the top quartile of PBPEj,t  in year t, 0 otherwise. Over0j,t equals 1 
if j firm is overvalued once during the sample years from 2009 to 2012, and 0 otherwise. Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued one consecutive year during the 
sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm 
is overvalued three consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. AM10j,t is absolute ‘abnormal’ accruals ((ej,t) of Equation (8) where AQj,t is 
measured using 10 year-rolling window of residuals (vj,t) of Equation (7) for firm j, year t. InAM10j,t is positive of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive residuals (ej,t) 




3.6.2.2 Modified Jones model 
In this section, this paper re-examines accruals earnings management using modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al., 1995) which is the widely used in the earnings management literature 
(Dechow et al., 2010). By applying the modified Jones model, accruals quality is associated 
with the extent to which accruals are captured by fitted values by regressing total accruals on 
changes in revenues and PPE. This paper uses a modified Jones model (modified by Dechow 












+ 𝜀j,t   (14) 
Where: j is firm observations. t is years from 2009 to 2012. Aj,t-1 equals the total assets for 
firm j, in year t-1. ∆Sj,t equals the net sales for firm j in year t minus net sales for firm j in 
year t-1. TACCj,t is the total accruals for firm j, in year in t, which is measured by earnings 
before tax for firm j, year t minus operating cash flows for firm j, year t. ΔARj,t equals the 
change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to t, for firm j, and PPEj,t equals the value of 
property, plant, and equipment for firm j, in year t. The cross-sectional residuals of Equation 
(14)− 𝜀j,t are used to calculate accruals earnings management. MJj,t is the absolute values of 
residuals (𝜀j,t) representing the discretional accruals earnings management, and InMJj,t is a 
dummy variable that the positive values of residuals  (𝜀j,t) are coded as ‘1’ to represent the 
income-increasing accruals earnings management, and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Table 19 presents the results of re-measuring the accruals earnings management using the 
modified Jones model. Panel A of table 19 shows the results of H6 with MJj,t (model 37) and 
UEj,t (model 38) as dependent variables using the year industry fixed-effects regressions. 
Model 37 is tested using the year industry fixed-effects panel model with MJj,t as the 
dependent variable, while model 38 is measured by the year industry fixed-effects logit 




with InMJj,t (model 39) and InExj,t (model 40) as dependent variables using the year industry 
fixed-effects logit regressions. The results of panel A show that MJj,t is significantly and 
positively related to Over0j,t (coefficient=0.065, p-value=0.000) and is weakly significant and 
positively associated with Over1j,t (coefficient=0.031, p-value=0.082), while both Over1j,t and 
Over2j,t are significantly positively associated with UEj,t (coefficient=1.050, p-value=0.033) 
and (coefficient=2.884, p-value=0.000), respectively. Turning to the income-increasing 
earnings mechanisms, the results of panel B show that Over1j,t, Over2j,t, and Over3j,t are 
significantly and negatively related to InMJj,t (coefficient=-0.820, p-value=0.073), 
(coefficient=-2.090, p-value=0.000), and (coefficient=-0.734, p-value=0.077), respectively, 
while Over1j,t and Over2j,t are significantly and positively related to InExj,t (coefficient=0.783, 
p-value=0.090) and (coefficient=2.160, p-value=0.000), respectively. The results of the 
modified Jones model are similar to the main results which suggest that the duration of equity 
overvaluation is an important determinant of earnings management mechanism managers 
choose. The longer firms are overvalued the higher the likelihood that managers will disclose 












Table 19: Regression results for using modified Jones model (H6) 
Table 19 Panel A: the regression results for H6 using modified Jones model with MJj,t and UEj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 37 with MJj,t as dependent variable Model 38 with UEj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Over0j,t 0.065
*** 0.018 3.670 0.000 0.699 0.473 1.480 0.139 
Over1j,t 0.031
* 0.018 1.740 0.082 1.050** 0.491 2.140 0.033 
Over2j,t 0.020 0.016 1.230 0.220 2.884
*** 0.648 4.450 0.000 
Over3j,t 0.009 0.016 0.570 0.570 0.645 0.419 1.540 0.123 
AM specific 
        
Big4j,t -0.086
*** 0.019 -4.540 0.000     
Litigationj,t 0.030 0.029 1.060 0.288     
UE specific 
        
Meetj,t 
    
0.053 0.261 0.200 0.839 
Lossj,t 
    
1.197*** 0.438 2.730 0.006 
General 
controls 
        
UEj,t -0.017
* 0.009 -1.860 0.063 
    
MJj,t 
    
-3.101** 1.298 -2.390 0.017 
Leveragej,t 0.028
* 0.016 1.770 0.077 1.078* 0.581 1.860 0.064 
SalesGj,t -0.018 0.017 -1.010 0.313 -1.150
** 0.507 -2.270 0.023 
MtoBj,t 0.031
*** 0.006 4.950 0.000 -0.550*** 0.191 -2.880 0.004 
Mktcapj,t -0.001 0.003 -0.380 0.704 0.453
*** 0.093 4.870 0.000 
NOAj,t -0.003 0.007 -0.440 0.659 0.289 0.243 1.190 0.233 
ROEj,t -0.087
*** 0.036 -2.390 0.017 1.482 1.053 1.410 0.159 
Capitalj,t 0.020
** 0.009 2.220 0.027 0.493* 0.269 1.830 0.067 
_cons 0.130*** 0.041 3.170 0.002 -4.313*** 1.149 -3.750 0.000 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 




   
YES 




   
463 







*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
                                                          
26





Table 19: Regression results for using modified Jones model (H6) (continued) 
Table 19 Panel B: the regression results for H6 using modified Jones model with InMJj,t and InExj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 39 with InMJj,t as dependent variable Model 40 with InExj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Over0j,t 0.289 0.449 0.640 0.519 0.269 0.503 0.530 0.593 
Over1j,t -0.820
* 0.457 -1.800 0.073 0.783* 0.462 1.690 0.090 
Over2j,t -2.090
*** 0.547 -3.820 0.000 2.160*** 0.489 4.420 0.000 
Over3j,t -0.734
* 0.416 -1.770 0.077 0.686 0.431 1.590 0.111 
AM specific 
        
Big4j,t 0.129 0.490 0.260 0.792 
    
Litigationj,t -1.295 0.808 -1.600 0.109 
    
UE specific 
        
Meetj,t 
    
0.023 0.256 0.090 0.927 
Lossj,t 
    
1.945*** 0.413 4.710 0.000 
General controls 
        
InExj,t -0.733
*** 0.229 -3.200 0.001 
    
InMJj,t 
    
-0.850*** 0.240 -3.550 0.000 
Leveragej,t -0.631 0.548 -1.150 0.249 0.928 0.581 1.600 0.110 
SalesGj,t -0.231 0.470 -0.490 0.623 -0.635 0.507 -1.250 0.211 
MtoBj,t -0.359
** 0.170 -2.110 0.035 -0.608*** 0.169 -3.610 0.000 
Mktcapj,t 0.129 0.085 1.510 0.130 0.307
*** 0.089 3.470 0.001 
NOAj,t -0.092 0.162 -0.570 0.570 0.194 0.197 0.990 0.324 
ROEj,t -0.802 1.055 -0.760 0.447 1.021 0.947 1.080 0.281 
Capitalj,t -0.647
** 0.267 -2.420 0.015 0.751*** 0.256 2.940 0.003 
_cons 1.147 1.080 1.060 0.288 -4.493*** 1.124 -4.000 0.000 
Year effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Industry effects YES 
   
YES 
   
Number of obs. 463 










 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note: Overj,t is dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm is in the top quartile of PBPEj,t  in year t, 0 otherwise. Over0j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued 
once during the sample years from 2009 to 2012, and 0 otherwise. Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued one consecutive year during the sample 
years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j 
firm is overvalued three consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise.  MJj,t is absolute values of residuals (𝜀j,t) of Equation (14) 
representing the discretional accruals earnings management for firm j, in year t and InMJj,t is dummy variable that the positive values of residuals  




3.7 Summary of chapter three 
According to Jensen’s (2005) agency theory of overvalued equity, firms with overvalued 
equity have strong incentives to engage in different opportunistic earnings management 
mechanisms in order to sustain overvaluation. This paper attempts to examine whether 
overvalued firms engage in opportunistic earnings management and whether the duration of 
overvaluation influence manager’s choice of using different earnings management 
mechanisms. This paper presents evidence that overvalued firms are more likely to disclose 
underlying earnings and report them opportunistically for the whole sample periods. 
Considering how the duration of overvalued equity influence managers’ choices of earnings 
management, the results suggest that managers engage in accruals earnings management in 
the early stage of overvaluation, but at the later stage, firms are more likely to disclose 
underlying earnings opportunistically to sustain overvaluation. These results hold true even 
when using alternative equity overvaluation and accruals earnings management 
measurements. Furthermore, this paper finds that overvalued firms with accruals earnings 
management constraints do not engage in accruals earnings management, they only engage in 
opportunistic underlying earnings reporting to sustain the overvalued equity. Collectively, 
these results are consistent with Jensen’s (2005) agency theory that the duration of equity 
overvaluation is an important determinant of managers’ choosing to use alternative earnings 




















CHAPTER FOUR Intellectual capital disclosure and opportunistic 
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The rise of the ‘new economy’, which is driven by information and knowledge, has led to an 
increased interest in IC in recent decades (Stewart, 1997; Petty & Guthrie, 2000; Bontis, 
2001). IC is used to determine a firms’ value (Stewart, 1997; Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; 
Sveiby, 1998; Lev & Feng, 2001; Guthrie, 2001; Tan et al., 2007) and it is generated by or 
developed from unique organisational designs, innovations, and human resources (Joshi et 
al., 2013). To this extent, accounting standards do not provide for a comprehensive 
measurement and identification of IC in firms, especially knowledge-based firms (Guthrie et 
al., 1999; Guthrie et al., 2006; Vafaei et al., 2011). Although IFRS provide financial 
information in order to provide comprehensive financial statements that enhance the 
comparability of financial reports
27
, they have nonetheless adopted the conservative 
measurements of IC, as argued by Ahmed & Goodwin (2007), Goodwin et al. (2008a), and 
Goodwin et al. (2008b). These studies acknowledged that the book value of intangible assets 
in balance sheets lack relevance because intangible assets in the balance sheet are represented 
by only a fraction of IC as a whole (e.g., Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Sveiby, 1997; Lev, 
2001; Pulic, 2004; Kim &Taylor, 2014). 
In this ‘new economy’ age, only firms that account for their IC can positively influence 
investment decisions and the value of firms in a knowledge economy (Holland, 2003; Cahill 
& Myers, 2000; Bukh et al., 2005; Bukh, 2003; Joshi et al., 2013). Firms that do not disclose 
IC actually generate information asymmetries and a lack of transparency (Aboody & Lev, 
1998; Barth et al., 2001; Vafaei et al., 2011), so this deficiency in IC reporting means that 
financial reporting loses its relevance to some extent (Lev & Sougiannis, 1996; Amir & Lev, 
                                                          
27
 There are a few changes concerning IC in the financial statements after the adoption of IFRS. For example, IFRS 3 
requires that goodwill is considered to be an asset with an indefinite lifespan, and would therefore not be eligible for 
amortization. Instead, the book value of goodwill is subjected to impairment testing at either the level of a cash generating 
unit (CGU) or a group of CGUs of the consolidated entity. Further, all ICs that do not meet the criteria of control, 




1996). Therefore, allowing for sufficient IC disclosure would enhance the value relevance of 
accounting numbers to investors (Beisland et al., 2008; Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Barth & 
Clinch, 1996; Groujer, 1993).  
Based on resource-based theory and signalling theory, this paper attempts to examine 
whether disclosed IC, which is treated as the inimitable and non-substitutable resources of a 
firm, can reflect their current and future financial performance and whether signals of such 
valuable resources to investors are relevant for evaluating a firm. Moreover, papers one (i.e., 
chapter two) and two (i.e., chapter three) of this thesis found that opportunistic underlying 
earnings reporting, as an earnings management tool, is used by managers to influence 
investors’ perceptions of firm performance and to maintain equity overvaluation, but even so, 
this earnings management tool is rarely detected by investors. This paper attempts to examine 
whether firms who practice earnings management have difficulty disclosing the inimitable 
IC. The reasoning behind this is that high quality firms are more likely to disclose IC because 
it represents the inimitable and non-replaceable resources that enhances their performance, 
whereas low quality firms often find it difficult to disclose IC because it is hard to imitate. As 
a market valuation incentive, low quality firms are more likely use earnings management to 
influence investor’s perceptions, so for this paper, earnings management is represented by 
opportunistic underlying earnings reporting.  
The sample used for this study is based on 610 observations of ASX 200 listed firms from 
2009 to 2012. Their financial performance shows that IC disclosure is positively related to a 
firm’s current and future profitability and productivity. The result of value-relevant finds a 
significantly positive relationship between sufficient IC disclosure and the amount of future 
earnings reflected in current annual returns. These results confirm resource-based and 




performance and also signals IC through annual reports that could bring future earnings to 
current stock returns on the basis that the markets react favourably to such reporting. Finally, 
this paper finds that IC disclosure and sufficient IC disclosure are negatively related to 
opportunistic underlying earnings management, thereby confirming that low quality firms are 
less likely to disclose IC and use opportunistic underlying earnings reporting to influence 
market perceptions. In the additional tests, this paper uses the traditional market valuation 
model to bolster the value-relevant results. The results show that IC disclosure and sufficient 
IC disclosure are positively related to the current and future market-to-book ratios, which 
confirms the main results that IC carries relevant information to the market, and also 
enhances the market value of firms. Furthermore, this paper investigates which particular 
category of IC (including internal capital, external capital, and human capital) is value-
relevant to the market. The results showed that external capital can effectively carry current 
earnings information to the market, while human capital and internal capital can bring future 
earnings forward to the current stock returns, suggesting that the market perceives external 
capital disclosure to be value-relevant in order to reflect current earnings information, while 
human capital and internal capital are value-relevant in order to reflect a firm’s future 
earnings. Finally, this paper finds that firms who practice opportunistic underlying earnings 
reporting rarely disclose external capital, internal capital and inimitable human capital.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 4.2 examines the relevant 
literature; Section 4.3 explains the theoretical framework and development of hypotheses; 
Section 4.4 describes the research design; Section 4.5 presents analyses and results, including 
descriptive statistics, pearson and spearman correlations, and regressions results; Section 4.6 





4.2 Literature review  
4.2.1 Definition of IC 
Prior to the mid-1990s, scholars started raising the awareness of IC, especially those in 
Scandinavian and northern European academia (e.g., Brooking, 1996; Edvinsson & Malone, 
1997; Stewart, 1997; Sveiby, 1997; Roos et al., 1998). At that time IC was recognised as 
being significant and therefore it should be measured and reported to create and manage the 
sustainable competitive advantages of firms (Guthrie et al., 2012), so in this growth, various 
terms, such as intangible resources, intangible assets, knowledge assets and intangibility, 
were used interchangeably to cover the concept of IC (Bontis, 2001; Kujansivu, 2005; Joshi 
et al., 2013).  
In recent decades the term ‘IC’ is used as an instrument of value-creation, so interdisciplinary 
researchers investigated how the capital market reacted towards the potential for IC to create 
firm value (Murthy & Abeysekera, 2007; Mavridis, 2005; Dumay & Tull, 2007; Guthrie et 
al., 2012). Guthrie & Petty (2000c) suggest that IC is used as a foundation on which to create 
and use knowledge to enhance firm value, so IC essentially refers to the ability to translate 
organisational knowledge into value. Examples of this include the ability to forge and 
maintain positive relationships with customers, suppliers and other stakeholders and also 
innovate and implement new initiatives (Abeysekera, 2011 p.20).  
In conclusion, IC underlines the importance of using the capital generated by humans and 
resources to generate products and services in a competitive manner (Phusavat et al., 2011), 
and this is reflected in strong firm performance and the creation of value (e.g., Lev, 2001; 





4.2.2 Measurement of IC 
Despite the increasing recognition of IC in driving their competitive advantage and value, an 
appropriate measure of firms’ IC is still in infancy (Ming-Chin et al., 2005). Indeed, 
measuring IC is problematic because it is difficult to capture from corporate reporting (Petty 
& Guthrie, 2000; Guthrie et al., 2012). The first attempts at measuring IC are found in 
consulting practices in the late eighties (Sveiby, 1988), and it was only in the mid-1990s that 
research on IC began to develop in academic literature (Kaplan & Norton, 1992; Nonaka & 
Takeuchi 1995; Stewart, 1997; Edvinsson & Malone, 1997). 
Sveiby (2010) reviewed fifties of IC literature and classified 42 models of IC into four 
categories that are an extension of the classifications suggested by Luthy (1998); they are: (a) 
the direct intellectual capital (DIC) measurement, (b) the market-based measurement (MCM), 
(c) the return on assets (ROA) measurement, (d) the scorecard (SC) measurement. Chan 
(2009a) and Sveiby (2010) however, argued that the ‘Value Added Intellectual Coefficient’ 
(VAIC
TM
) methodology does not quite fit any of the four categories, so this paper modified 
Sveiby’s (2010) classifications into four categories where the direct intellectual capital (DIC) 
measurement and the scorecard (SC) measurement is combined into one category called 
components-based (COB) measurement because both measurements measure individual IC 
components. Moreover, this paper adds VAIC
TM
 as the fourth measurement, so the 
measurements of IC are categorised into four categories, namely: (a) ROA measurement, (b) 
MCM, (c) VAIC
TM
 measurement, and (d) COB measurement. 
 
 
4.2.2.1 ROA measurement  
As a basis on which to calculate the value of IC, the ROA measurement takes the difference 




the average total tangible assets to obtain the firm’s ROA, which is then compared with its 
industry average ROA. The difference is then multiplied by the average total tangible assets 
of the firm to calculate average annual earnings from the intangibles. The estimate of the 
value of a firm’s IC is obtained by dividing the above-average annual earnings by their 
average cost of capital or interest rate (Sveiby, 2010). 
An example of ROA measurement is the ‘Knowledge Capital Earnings’ method that was 
developed by Lev (1999). ‘Knowledge Capital Earnings’ is calculated as the portion of 
normalised earnings (3 years industry average and consensus analyst future estimates) over 
and above the earnings attributable to a book value of assets; these earnings are then used to 
capitalise Knowledge capital. 
  
4.2.2.2 MCM measurement  
MCM measurement suggests that the IC value of a firm can be obtained by subtracting the 
net asset value from its observable market value (Chan, 2009a; b). MCM defines firm’s IC as 
the difference between its net assets and market capitalisation. This measurement is based on 
an evaluation of the historical cost and balance sheet (Sveiby, 2010). Traditional MCM 
includes measuring the market-to-book value and Tobin’s q invisible balance sheet.   
Empirical evidence regarding the measurement of IC using the market-to-book ratio is mixed 
where in recent decades of increasing demand for IC disclosures, measurements of the 
market-to-book ratio as proxy for IC has been questioned (Li & Mangena, 2014). Van Der 
Meer-Kooistra & Zijlstra (2001) interviewed a number of CEOs, and discovered that they 
consider market-to-book ratios as insufficient indicators of IC, arguing that fluctuations in 




market values may distort estimations of an IC value, excess market values may not be 
completely attributable to the IC value. These CEOs therefore concluded that the market-to-
book ratio as a measure of IC value may be flawed because cannot measure IC effectively, as 
has been found in further empirical studies. For example, Kamath (2008); Ghosh & Mondal 
(2009) and Firer & Williams (2003) found insignificant results between information on IC 
and market-to-book ratio, and Cerbioni & Parbonetti (2007) found that market-to-book ratios 
did not present the overall value of IC.  
To address these limitations, Tobin’s q was used to indicate the value of IC in IC literature. 
Previous studies found that Tobin’s q may approximate the value of IC because it attempts to 
provide a ratio of market value over the replacement values of tangible assets (Villalonga, 
2004; Lindenberg & Ross, 1981). With these underlying assumptions, Tobin’s q may 
partially reduce distortions in the market-to-book ratio, but previous studies found that it 
cannot represent an accurate measure of IC value and it has limited ability to represent IC in 
the context of long-term growth opportunities of firms (Goebel, 2015). 
The most recent, long-run value-to-book ratio as a measurement of IC has been examined 
(Goebel, 2015). This approach assumes that IC value is investigated based on merger and 
acquisition events which provide enough additional information to estimate intrinsic firm 
values and long-run growth opportunities (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Goebel, 2015). Using 
the long-run value-to-book ratio as a measure of IC can indicate the long-term growth 
opportunities of firms. The author found that the long-run value-to-book ratio is an IC value 
measurement with the highest explanatory value when compared to the market-to-book ratio 












 was developed by the Austrian Intellectual Capital Research Centre (AICRS) 
under Pulic (1997). An important concept in the VAIC
TM
 methodology is a firm’s intellectual 
ability which is measured by its value added intellectual coefficient. This value added 
intellectual coefficient refers to the total value creation efficiency because both physical 
capital and IC function in concert in a business environment (Pulic, 2004). Furthermore, 
VAIC is an indicator of the overall ability or efficiency of a firm to use the total resources of 
physical capital and IC to create value for a particular firm (Chan, 2009a). A higher VAIC
TM
 
coefficient shows that more value is created with the same amount of resources (Pulic, 2004). 
The VAIC
TM
 model uses values from balance sheets and income statements to measure any 
occurrences of adding value that either stems from or can be attributed to the development of 
firm’s IC. For example, labour expenses are argued to equate human capital as an investment 
rather than an expense. VAIC measures how efficiently and how much IC and capital are 
used to create the value of a firm based on three major components: (1) capital employed; (2) 
human capital; and (3) structural capital (Goebel, 2015). 
VAIC
TM
 has been used by many researchers to investigate different aspects of IC efficiency. 
For examples, studies have been found in Taiwan (Chen et al., 2005); Hong Kong (Chan, 
2009a; 2009b); Singapore (Tan et al., 2007); Thailand (Phusavat et al., 2011); India (Kamath, 
2008; Ghosh & Mondal, 2009); South Africa (Firer & Williams, 2003); Australia (Joshi et al., 








4.2.2.4 COB measurement  
 
Component-based measurement is a measurement of individual IC components where 
interactions of IC components are seen to contribute greatly to IC value (Van Der Meer-
Kooistra & Zijlstra, 2001; Goebel, 2015). Direct IC (DIC) measurement and Scorecard (SC) 
measurements are subject to this category.  
 
DIC measurement  
Under DIC measurement, the dollar-value of IC is estimated and assigned to what a firm may 
consider as individual components (e.g., intellectual property assets, human-centred assets, 
etc.). Once these components are identified, they can be evaluated directly and take the form 
of either a dollar value or an aggregated coefficient (Sveiby, 2010; Chan, 2009a).  
An example of DIC measurement is Andersen & McLean’s (2000) ‘Total Value Creation’ 
(TVC
TM
) model that uses discounted projected cash-flows to re-examine how individual IC 





model. This model allocate and calculate the value of IC 
components into 5 types of intangibles: (1) Skills & tacit knowledge; (2) Technology and 
explicit knowledge; (3) Collective values and norms; (4) Primary and management processes; 
and (5) Assets and endowments (Sveiby, 2010; Goebel, 2015). 
DIC measures IC using the dollar-value, but previous studies have revealed that nearly every 
instance of IC reporting involved the expression of IC in discursive rather than numerical 
terms. The low incidence of a quantitative expression of IC items seems to confirm the 
widely held view that firms are not motivated to assign dollar values to IC (e.g., Petty & 




measurements that can measure the non-dollar values components are now prevailing in 
recent IC literature.  
 
SC measurement  
Under the SC measurement, the various ICs are synthesised into a series of indicators and 
indices which are then reported on graphs or in a scorecard to measure the non-dollar values 
of IC components. The SC method is similar to the DIC method in that it assumes that no 
estimate is made for the dollar-value of IC (Sveiby, 2010).  
A well-known SC measurement is the ‘balanced scorecard’ (Kaplan & Norton, 1992), which 
was originally used in management reporting. A balanced scorecard means that to understand 
a firm’s entire performance, the non-financial information should be measured and disclosed 
under the ‘scorecard,’ as well as the financial information. A firm’s performance is therefore 
measured by four perspectives of scorecard: (1) financial perspective; (2) customer 
perspective; (3) internal process perspective; and (4) learnings perspective (Chan, 2009a).  
In 1997, Edvinsson & Malone developed the Skandia navigator 
TM
 SC measurement where 
IC is measured by analysing up to 164 metric measures (91 intellectually based and 73 
traditional metrics) that cover five components: (1) human; (2) customer; (3) process; (4) 
renewal and development; and (5) financial. They categorised IC as including human and 
structural capital, where human capital includes the knowledge, skills, competences and 
experiences of the people employed, while structural capital consists of firm’s values, culture 






At almost the same time, the ‘Intangible Asset Monitor’ was developed by Sveiby (1997) to 
measure and report firm’s IC. In his method, management selects indicators based on the 
strategic objective of the firm in order to measure the four aspects of creating value from 
three classes of IC. The indicators are listed as being: (1) growth; (2) renewal; (3) utilisation; 
and (4) risk (Pucci, 2015). The three classes of IC consist of internal capital, external capital, 
and employee competence (Phusavat et al., 2011). Sveiby (1997) defined internal capital as 
knowledge that is created by an organisation and which cannot be separated from the entity; 
this knowledge includes concepts, patents, models, and administrative and computer systems, 
etc. Sveiby (1997) defined external capital as ‘relationships with customers and suppliers’. 
The external capital in Sveiby (1997)’s IC framework consists of profitability per customer, a 
satisfied Customers Index, and devoted customers, etc. Sveiby (1997) defined employee 
competence as an individual’s capacity to act in a wide variety of situations to create both 
intangible and tangible assets; this includes their education, skills, trainings, values, 
experiences and so forth (Joshi et al., 2013; Singh & Kansal, 2011).  
While Sveiby’s IC framework has attracted widespread acceptance, Guthrie et al. (1999) 
recently extended Sveiby (1997)’s IC measurement framework to include 24 items that are 
divided into internal capital (including copyrights, trademarks, patents, management 
philosophy, management processes, information systems, financial relations, networking 
system, corporate culture), external capital (including brands, customer loyalty, customers, 
company names, licensing agreements, favourable contracts, franchising agreements, 
business collaborations, distribution channels) and human capital (including knowhow, 
vocational qualification, education, work-related competencies, entrepreneurial spirit, 
innovativeness, proactive and reactive abilities, changeability, work-related knowledge). 
Meanwhile Abeysekera & Guthrie (2005) and Abeysekera (2008) provided a more 




abilities of employees that generate value for a firm; this consists of 25 items. Internal capital 
is described as organisational capital that consists of 10 items, and external capital refers to 
the firm’s relationships with external parties, including suppliers and customers, and consists 
of 10 items.  
 
The COB measurement used to measure IC has been applied extensively in literature; for 
example, studies have conducted in USA (Abdolmohammadi, 2005), Sri Lanka (Abeysekera 
& Guthrie, 2005; Abeysekera, 2011a; b), Australia (Guthrie & Petty, 2000a; b; c; Guthrie et 
al., 1999), Hong Kong and Australia (Guthrie et al., 2006), Australia and Sri Lanka 
(Abeysekera, 2007), Italy (Ferraro & Veltri, 2011), German (Gamerschlag, 2013). For 
detailed information see sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 of this paper.  
 
 
4.2.2.5 The advantages and disadvantages of each measurement 
Based on the literature (Chan, 2009a; b; Andriessen, 2004; Bontis, 2001; Caddy, 2002; Pike 
& Roos, 2004; Sveiby, 2010; Goh, 2005; Tseng & Goo, 2005; Phusavat et al., 2011; Clarke 
et al., 2011; Chu et al., 2011; Maditinos et al., 2011; Chang, 2007; Joshi et al., 2013), the 








Table 20: Advantages and disadvantages of different IC measurements 
Measurements Advantages Disadvantages  
ROA 1.offer dollar-valuations which are 
useful for stock market valuations 
and in acquisition and merge 
situations; 
2.can be used for firms between 
firms within the same industry; 
3.are easily collected and 
communicated in the accounting 
profession 
 
1.using dollar-measure as proxies 
for IC is far removed from the 
actual event or action that caused 
the phenomenon then they are at 
once incomplete; 
2.very sensitive to discount and 
interest rate assumptions; 
3.measure only on the organisation 
level; 
4.ROA approaches tend to be based 
on industry comparisons rather than 
the company itself; 
5.several of them are not useful for 
non-profit and public sector firms 
as well as internal departments 
MCM 1.offer dollar-valuations which are 
useful for stock market valuations 
and in acquisition and merge 
situations; 
2.can be used for comparisons 
between firms within the same 
industry; 
3.are easily collected and 
communicated in the accounting 
profession 
 
1.using dollar-measure as proxies 
for IC is far removed from the 
actual event or action that caused 
the phenomenon then they are at 
once incomplete; 
2.market value of a company varies 
from day to day, and may be subject 
to speculation in the capital market; 
3.this approach does not easily 
assist managers to understand what 
IC is, how it exists or how it 
influences the dynamics of a 
business as it does not immediately 
identify the components of IC; 
4.several of them are not useful for 
non-profit and public sector firms 




1.easy to calculate; 
2.can be applied to any size of 
organization and it aims to measure 
a company’s IC level; 
3.it does not require expertise to use 
or understand and does not require 
sophisticated accounting knowledge 
and 
 
1.omitted the Research & 
Development (R&D) expenditure 
and intellectual property which may 
capture additional information on 
IC;  
2.disregards the level of firm risk, 
which is one of the most important 
factors determining the IC value 
and firm value; 
3.inability to measure IC in a firm 
with negative operating profit or 






Table 20: Advantages and disadvantages of IC measurements (continued) 
Measurements Advantages Disadvantages  
COB 1.create a more comprehensive 
view of a firm’s health than 
financial metrics; 
2.easily applied at any level of a 
firm; 
3.measure closer to an event and 
reporting, therefore be more 
accurate and more faster than pure 
financial measures; 
4. useful for non-profit firms, public 
sector firms and internal 
departments and also for social and 
environmental purposes; 
5.suit best for uncovering the 
hidden value of a firm. 
1.indicators are contextual and have 
to be customised each purpose for 
each firm, which makes 
comparisons not easily reached; 
2.new and not well accepted by 




4.2.3 IC and firm’s financial performance  
Whether IC can enhance a firm’s financial performance is uncertain. A number of studies 
have confirmed that IC represents strategic advantages for a firm’s economic performance, 
and also contributes to their value creation, however, some studies do not find a relationship 
between IC and a firm’s financial benefits. 
Chen et al. (2005) examined the value creation of IC for firms’ current and future financial 
performance using data drawn from Taiwanese listed firms. The authors used VAIC
TM
 
measurement to measure the efficiency of IC and used return on assets (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE), growth in revenues, and employee productivity to measure a firm’s financial 
performance. The results revealed that a firm’s IC is significantly positive when associated 
with their current and future financial performance, which suggests that IC contributes to a 
firm’s current and future financial value creation. In a further study, Chan (2009a; b) 
investigated the relationship between IC and financial performance using Hong Kong listed 






measurement, and a firm’s financial performance was measured by ROE and ROA. The 
results indicated that IC helped to increase ROE and ROA. Tan et al. (2007) investigated the 
association between IC disclosure and their financial performance using 150 publicly 
Singapore Exchange listed firms; IC was measured by VAIC
TM
 measurement, and a firm’s 
financial performance was measured by ROE and EPS. The findings indicated that IC was 
correlated to future firm performance and the rate at which a company’s IC grows was 
positively related to company performance. Phusavat et al. (2011) examined the influence of 
IC on the financial performances of manufacturing firms in Thailand; IC was measured by 
VAIC
TM
 measurement and financial performance was measured by ROE, ROA, growth in 
revenue, and employee productivity. The results indicated that IC positively affected a 
manufacturing firm’s financial performance and thus highlighted how IC strengthened a 
manufacturing firm’s long-term competitive advantage.  
Some studies did not find a relationship between IC and future economic benefits, and 
consequently argued that IC does not fully explain a firms’ financial performance. 
Kamath (2008) examined the relationship between IC and firm performance using the top 25 
firms in the drug and pharmaceutical industry in India as a sample; IC was measured by the 
VAIC
TM
 measurement and financial performance was measured by profitability (measured by 
ROA) and productivity (measured by revenue to book ratio ‘ATO’). The results indicated that 
IC had an insignificant impact on the ROA and ATO, but a correlation analysis indicated that 
human assets were more important than the physical and structural assets in the profitability 
and productivity of Indian pharmaceutical industry. Al-Twaijry (2009) examined how 
investment in IC affected firms’ future growth and how those factors influence their 
investment in IC based on data from 384 Japanese listed manufacturing firms. Investment in 




was not always positively related to or lead directly to future growth, and these investments 
could be affected by some other variables. Firer & Williams (2003) examined the relationship 
between IC and firm performance (profitability and productivity) using a sample of 75 
publicly traded firms in South Africa; IC was measured using the VAIC
TM
 measurement, 
profitability was measured by ROA and productivity was measured using revenue to book 
ratios (ATO). The results indicated there was no relationship between IC and firm 
performance and the associations between the IC and firms’ profitability and productivity 
were generally limited and mixed, which suggested that physical capital remains the most 
significant underlying resource of corporate performance in South Africa, despite efforts to 
increase the nation’s IC base. Similarly, Ghosh & Mondal (2009) examined the relationship 
between IC and firm performance using Indian software and pharmaceutical firms as a 
sample frame; IC was measured using the VAIC
TM
 measurement, and firm performance was 
measured by profitability (ROA) and productivity (ATO). The results indicated that IC does 
not fully explain the performance of firms in India, while the findings suggested that a firm’s 
IC performance could explain profitability but not productivity.   
 
4.2.4 Value relevance of IC 
From the perspective of market valuation, many studies found that investors perceive IC as 
value-relevant with regards to decision-making, and they generally react favourably to such 
reporting, so a firm’s stock price or market value would be enhanced in this sense.  
The most widely used tool to measure the market valuation of IC is market-to-book ratios. 
Studies have confirmed that IC has positive effects on the market-to-book ratios in Taiwan 
(Chen et al., 2005; Tseng & Goo, 2005), Greece (Maditinos et al., 2011), Hong Kong (Chan, 




for market valuation because it increases the market value of a firm. Notwithstanding those 
results, some scholars have criticised the market to book ratio as a market valuation 
measurement (see, section 4.2.2.2). 
Several studies examined the relationship between IC and stock prices or stock returns to 
measure its value relevance; for example, Tan et al. (2007) found a positive relationship 
between IC and stock returns in 150 Singapore listed firms, while Vafaei et al. (2011) 
investigated whether the extent of textual IC information in annual reports and its 
components (human, structural, relational and general) is value-relevant to the share market, 
and whether IC disclosure moderates the incremental value relevance of reported IFRS 
adjustments to earnings and equity, based  analysing the contents of the text in annual reports 
using a sample of listed firms in Australia (63 firms), Britain (58 firms), Singapore (50 firms) 
and Hong Kong (49 firms). IC was measured using the SC measurement. The study found 
that IC disclosure was positively related to the market price of firms in non-traditional 
industries in two (Britain and Hong Kong) of the four countries. Furthermore, the incremental 
value relevance of IFRS earnings and IFRS net assets was insignificant, but the interaction of 
IFRS earnings with IC disclosure increased the basic coefficients and explanatory power of 
the models quite considerably, which suggested that IC moderated the value relevance of 
reported IFRS earnings numbers. Abdolmohammadi (2005) examined the effects of IC 
disclosure on the market capitalisation of firms by analysing the contents of annual reports of 
a sample of 500 firms in the USA; market capitalisation was measured using a logarithm of 
market capitalisation, and IC was measured using a SC measurement. The results indicated a 
positive relationship between the market value of equity of firms and IC disclosure.  
However, other studies found that the market cannot incorporate IC and immediately absorb 




Ferraro & Veltri (2011) applied a simplified Ohlson model (1995) to examine the value 
relevance of IC to 524 firm-year observations of Italian firms for the period of 2006 to 2008. 
IC was measured using the SC measurement; the findings showed that the book value of 
equity and earnings was positively related to the stock price despite IC not having a 
meaningful relationship to the market value. These results suggest that Italian investors are 
perhaps unable to detect and incorporate information on IC to evaluate their business 
investments. Abeysekera (2011a) examined the influence of political setting (civil war from 
1998-2000 versus temporary truce from 2002-2004) on firms’ current narrative using a 
sample of top 30 Sri Lankan listed firms from 1998 to 2004, where numerical and visual IC 
disclosure is included in the current market value of equity. IC was measured using the SC 
measurement, and indicated that during the civil war, the current market value of equity only 
included current earnings and net book value it did not include visual, narrative, and 
numerical IC disclosure. During the temporary truce, although the current market value of 
equity included the current earnings, net book value, and narrative disclosure, it did not 
include numerical or visual IC disclosure. In a further study, Abeysekera (2011b) examined 
whether current-period IC disclosure can carry future earnings towards current annual stock 
returns during a civil war period using the top 30 Sri Lankan listed firms over six years (from 
1998 to 2003). The study found that an increase in the current period of IC disclosure did not 
influence earnings or future earnings included in the current stock returns during the civil war 
period. Gamerschlag (2013) investigated the value relevance of human capital information 
where information was provided voluntarily by German firms using two established valuation 
models; IC was measured using the SC measurement, and the results indicated that human 
capital was significantly and positively related to the current stock price, suggesting that 
information regarding human capital is value-relevant to the market. Nonetheless, this 




because the index containing these changes in human capital did not lead to changes in 
current stock returns. As a result, the author concluded that human capital information is 
value-relevant, but not immediately. 
The literature reveals that whether or not IC enhances financial performance, and whether it 
is value-relevant for investors in decision making depends on the methodology that the study 
used, and the countries and research periods that were examined.   
 
4.2.5 IC in Australia  
4.2.5.1 Development of IC in Australia 
 
Australia provides an ideal ground for IC reporting because it has experienced fast economic 
growth and is also undergoing a transformation with an increasing emphasis on new sectors 
such as niche manufacturing, information technology, tourism, and financial services. It is 
also experiencing a relative decline in its traditionally strong areas of mining and agriculture 
(Guthrie et al., 1999; Abeysekera, 2008).  
An early study based on Sveiby’s (1997) IC framework used content analysis to capture IC 
data from annual reports. In the early 21
st
 century, Guthrie and his team focused on the IC 
disclosure of the largest (by market capitalisation) Australian listed firms, and noted that most 
of the IC information reported was on external capital, while reporting on internal capital and 
human capital were distributed evenly. The main areas of IC reporting focused on intellectual 
property rights, technology, human resources, and organisational and workplace structure. 
The study concluded that even though Australian firm were thought of as ‘best practice’ in IC 




managed inefficiently, and were not reported within a consistent framework. Overall, the 
results indicated that few Australian firms appeared to take a conceptual approach to 
reporting their IC (Guthrie, et al., 1999; Guthrie & Petty, 2000a; b). 
In a further study, Guthrie et al. (2006) examined the voluntary disclosure of IC attributes for 
50 listed Australian firms and 100 listed Hong Kong firms using year 2002 data. Here, 24 
items were collected using content analysis and then divided into three categories (nine 
relating to internal capital, nine to external capital and six to human capital). The levels of 
voluntary IC disclosure were found to be low, and in qualitative rather than quantitative form 
in both countries, and in 2002, Australian firms disclosed more IC information than 
Australian firms in 1998 and Hong Kong firms in 2002. 
Abeysekera (2007) compared the level of IC reporting of large listed firms (based on market 
capitalisation) in Sri Lanka with the level of IC reporting of large listed firms in Australia 
using content analysis to capture the IC data. The results suggested that unlike Australian 
firms, firms in Sri Lanka reported more on brand building, and while the disclosure of human 
capital was higher in Sri Lanka than in Australia, Australian firms were far more involved in 
R&D than Sri Lankan firms, and investors in Australia were willing to support such 
entrepreneurship, while the disclosure of internal capital by Sri Lankan firms was less than in 
Australia. The author argued that this occurred because the Australian government was more 
supportive of the entrepreneurial culture than the Sri Lankan government, and Australia has 
more comprehensive laws to protect intellectual property rights. In conclusion, there were 
differences in IC reporting between Sri Lankan and Australian firms that could arguably be 
attributed to social, economic, and political factors.  
All of the above studies empirically examined Australian firm practices in reporting and 




the extent to which these firms report their IC, and also applied content analysis to capture 
the IC in annual reports by frequency count. The authors also conducted interviews to 
provide a deeper understanding of how firms measure, identify, report and manage IC. In 
their research, the authors used the IC framework developed by Sveiby (1997) to divide IC 
into three categories: internal capital, external capital and employee competence/human 
capital. Overall, firms do not have a consistent framework for IC reporting (Abeysekera, 
2011). 
 
4.2.5.2 The IC and financial performance in Australia  
 
Evidence about IC and a firm’s financial performance in Australia generally supports the 
belief that IC can enhance their financial performance as well as carrying useful looking 
forward financial performance values that are relevant for investors evaluating firm value.   
For example, Joshi et al. (2013) examined the relationship between IC measured by VAIC
TM
 
and firm financial performance measured by ROA in the Australian financial sector for the 
period from 2006 to 2008. The study found that all Australian owned banks have human 
capital that is slightly more efficient than structural capital and capital employed. The study 
also found that the size of the bank in terms of its total number of employees, total assets and 
total shareholders’ equity, had little or no impact on their IC efficiency. Clarke et al. (2011) 
examined the effect that IC efficiency has on the firm performance of Australian listed firms 
between 2004 and 2008 where IC efficiency was measured by VAIC
TM
 and financial 
performance was measured by ROE, ROA, growth in revenues and employee productivity. 
The results indicated there was a positive relationship between IC efficiency and the 
performance of Australian listed firms, particularly regarding capital employed and human 




capital efficiency in the prior year and performance in the current year. Kim & Taylor (2014) 
compared the value relevance of the productivity of IC and its components, and the 
productivity of the book value of assets based on a sample of 160 Australian listed firms from 
2006 to 2010. The study developed models that drew on publicly available share prices and 
accounting numbers to compute and compare the value relevance of the productivity of IC (as 
well as its components of structural and human capital). IC was measured using a 
components-based direct IC measurement using hand-collected annual reports. The results 
showed that the productivity of structural capital, human capital, and IC were each positively 
associated with the share price, whereas the productivity of total assets at book value was 
insignificant and tangible assets were negatively significant. The authors concluded that the 
book value of intangible and tangible assets in the balance sheet have no value relevance, 
while only a fraction of IC was represented by intangible assets in the balance sheet. The 
papers discussed in the literature review are summarised in Appendix 1.3. 
 
4.3 Theoretical framework and development of hypotheses  
4.3.1 Resource-based theory 
4.3.1.1 Definition of resource-based theory 
Resource-based theory originated in the field of economics in the work of Penrose (1959), 
also known as the theory of firms. Resource-based theory asserts that firms have resources 
that are not established identically, and when they are maintained for a long time, they can 
result in long-term revenue (Penrose, 1959, p.24). In resource-based theory a firm is seen as a 




powerful source of sustained competitive advantage (Lado & Wilson, 1994). These resources 
and capabilities cannot be duplicated by competitors. 
 
4.3.1.2 Key concepts of resource-based theory  
The key concepts of resource-based theory are the resources and capabilities.  
‘Resources’ have been variously defined by resource-based theorists and can include tangible 
and intangible items (Hofer & Schendel 1978). The difference between providing short-term 
competitive advantages and those that are sustainable resides in the notion that these 
resources cannot be imitated by another firm (non-imitable), they are unevenly distributed 
and deployed across firms within a given competitive environment, (heterogeneous), and 
irreplaceable by another resource (non-substitutable) (Olalla, 1999; Barney 1991; 
Abeysekera, 2011). In orchestrating a firm’s resources, managers must select, develop, and 
bundle tangible and intangible resources to create capabilities (Sirmon et al., 2007); where 
‘Capabilities’ are defined as joining resources to produce activities or works (Grant, 1991). 
Grant also stated that capabilities are a combination of resources that become the basis for 
creating firm value and sustaining competitive advantage. Tangible and intangible resources 
are bundled to create capabilities; for example, technology, scientific equipment and human 
capital are bundled to create a research and development capability (Sirmon et al., 2007). 
Understanding the relationship between resources, capabilities, and performance helps firms 







4.3.1.3 Application of resource-based theory in the literature 
 
Resource-based theory has been found in supply chain management research where it was 
used to identify and highlight how a supply chain can contribute to a firm’s competitive 
advantage. For example, Barratt & Oke (2007) found that supply chains that are highly 
visible are valuable resources that can deliver a sustainable competitive advantage to a supply 
chain linkage. Das & Buddress’ (2007) study found that focusing on external value-network 
resources can help to develop firm-specific capabilities, while Bititci et al. (2011) found that 
organisational learning by effectively managing knowledge and networking is a critical 
competence that enables firms to develop innovative responses to unpredictable contexts and 
thus sustain competitive advantage and performance. 
Resource-based theory has become increasingly popular in performance management 
research in recent decades because the ultimate goal of performance management is to satisfy 
customers by providing greater value through enhanced efficiency and effectiveness 
(Liyanage & Kumar, 2003; Hitt et al., 2015). Resource-based theory provides a useful view 
of how performance can be managed based on the argument that the valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and non-substitutable resources will improve firm performance. For example, 
Mesquita et al. (2007) found that investments in new resources and capabilities were 
positively associated to the level productivity, which suggests that firms enhance their 
performance when they successfully create links with critical suppliers while excluding 
competitors from forming the same relationships. Reuter et al. (2010) found that the explicit 
and tacit categories of information technology resources improved financial performance and 
sustained competitive advantages, while Jeffers et al. (2008) found that a distinct competence 
or capacity to manage and make better use of information technology can help firms achieve 




According to resource-based theory, firms’ valuable resources and specific capabilities are 
necessary for innovation, so research is fruitful in product/service innovation literature. For 
example, Lewis et al. (2010) examined how two ‘classic’ and ‘extended’ resource-based 
advantages might combine to create a long-term advantage, process and organisational 
innovation; they also found that unbounded external resources such suppliers engaged in 
developing new product could create an initial advantage for firms. Camison & Lopez (2010) 
examined the indirect effects of manufacturing flexibility on organisational performance 
while considering product, process, and organisational innovation as mediating variables. The 
results indicated that organisational capabilities mediate manufacturing flexibility and 
performance, which can create competitive advantages. Menor & Roth (2008) found that the 
technical system and work force are resource capabilities that can also be managed to drive 
competitive advantage.  
IC is seen as a valuable resource that is more likely to produce a competitive advantage 
because it is difficult to imitate and even more difficult to substitute (Craighead et al., 2009; 
Hitt et al., 2001; Hitt et al., 2006). IC is seen as a ‘claim to future benefits’, so many analyses 
have been carried out to demonstrate a causal link between IC and value creation using 
resource-based theory (Ashton, 2005). Analyses linking IC to performance measures such as 
return on equity (Chen et al., 2005; Phusavat et al., 2011; Clarke et al., 2011), revenue growth 
(Chen et al., 2005; Phusavat et al., 2011; Clarke et al., 2011) return on assets (Joshi et al., 
2013; Chen et al., 2005; Phusavat et al., 2011; Clarke et al., 2011) and productivity (Chen et 
al., 2005; Phusavat et al., 2011; Clarke et al., 2011)
28
, have also been carried out.  
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 As section 4.2.3 of this paper has already presented each research in great details, thus for the brevity, this paper does not 




4.3.2 Signalling theory and voluntary IC disclosure  
Although resource-based theory has become popular in IC literature, it has also been 
criticised (Priem & Butler, 2001). Some criticisms include the static nature of these 
arguments and the fact that it ignores the potential influence of the external environment (Hitt 
et al., 2015). Thus, this paper adopts signalling theory to complement resource-based theory 
to examine the value relevance of IC disclosure.  
According to signalling theory, signalling would make investors and other stakeholders 
reassess the value of a firm before making decisions that are more favourable to the firm 
(Whiting & Miller, 2008). Firms have several ways of signalling information about 
themselves, of which voluntary disclosure of positive accounting information is considered to 
be one of the most effective (Ross, 1977; Watson et al., 2002; Xiao et al., 2004). Healy et al. 
(1999) found that increased voluntary disclosure leads to an increase in stock price, so 
voluntary IC disclosure could be a very effective means for firms to signal their superior 
quality due to the significance of IC for future wealth creation and forward looking benefits 
(Guthrie & Petty, 2000; Whiting & Miller, 2008); so for firms with a strong IC base, 
voluntary disclosure of IC could distinguish them from other low quality firms.  
Paper one section 2.3.2 of this thesis presented the three major motivations for management 
to voluntarily disclose positive information to outside users: management talent signalling, 
limitations of mandatory disclosure, and information asymmetry. The motivations for 
signalling IC may also follow these projections. Since studies found that the lack of value 
relevance with regards to financial reporting due to insufficient disclosure of IC, a sufficient 
disclosure would obviously help in the decision making process and would fill the gaps made 




A reduction in information asymmetry between a firm and external users is a major reason 
for voluntary IC disclosure because according to some scholars, inadequate IC disclosure 
disadvantages average investors compared to knowledgeable insiders, so a firm is at risk of 
insider trading (Leadbeater, 1999; Vergauwen & Van Alem, 2005). This could potentially 
make capital more costly because investors demand a premium for bearing risky information, 
therefore IC signalling would reduce information asymmetry and enable a firm to obtain 
more capital investment at a reduced risk (Mangena et al., 2014; Brüggen et al., 2009; Tan et 
al., 2007). A better assessment and belief in future wealth creation capabilities might raise a 
firm’s share price, and their market capitalisation (Williams, 2001). In this sense a firm’s 
share price would rise with adequate IC disclosure, so failure to provide relevant information 
about IC may weaken their financial position and reduce their competitiveness in the long 
term (Canibano et al., 1999). In fact, investors find it difficult to assess firm value and 
allocate resources when financial statements do not report IC, and as a consequence, the stock 
price of firms with adequate disclosure of IC would be higher than firms with inadequate 
disclosure.   
Some studies also suggest that signalling management talent to the market could be a strong 
motivation to disclose IC information (e.g., Garcia-Meca et al., 2005; Oliveira et al., 2006; 
Rodgers, 2007), because managers are more likely to signal their ability to make firms grow 
over the long term. When investors buy shares or when customers enter into a relationship 
with a firm, these associations are not based on a particular product or set of products, they 
believe the firm will continue to develop processes over the long term that will enable it to 
capitalise on emerging technologies and change market needs to create useful and profitable 
products and services (Brüggen et al., 2009; Petty et al., 2008). IC that enhances a firm’s 




information, these firms display their wealth creating capabilities to the public over the long 
term, and which in turn may enhance their stock price.  
 
 
4.3.3 Application of signalling theory in IC literature  
Empirical studies have examined IC disclosure using signalling theory and confirmed that it 
could reduce the risk of insider trading, lower the cost of capital, decrease the misallocation 
of capital, increase incentives for entrepreneurs and knowledge workers, and reduce market 
volatility (An et al., 2011; Rodgers, 2007).  
Van der Meer-Kooistra & Zijlstra (2001) reported that failure to disclose information 
regarding investments in IC leads to an underestimation of future earnings, increases 
investors’ perception of risk, and thereby increases the cost of capital. Chan et al. (2001) 
provided similar findings arguing that the cost of capital increases if R&D intensive firms fall 
to disclose sufficient R&D. Chan et al. (2001) confirmed that lack of information on IC 
imposes real costs on investors through increased uncertainty about firms’ future 
performance. Various studies have suggested greater disclosure of IC to reduce the 
information asymmetry component of the cost of capital, which in turn decreases the returns 
required by investors (e.g., Sengupta, 1998; Botosan, 1997; Coles et al., 1995; Elliot & 
Jacobson, 1994; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). Based on surveys and questionnaires, 
Youndt et al. (2004) and Reed et al. (2006) found that firms with more distinctive IC profiles 
generated higher returns than firms with less developed IC. According to this argument, firms 
with a high level of IC value are expected to perform well.  
Some other studies in the area believe that signalling IC would improve corporate reputation 




relationships with various stakeholders (e.g., Bozzolan et al., 2003; Whiting & Miller, 2008).  
 
4.3.4 Development of hypotheses  
To make useful signals it is important to make an inimitable signal to competitors. This paper 
argues on the basis of signalling theory which assumes that a good quality firm is likely to 
use multiple signals to entice its investors to view them favourably. IC is a very effective 
signal to the market of firm quality because according to resource-based theory, it is rarely 
imitable and replaceable. Therefore IC disclosure can signal firm performance to outsiders, 
which influences investors’ perceptions of firm performance, which in turn affects the stock 
price. Although empirical tests of this theory provided mixed results, following the findings 
of prior researches such as Chen et al. (2005), Phusavat et al. (2011), Joshi et al. (2013), Tan 
et al. (2007) and the tenets of resource-based theory and signalling theory, this study expects 
that IC disclosure will be positively related to current and future financial performance, so the 
hypothesis is presented as follows:  
H8: IC disclosure is positively associated with firms’ current and future financial 
performance. 
 
The signalling process will make investors reassess firm value, so the disclosure of IC, which 
is an inimitable resource that signals future growth, enhances the stock price because 
investors place more value on firms who disclose more IC (Firer & Williams, 2003; Petty et 
al., 2008; Brennan & Connell, 2000). Following earlier findings regarding the benefits to the 
capital market of disclosing enough IC because it reduces the information asymmetry 




market dominance, it is reasonable to propose that financial professionals reward the 
voluntary disclosure of IC information. Therefore, this thesis provides the below hypothesis: 
H9: The IC disclosure is value-relevant to market to evaluate firm value.   
 
The market comprises different levels of investors, but if it is insufficient, investors may be 
unable to distinguish between high quality firms and low quality firms. Investors may reward 
firms for any favourable positive accounting information, whereas the market rewards firms 
with sufficient IC disclosure, as is supported by severable studies (e.g., Vafaei et al., 2011; 
Joshi et al., 2013). However, positive accounting information can also be achieved when 
managers use earnings management techniques. Prior studies have argued that firms may 
manipulate perceptions resulting in overvaluation by investors without adequate information 
regarding IC (e.g., Rodgers, 2007). Deficient IC disclosure escalates information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders, and provides fertile ground for insiders to extract personal 
benefits rather than act in the best interests of outsiders (Singh et al., 2008). Paper one and 
paper two have argued that opportunistic underlying earnings reporting is now perceived as 
being less detectable earnings management tool that affects investors’ perceptions of firm 
performance. This paper assumes that if IC, which is a firm’s valuable resources that are 
difficult for low quality firms to imitate, truly signals firms’ potential growth and competitive 
advantage, then low quality firms will find it difficult to follow these signalling strategies, 
and engage in opportunistic underlying earnings reporting to influence the market. In this 
sense, firms with opportunistic underlying earnings reporting are less likely to make 
sufficient IC disclosure, and therefore this thesis presents the following hypothesis: 




The relationships described above are summarised in figure 7. Managers disclose IC through 
annual reports with the assumption that it will enhance firm value because it represents firms’ 
inimitable resources that enhance firms’ current and future performance; as is argued by 
resource-based theory. It is possible however that these strategies also allow managers to 
satisfy personal interests (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Toms, 2002). The purpose of 
signalling is to influence investors’ perceptions of firm value in terms of increasing the stock 
price. Whilst the market will be influenced by factors such as unforeseen variables, the 
assumption is that stock price can be influenced through the disclosure process, so the value 
of IC will be a function of uniqueness and difficulty of imitation. Thus, if firms are able to 
create IC that is inimitable, managers will be able to make disclosures through annual reports, 
which competitors will also find impossible to imitate without making false declarations. 
High quality firms can disclose sufficient IC, whereas low quality firms find this difficult to 
follow. As incentives from market valuation, low quality firms will find other ways to 
influence the market, and since making false IC disclosures is costly, a firm with insufficient 
IC would find it very difficult to imitate. Therefore, low quality firms will pursue 
opportunistic underlying earnings reporting to influence investors’ perceptions because it is 









Figure 7: Flow chart of theoretical framework for IC reporting and opportunistic 











4.4 Research design  
4.4.1 IC data capture  
4.4.1.1 Content analysis  
Guthrie and his team (Guthrie et al., 1999; Petty & Guthrie, 2000; Guthrie & Petty 2000a ; b) 
stated that most IC information disclosed for Australian firms is expressed in discursive 
rather than numerical terms because it is belevied that using a scorecard to measure IC is 
appropriate 
29
. This study measures IC using the SC measurement based on an IC framework 
                                                          
29 The other reason for using SC measurement is because the literature review section reveals that VAICTM method is 
applied more frequently among the scholars for firm value creation studies, however, the SC as good measurement for 
hidden value creation (Sveiby, 2010) is still limit in the literature. Therefore, to fill the gap, this paper uses SC method to 
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developed by Sveiby (1997) and further modified by Guthrie et al. (1999), Abeysekera & 
Guthrie (2005) and Abeysekera (2008). Using the content analysis for SC measurement of IC 
is the most popular method, although as a research instrument it is tested rigorously 
(Abeysekera, 2008; Guthrie et al., 2004). It is widely used in files such as social, 
environmental, accounting (e.g., Andrew et al., 1989; Cameron & Guthrie 1993; Choon et al. 
2000; Newson & Deegan 2002), and especially in IC studies (Guthrie et al., 1999; Petty & 
Guthrie, 2000; Guthrie & Petty, 2000a; b; Olsson 2001). 
Content analysis is defined as ‘a technique for gathering data that consists of codifying 
qualitative information, in literary and anecdotal form, into pre-defined categories in order to 
derive quantitative scales of varying levels of complexity to track patterns in the presentation 
and reporting of information’ (Abbott & Monsen 1979, p.504). This method attempts to 
manifest and determine the written content or the content of other published communications 
by means of an objective, systematic, and reliable analysis (Krippendorf, 1980; Guthrie, 
1983; Guthrie et al., 2004). Content analysis assumes that important subject matter is 
indicated by frequency counts (Krippendorff, 1980), so for content analysis to be effective, 
studies should meet certain technical requirements (Guthrie & Mathews, 1985). First, the 
categories of classification must be clearly and operationally defined; second, information 
can be quantified; third, the core is objectivity, which means that an item either does, or does 
not belong to a particular category, and a reliable coder is needed for consistency. 
This paper conceptualises IC according to Abeysekera (2008)’s framework because he 
provided a more comprehensive list of IC items (Abeysekera, 2011). The IC framework 
presented was modified so that items likely to be reported by Australian firms will converge 
better. Under a category of internal capital, this paper combined patents, copyrights, and 




capital this study added favourable relations with stakeholders, and this includes customer 
relationships, public relations and relationships with suppliers. This item was added because 
this paper believes that strong relations with stakeholders can bring economic benefits to a 
firm. Several changes were made to the human capital items; the union activity item, as 
shown in Abeysekera (2008)’s framework, was entered into employee involvement in the 
community because there were only 9 frequency counts found in the union activity item. The 
employee measurement combined the average professional experience item and expert 
seniority item into one item known as professional experience, and average value-added per 
expert and value added per employee were combined into an item called value-added by 
employee. The median age of employee item was deleted. These changes were made because 
in Sri Lanka there are tables called  ‘Expertise’ , charts called  ‘Age wise analysis of 
corporate & senior management, charts called ‘service analysis of executives KVPL’ and 
statement called ‘statement of Value Added of the Company’ to present average professional 
experience, value-added per employee, or expert, and senior expert. There are no such charts 
or statements in Australia that systemically present that sort of information. Information 
regarding professional experience can be found in a director’s profile, while value added by 
employee can be found in any section of annual reports in listed Australia firms. Further 
changes were as follows: average education level, vocational qualifications and education 
were combined into one item called education; race, gender, religion, and disabilities were 
combined into one item named as employee diversity to present equity issues. Finally, 
employee benefits, employee compensation plans, employee share and share option scheme, 
were combined into one item called employee welfare. Executive compensation plans, 
executive share, and share option plans were excluded because they are part of executive 
remuneration packages listed in remuneration reports which summarises the remuneration 




Act 2001 and its Regulations, which do not fit the executive compensation plan defined by 
Abeysekera’s (2008) framework
30
. Consequently, internal capital comprises 8 items 
(including Intellectual property; Management processes; Technological processes; 
Information systems; Network systems; Management philosophy; Corporate culture; 
Financial relations). External capital comprises 11 items (including Brands; Customer 
satisfaction; Quality standards; Company names; Favourable contracts; Business 
collaborations; Licensing agreements; Franchising agreements; Distribution channels; Market 
share; Favourable relations with stakeholders), and human capital comprises 14 items 
(including Employee involvement in the community; Employee thanked; Employee featured; 
Employee numbers; Professional experience; Value added by employee;  Know-how; 
Education; Career development; Training programmes; Entrepreneurial spirit, 
innovativeness, proactive and reactive abilities and changeability; Employment safety; 
Workplace diversity; Employee welfare).   
To undertake a content analysis of the 610 annual reports
31
, the IC items collected from 
reading and analysing annual reports were entered into a coding sheet for four separate years.  
A numerical coding scheme was used for each IC item. For each firm, the frequency of 
occurrence of each IC item was used to present the level of IC disclosures; zero was used if 
the IC item did not appear in the annual report.  
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 Abeysekera (2008) defines the executive compensation plan as ‘recompense executive staff for their effort towards the 
firm in addition to their statutory entitlements’ (p.87) 
31
 Annual reports are an ideal research object to apply the IC framework to because they are a good proxy to measure the 
comparative positions and trends of IC between firms, industries and countries (Abeysekera, 2008). Much of the published 
research has used annual reports as audit objects to ascertain the status of the IC of firms within countries (Guthrie et al., 
1999; Brennan, 2001; Olsson, 2001; Abeysekera, 2008) and between countries (Subbarao & Zeghal 1997; Abeysekera, 




4.4.1.2 Threats to the validity and reliability of the content analysis 
The terms validity and reliability are often expressed in relation to quantitative methodology 
(Black & Champion 1976, p.221; McKinnon 1988). The term ‘validity’ is defined as the 
property of a measure that allows researcher to say that an instrument measures what they say 
it measures (Abbott & Monsen 1979; Ragin, 1994, p.193; Abeysekera, 2008, p.61). It is 
concerned with the question to be studied (McKinnon, 1988, p.36). The term ‘reliability’ is 
defined as the ability of an instrument to consistently measure what must be measured (Black 
& Champion 1976, p.234; Ragin, 1994, p.190; Abeysekera, 2008, p.61); it is concerned with 
whether a researcher is obtaining reliable data (McKinnon, 1988, p.36). Since raw data in 
annual reports cannot be used for research purposes, it must be entered into a coding sheet in 
terms of IC items; a process can threaten validity and/or reliability and lead to two errors. 
First, IC items in an annual report may not reflect all the issues of interest that are actually 
embedded in the annual report. Second, raw data can be inaccurately coded into the coding 
sheet, and categorising raw data can affect the validity and reliability of the research results 
(Abbott & Monsen 1979).  
 
4.4.1.3 Overcoming threats to content analysis 
According to Milne & Adler (1999) and Guthrie et al. (2004), three main techniques are used 
to reduce concerns about reliability and validity in content analysis: by selecting disclosure 
categories from well-grounded relevant literature, and clearly defining them; by establishing 
a reliable coding instrument with specific decision categories and decision rules; by training 
the coders and showing that coding decisions made on a pilot sample have reached an 
acceptable level by other coders. The first two methods can be realised because this paper 
follows Gutheir & Petty (2000) and Abeysekera’s (2008) IC framework, which clearly 




was to count pre-determined IC items referred to in the annual reports using Nvivo software. 
The third technique is difficult to realise due to restrictions on the research domain because a 
conventional reliability test requires a measure of consensus between different coders, which 
is interpreted by a consensus coefficient. In coding data, another researcher could code the 
semantic content differently from that recorded in this thesis by this researcher. Abeysekera 
(2008) argued that this problem is not due to laxity or carelessness between researchers, but 
because of differences in objectively driven sensibility and creativity between them. The 
creative aspect is an accepted factor in semantic content analysis, unlike syntactic content 
analysis. Under semantic rules, words can express different concepts to different people, and 
since there is no natural language that determines one interpretation of a sentence, a true or 
correct semantic investigation is directed towards building empirical knowledge rather than 
normative knowledge (Andren 1980, pp.60-63). According to Abeysekera (2008), the 
consensus coefficient has weaknesses in that it can cast doubt on reliable data if the 
coefficient is low and a high coefficient can seem trustworthy even if it is unreliable because 
there is a high frequency of false data. A more qualified reliability test can involve several 
others by re-coding a random sample of investigated material to identify differences so that 
an ordinary coefficient can be calculated. However, this method is time consuming and 
costly. Given the above limitations, a sole researcher’s judgment should be trusted because it 
seems to be the only feasible way of measuring the veracity of data concerning semantic 
content (Andren 1980, pp.65-66). Therefore, this study does not require another coder to re-
capture IC using content analysis, however after capturing the IC data, the author of this 
study has reviewed the coded IC items twice, and there is a one week interval between first 






4.4.2 Empirical models 
4.4.2.1 IC and firm’s financial performance (H8) 
There is at present no specific theoretical perspective or adequate empirical evidence that 
supports the superiority of any specific proxy financial performance measure (Ghosh & 
Mondal, 2009), in fact a study found that firm productivity relies more on its IC and system 
capabilities than its hard assets, and a firm with higher IC disclosure is expected to have 
higher rate of profitability and may also experience higher productivity (Patton, 2007). 
Therefore, financial performance in this paper is measured by productivity and profitability.  
Profitability shows the operating success of an entity for a given period of time; it is a 
measure of the degree to which revenues exceed costs, and is frequently used as the ultimate 
test of management’s operating effectiveness (Chen et al., 2005). Three commonly used 
measures in literature are applied in this paper; return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), and revenue growth (RG).  
Return on assets (ROA)= Earnings before tax/Average total assets                               (15) 
Return on equity (ROE)=Earnings before tax/Average shareholders’ equity                 (16) 
Revenue growth (RG)=(Current total revenue-prior year revenue)/Prior year revenue  (17) 
ROE is generally considered by investors to be an important indicator of financial 
profitability because it shows how much profit was earned for each dollar invested by the 
owners. ROA reflects firms’ efficiency in utilising total assets by measuring the overall 
profitability of assets in terms of the rate earned on each dollar invested in assets, while RG 
measures changes in firms’ revenues. Increases in revenues usually signal opportunities for 




Productivity measures the efficiency with which ability firm convert inputs into outputs; the 
most frequently used measurement of productivity in literature is the ratio of revenue-to-
assets.    
Revenue-to-assets ratio (ATO)=Total revenue/Average total assets                          (18) 
ATO is used to compare how much in assets a company has relative to the amount of 
revenues it can generate using their assets; basically, the higher the ratio, the smaller the 
investment needed to generate revenue (Kamath, 2008).  
Empirical model for H8:  
Financial performance measurementsj,t,t+1,t+2 = a1ICj,t/HICj,t + a2Controlsj,t +Year effects+ 
Industry effects+ ej,t                                                                                                                                                          (19) 
Where: j-firm observations, t-years from 2009 to 2012.  
Financial performance is measured by ROA, ROE, RG and ATO for firm j, in year t, in year 
t+1, and in year t+2, respectively;  
ICj,t–the sum of natural logarithm of frequency counts of internal capital, external capital, and 
human capital for firm j, in year t.  
HICj,t –dummy variable where each year is ranked on IC and the upper quartile of IC is 
selected as sufficient IC disclosure and coded as one, or zero otherwise. Sufficient IC 
disclosure is also included as an independent variable because this paper assumes it is more 






4.4.2.2 Control variables for financial performance  
This paper includes several variables that are known to influence financial performance and 
IC disclosure. They are: leverage ratio, firm size, corporate governance, industry effects and 
year effects.  
Leverage ratio: firms that rely heavily on debt may lack the security needed to attract 
investors, and will likely have higher interest payments that reflect on their riskiness and 
returns (Clarke et al., 2011). Researchers argued that lenders may represent influential 
shareholders with increasing debt to equity ratios to monitor IC investments (Firer & 
Williams, 2003; Dignam & Galanis, 2009; Abeysekera, 2011), so firms may be forced to 
disclose their IC more actively. Consistent with prior research, this paper includes the 
leverage ratio (Leveragej,t) as a control variable measured by short-term and long-term debt 
divided by total assets for firm j, in year t. 
 
Firm size: agency theory predicts that larger firms will disclose more information to mitigate 
any potential transfers of wealth from suppliers of outside capital to managers (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Leftwich et al., 1981; Garcia-Meca et al., 2005). Studies found that firm size 
may positively influence IC value due to advantageous access to resources and market power 
(Youndt et al., 2004; Reed et al., 2006; Goebel, 2015). Guthrie et al. (2006) found that, on 
average, large Australian companies have a higher level of disclosure than small companies, 
so firm size (Sizej,t) is included as a control variable measured by the natural logarithm of 
total assets for firm j, at the beginning of year t.  
Corporate governance: Keenan & Aggestam (2001) were the first to investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance and IC. They argued that the responsibility for 




relationship between corporate governance structure and IC disclosure of UK listed firms and 
found that board composition, ownership structure, the size of an audit committee and 
frequency of committee meetings have a significantly positive relationship with IC 
disclosure, while dual roles were insignificant. Safieddine et al., (2009) examined the 
relationship between IC and corporate governance in a university setting and concluded that 
corporate governance and IC are indeed related and corporate governance is a major factor 
attracting IC in a firm. Abidin et al., (2009) conducted a study in Malaysia and found 
evidence of a positive link between large board size and IC performance, and also showed a 
positive link between the number of non-executive directors and IC. Zamani et al., (2012) 
studied the association between three board characteristics (board size, independent directors, 
and role duality) and IC efficiency by using VAIC
TM
 in the Tehran Security Exchange, and 
concluded there was a positive link between them. Muttakin et al. (2015) examined the 
relationship between corporate governance and the extent to which Bangladeshi firms 
disclose IC and found that foreign ownership, board independence, and the presence of audit 
committees are positively associated with the extent of IC disclosure. Conversely, family 
duality (where the positions of CEO and chairperson are occupied by two individuals from 
the same family) is negatively associated with the extent of IC disclosure. According to 
Gillan (2006), two measures of corporate governance, the percentage of independent 
directors on the board of directors and the percentage of shares held by institutions, are two 
important measures used to capture the mechanisms of corporate governance. Thus this paper 
includes the percentage of independent directors (INDj,t) and the percentage of shares held by 
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 The financial data used in this paper were captured from DatAnalysis database available on the University of Wollongong 
website. The corporate governance data were collected from corporate governance section and shareholder information 




As with papers one and two, paper three controls the year and industry effects in Equation 
(19). 3 dummy variables were generated (year 2010=1, and others zero; year 2011=1, and 
others zero; year 2012=1, and others zero) to control for the unobservable confounding 
variables that differ from time to time, but are constant across the industries. Year 2009 was 
dropped by Stata software because the fixed-effects model included a constant. For industry 
effects, 7 dummy variables were generated (energy=1, and others zero; materials =1, and 
others zero; industrials=1, and others zero; health care=1, and others zero; software & 
services=1, and others zero; telecommunication services=1, and others zero; utilities=1, and 
others zero) to control for the unobservable confounding variables that differ across 
industries, but are constant over time. Consumer discretionary was dropped by Stata software 
because the fixed-effects model included a constant. 
 
4.4.2.3 Value relevance of IC (H9) 
Chapter two and section 2.4.5 discussed three value relevance models (including the balance 
sheet model, the earnings model, and Ohlson’s (1995) model). Of these, Ohlson’s (1995) 
model is widely used in the literature (Holthausen & Watts, 2001). Several studies have 
examined the value relevance of accounting information based on Ohlson’s (1995) model, 
and included voluntary disclosure in the model (e.g., Vafaei, 2011; Kim & Taylor, 2014; 
Ferraro & Veltri, 2011). Lundholm & Myers (2002) measured the disclosure activities of 
firms by rating the published reports of the Association for Investment Management Research 
(AIMR), and found that increasing firms’ discretionary disclosure activities would bring 
credible and relevant information about future earnings into the current market place, which 
then increases the stock price. Their model is based on the residual income valuation model 
where they characterised the current annual stock return as the sum of unexpected current 




researchers used the level of current earnings and past year’s earnings as proxy for 
unexpected current earnings where the proxy for changes in expected future earnings is 
central to the model. As future earnings have expected and unexpected components, the 
unexpected component to future earnings is an error in measurement when the realised future 
earnings are used as proxy for expected future earnings. Future stock returns are included to 
control for measurement errors in the model because they believe an unexpected shock to 
future earnings should also generate future returns. The measurement error (future returns) 
should not be associated with current returns in a regression by excluding future earnings, nor 
should it be negatively associated with current returns in the model. By extending the model, 
their study assumes that a significant source of changing expectations about a firm’s future 
performance is disclosure activity by the firm itself. If a firm reveals news relevant to its 
future earnings through its disclosure activity, then realised future earnings will be reflected 
in current returns, albeit with some measurement error. Thus, they included the interaction 
effect between future earnings and the level of a firm’s disclosure activity on stock returns as 
an interested variable, and thus the interaction between future earnings and voluntary 
disclosure activity is labelled as ‘revealed future earnings’. From this the researchers found a 
positive relationship between ‘revealed earnings’ and stock returns. Abeysekera (2011b) 
extended Lundholm & Myers (2002)’s study to examine whether IC would bring future 
earnings forward to current stock prices in the civil war period in Sri Lanka and found that 
people often lost confidence due to future economic performances during this period so they 
did not include IC in the current price.  
Lundholm & Myers (2002) is more appropriate to examine the market value relevance of IC 
because this paper attempts to consider whether IC would bring information regarding a 
firm’s future earnings into current stock returns. Collins et al. (1994) and Lundholm & Myers 




so this study regards future earnings as the sum of three years of future accounting based 
earnings for each current year (investigation year) of the sample. Following Lundholm & 
Myers (2002) assertion, this study does not predict the coefficient on IC disclosure or 
sufficient IC disclosure itself, but does include it in the regression model because it is part of 
the interaction terms. If IC disclosure or sufficient IC disclosure is excluded, the interaction 
terms could inadvertently proxy for the level of disclosure so the interested variable for the 
H9 model is the interaction between IC disclosure or sufficient IC disclosure, and future 
earnings (i.e., the ‘revealed earnings’).  
 
This study applies the Lundholm & Myers (2002)’s model as follow to test H9: 
Rj,t = a1Ej,t-1 + a2Ej,t+ a3Ej,t+1to3 + a4Rj,t+1to3 + a5ICj,t/HICj,t + a6ICj,t*Ej,t-1/HICj,t*Ej,t-1 + 
a7ICj,t*Ej,t/HICj,t*Ej,t + a8ICj,t*Ej,t+1to3/HICj,t*Ej,t+1to3 + a9ICj,t*Rj,t+1to3/ HICj,t*Rj,t+1to3 + a10 
Controlsj,t + Year effects+ Industry effects + ej,t                                                                                                     (20) 
Where: j is firm observations. t is years from 2009 to 2012.  
Rj,t - the annual stock returns for firm j, year t, measured by the natural logarithm of stock 
price three months
33
 after year end t/ stock price three months after year end t-1; 
ICj,t - the sum of natural logarithm of frequency counts of internal capital, external capital, 
and human capital for firm j, in year t.  
HICj,t - dummy variable where each year is ranked on IC and then the upper quartile of IC is 
selected as sufficient IC disclosure and coded as one, and zero otherwise. 
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 Following the prior studies (Yu et al., 2015; Swartz et al., 2006; Ferraro & Veltri, 2011), this study measures the firm’s 
stock price three months after year end, as it takes that period for annual reports to be released and inform shareholders about 
reported accounting profit in annual reports. This study uses stock return rather than the stock price as a measure to 




Ej,t-1 - earnings before tax for firm j, in year t-1, deflated by the market capitalisation at 
beginning of year t for firm j; 
Ej,t - earnings before tax for firm j, in year t, deflated by market capitalisation at the beginning 
of year t for firm j; 
Ej,t+1to3 - the sum of earnings before tax for firm j, in years t+1, t+2, and t+3, deflated by 
market capitalisation at the beginning of year t for firm j; 
Rj,t+1to3 - the sum of annual stock returns for firm j, in years t+1, t+2, and t+3, over a 12 
month period beginning on the first day of the third month of the given year and ending on 
the last day of the second month of the subsequent year; 
ICj,t*Ej,t-1/HICj,t*Ej,t-1 - interaction of IC disclosure or sufficient IC disclosure for firm j, in 
year t and earnings before tax for firm j, in year t-1, deflated by market capitalisation at the 
beginning of year t for firm j; 
ICj,t*Ej,t/HICj,t*Ej,t - interaction of IC disclosure or sufficient IC disclosure for firm j, in year t 
and earnings before tax for firm j, in year t, deflated by market capitalisation at the beginning 
of year t for firm j; 
ICj,t*Ej,t+1to3/HICj,t*Ej,t+1to3 - interaction of IC disclosure or sufficient IC disclosure for firm j, 
in year t and earnings before tax for firm j, in years t+1,t+2, and t+3, deflated by market 
capitalisation at beginning of year t for firm j; 
ICj,t*Rj,t+1to3/ HICj,t*Rj,t+1to3 - interaction of IC disclosure or sufficient IC disclosure for firm j, 
in year t and sum of annual stock returns for firm j, in years t+1, t+2, and t+3, over a 12 
month period beginning on the first day of the third month of the given year and ending on 




4.4.2.4 Control variables for value relevance of IC 
Previous studies identified several variables that influence current stock returns, while others 
found that firms with a higher rate of growth have higher earnings potential and are more 
likely to disclose a higher level of IC to inform investors about future earnings (Swinson, 
1998, p.4; Abeysekera, 2011); the market-to-book ratio (MtoBj,t) is included to control for 
firm growth, measured as market value of equity divided by the book value of equity for firm 
j, in year t. Studies also found that IC resources have a longer operating cycle and are realised 
as earnings over a longer period (Warfield & Wild, 1992), firm’s operating cycle (Opcyclej,t) 
is included as a control variable, measured as natural logarithm of days of accounts 
receivable plus days of inventory for firm j, in year t. Firm size can influence a firm’s 
discretionary disclosure practices, where larger firms are more visible and there is greater 
public demand for information beyond the statutory disclosure limits (Nagar et al., 2003). 
However, other studies found that large firms have difficulty in transforming future earnings 
into current earnings (Jense & Meckling, 1976). Firm size (Mktcapj,t) measured by the natural 
logarithm of market capitalisation of a firm, and is included as control variables
34
. As with 
the empirical Equation (19) for H8, Equation (20) controls the year and industry effects.  
 
4.4.2.5 IC and opportunistic underlying earnings reporting (H10) 
Since paper one and two of this thesis found that underlying earnings are manipulated by 
managers as an earnings management tool that is perceived to be less detectable and is an 
effective technique to influence investors’ perceptions of firm performance, this thesis 
developed the following empirical model to examine H10:   
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 The firm size is measured by logarithm of market capitalisation rather than total assets as the value relevance of IC is examined 




ICj,t/HICj,t=a1InExj,t+a2Controlsj,t+Year effects + Industry effects + ej,t                               (21) 
Where: j is firm observations. t is years from 2009 to 2012.  
ICj,t - the sum of natural logarithm of frequency counts of internal capital, external capital, 
and human capital for firm j, in year t.  
HICj,t - dummy variable where each year is ranked on IC and then the upper quartile of IC is 
selected as sufficient IC disclosure and coded as one, or zero otherwise. 
InExj,t - income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions, which is measured by a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if j firm discloses a underlying earnings number greater than the 
statutory earnings in year t, and zero otherwise.   
Control variables: except the general control variables in Equation (19) for H8, control 
variables in Equation (21) for H10 also include the specific control variables for opportunistic 
underlying earnings reporting that were examined in paper one. The specific control variables 
for opportunistic underlying earnings reporting are Meetj,t and Lossj,t. Where Meetj,t is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s earnings before tax in year t is greater or equals to 
earnings before tax in year t-1, and zero otherwise. Lossj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
j firm made statutory losses in year t, and zero otherwise. 
 
4.5 Analyses and Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics of variables for paper three 
Table 21 presents the descriptive statistics for IC and the disclosures of its three categories, 




extent of reporting varied greatly (standard deviation=8.917)
35
. The mean (21.033) and 
median (20) are high enough. Of the three IC categories, human capital presents the highest 
mean (9.926) and highest median (10.000), while the descriptive statistics suggest there is an 
increasing awareness of the importance of IC, especially for human capital, among ASX 200 
firms, and firms have increased their commitment to communicate information about their IC 
to external stakeholders. 
 
Table 21: Descriptive statistics for IC and its three categories 




ICj,t 610 21.033 20.000 8.917 2.000 66.000 
INCj,t 610 4.752 4.000 3.501 0.000 19.000 
ECj,t 610 6.354 6.000 4.498 0.000 34.000 
HCj,t 610 9.926 10.000 4.753 0.000 28.000 
Note: INCj,t is frequency counts of internal capital for firm j, in year t. ECj,t is frequency counts of external capital for firm j, 
in year t. HCj,tis frequency counts of human capital for firm j, in year t. ICj,t is the sum of frequency counts of internal capital, 
external capital, and human capital for firm j, in year t.  
 
 
4.5.2 Frequency of reporting specific IC attributes  
Table 22 shows the popularity of the reporting specific IC items. As table 22 shows, the two 
items disclosed most are ‘management processes’ under the internal capital category 
(reporting frequency=874) and ‘business collaborations’ with other partners under the 
external capital category (reporting frequency=863). ‘Management processes’ is most 
important, which is not surprising because it is principally concerned with relations between 
people, and is a common way of conducting business that leads to objectives being 
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accomplished. ‘Business collaborations’ is next because alliances and other forms of 
collaborative arrangements are important means of implementing firm’s growth strategies 
(Guthrie et al., 2006). The third most reported IC item is ‘know-how’ (reporting 
frequency=794). This is a human capital item that shows how much knowledge an employee 
possesses about a particular topic (Brooking, 1996, pp.51-51); it includes skills and 
knowledge, or skills used to accomplish jobs or the work related knowledge needed to do a 
job in terms of tacit, explicit, and implicit knowledge (Li et al., 2008). The least reported item 
















Table 22: The frequency counts of individual IC items 
IC items  Frequency counts 
Internal capital  2899 
Intellectual property 327 
Management processes  874 
Technological processes  622 
Information systems 213 
Network systems 72 
Management philosophy  383 
Corporate culture  304 
Financial relations 104 
External capital 3876 
Brands  665 
Customer satisfaction  152 
Quality standards 186 
Company names 87 
Favourable contracts  731 
Business collaborations 863 
Licensing agreements 366 
Franchising agreements  58 
Distribution channels  159 
Market share 299 
Favourable relations with stakeholders  310 
 
Human capital  6055 
Employee involvement in the community  266 
Employee thanked 543 
Employee featured  417 
Employee numbers 394 
Professional experience 556 
Value added by employee 76 
Know-how 794 




Table 22: The frequency counts of individual IC items 
(continued) 
IC items (Human capital continued) Frequency counts 
Career development  104 
Training programmers 267 




Employment safety  781 
Employee diversity 513 
Employee welfare  250 
 
 
4.5.3 Relative emphasis in terms of IC categories 
The frequency of reporting by categories of IC (including internal capital, external capital, 
and human capital) is to determine whether there is a particular focus on one particular 
category of capital. Figure 8 shows the relative emphasis in terms of IC categories. Reporting 
human capital appears to be more in favour with 47% of total IC disclosure, followed by 
external capital which accounts for 30% of total IC disclosure. Reporting internal capital 
seems to be less in favour with 23% compare to the other two categories. Human capital is 
emphasized in the light of an emphasis in recent years with increased global competition, so 
talented people are once more a priority. The increasing awareness of safety issues may also 
account for this emphasis on human capital, because most ASX200 firms now provide a 
safety and sustainability section in their annual reports. The reporting frequency of 
employment safety is 781, which is the second highest item reported in the human capital 
category. Moreover, an increasing number of firms reported the diversity of their employees 
(reporting frequency=513) based on ASX best practice recommendations 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 & 3.5 
in corporate governance statement section 4 of annual reports. This increased reporting of 
human capital may also arise from an increase in employee relations. Most firms (reporting 




also attempted to give special prominence to and reward employees, as shown in the high 
reporting frequency in employee featured (reporting frequency=417) item.  
Figure 8: The relative emphasis in terms of IC categories 
 
 
4.5.4 Pearson and Spearman correlations of variables for paper three 
4.5.4.1 Pearson and Spearman correlations for three individual IC categories 
Table 23 panel A presents the results of pearson and spearman correlations between IC, 
external capital, human capital, and internal capital, and shows that internal capital, external 
capital, and human capital, are significantly and positively correlated to each other. All three 
individual categories are highly correlated to total IC disclosure. Table 23 panel B shows the 
factor analysis of three individual categories, while in panel B, internal capital, external 
capital, and human capital are represented by one factor. The panel A and panel B results of 
table 23 indicate that by making the total of three individual categories represent total IC 














Table 23: The relations between IC and its three categories 
Table 23 Panel A: Pearson and spearman correlations for IC variables 
 
INCj,t ECj,t HCj,t ICj,t 
INCj,t 1.000 0.238
*** 0.130*** 0.582*** 
  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
ECj,t 0.278












*** 0.742*** 0.727*** 1.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Table 23 Panel B: Factor analysis 
Factor   Eigenvalue Difference  Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 0.548 0.602 1.963 1.963 
Factor2 -0.054 0.161 -0.193 1.770 
Factor3 -0.215 0.000 -0.770 1.000 
Number of obs 610 
   
Retained factors 1 
   
Number of params 3 
   
chi2(3) 93.45 
   
Prob>chi2 0 
   
 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness 
INCj,t 0.354 0.875 
ECj,t 0.496 0.754 
HCj,t 0.420 0.823 
p-value in parentheses  
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Pearson (spearman) correlations are presented above (below) 
Note: INCj,t is frequency counts of internal capital for firm j, in year t. ECj,t is frequency counts of external capital for firm j, 
in year t. HCj,tis frequency counts of human capital for firm j, in year t. ICj,t is the sum of frequency counts of internal capital, 





4.5.4.2 Pearson and Spearman correlations for financial performance variables 
 
Table 24 panel A presents the pearson and spearman correlations for five traditional financial 
performance variables with IC disclosure. Table 24 shows that IC disclosure (ICj,t) and 
sufficient IC disclosure (HICj,t) are positively and significantly correlated to each current 
profitability measurements (ROEj,t, ROAj,t and RGj,t), and the productivity measurements 
(ATOj,t) and traditional market valuation measurement (MtoBj,t). Moreover, ICj,t and HICj,t 
are found positively and significantly correlated to future profitability measurements 
(ROEj,t+1, ROEj,t+2, ROAj,t+1, ROAj,t+2, RGj,t+1 and RGj,t+2), future productivity measurements 
(ATOj,t+1 and ATOj,t+2), and future traditional market valuation measurements (MtoBj,t+1 and 
MtoBj,t+2). These correlation results provide the first sight that IC disclosure or sufficient IC 
disclosure can enhance current and future financial performance, and also help firms disclose 
information regarding their potential financial performance.   
Table 24 panel B shows the pearson and spearman correlations for value relevance variables 
where in general, Ej,t-1, Ej,t, and Ej,t+1to3 are positively correlated to each other, indicating that 
past accounting-based earnings guided present and future accounting-based earnings 
(Abeysekera, 2011b). ICj,t*Ej,t+1to3 is positively correlated to Rj,t for spearman correlation 
(correlation=0.223, p-value=0.000) and pearson correlation (correlation=0.196, p-
value=0.000), respectively. HICj,t*Ej,t+1to3 is positively correlated to Rj,t with correlation 
0.092, p-value 0.028 for spearman correlation and with correlation 0.185, p-value 0.000 for 
pearson correlation. These positive correlations suggest that IC disclosure and sufficient IC 
disclosure may bring future earnings forward to current stock price, that is, the market would 
believe that firms with IC disclosure and sufficient IC disclosure reflect future financial 




Table 24: Pearson and spearman correlations for financial performance measurements 
Table 24 Panel A: Pearson and spearman correlations for financial performance measurements 
 
ICj,t HICj,t ROEj,t ROEj,t+1 ROEj,t+2 ROAj,t ROAj,t+1 ROAj,t+2 RGj,t RGj,t+1 RGj,t+2 ATOj,t ATOj,t+1 ATOj,t+2 MtoBj,t MtoBj,t+1 MtoBj,t+2 
ICj,t 1.000 0.815
*** 0.110*** 0.122*** 0.081** 0.102** 0.122*** 0.124*** 0.093** 0.086** 0.090** 0.202*** 0.188*** 0.179*** 0.085** 0.122*** 0.177*** 
  
(0.000) (0.006) (0.003) (0.047) (0.012) (0.003) (0.002) (0.022) (0.035) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.003) (0.000) 
HICj,t 0.866




(0.016) (0.001) (0.137) (0.030) (0.017) (0.001) (0.026) (0.039) (0.015) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.090) (0.010) (0.000) 
ROEj,t 0.155




(0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.193) (0.570) (0.444) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROEj,t+1 0.177
*** 0.140*** 0.776*** 1.000 0.287*** 0.220*** 0.413*** 0.377*** 0.027 0.037 0.023 0.192*** 0.216*** 0.217*** 0.170*** 0.290*** 0.387*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.500) (0.363) (0.567) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROEj,t+2 0.186
*** 0.142*** 0.600*** 0.749*** 1.000 -0.107*** 0.005 0.118*** -0.007 0.022 0.027 0.124*** 0.055 0.109*** 0.096** 0.291*** 0.240*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.008) (0.901) (0.004) (0.863) (0.591) (0.510) (0.002) (0.177) (0.007) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROAj,t 0.138
*** 0.111*** 0.957*** 0.753*** 0.578*** 1.000 0.602*** 0.251*** 0.074* 0.029 0.043 0.307*** 0.277*** 0.244*** 0.204*** 0.177*** 0.107*** 
 
(0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.069) (0.469) (0.296) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) 
ROAj,t+1 0.122
*** 0.089** 0.736*** 0.885*** 0.658*** 0.736*** 1.000 0.533*** 0.050 0.047 0.029 0.289*** 0.325*** 0.272*** 0.161*** 0.187*** 0.149*** 
 
(0.003) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.222) (0.244) (0.482) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROAj,t+2 0.144
*** 0.111*** 0.585*** 0.715*** 0.862*** 0.584*** 0.753*** 1.000 0.002 0.076** 0.051 0.191*** 0.309*** 0.323*** 0.159*** 0.234*** 0.246*** 
 
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.955) (0.060) (0.212) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RGj,t 0.089
** 0.079* 0.211*** 0.201*** 0.104** 0.236*** 0.175*** 0.083** 1.000 -0.300*** 0.062 0.087** 0.078* 0.057 0.001 -0.049 -0.017 
 
(0.028) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) 
 
(0.000) (0.126) (0.032) (0.055) (0.163) (0.985) (0.223) (0.675) 
RGj,t+1 0.120
*** 0.102** 0.053 0.195*** 0.198*** 0.062 0.211*** 0.197*** 0.207*** 1.000 -0.213*** 0.028 0.048 0.052 0.014 0.026 -0.019 
 
(0.003) (0.012) (0.195) (0.000) (0.000) (0.130) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.489) (0.232) (0.204) (0.732) (0.529) (0.643) 
RGj,t+2 0.121




Table 24 Panel A: Pearson and spearman correlations for financial performance measurements (continued)  
 ICj,t HICj,t ROEj,t ROEj,t+1 ROEj,t+2 ROAj,t ROAj,t+1 ROAj,t+2 RGj,t RGj,t+1 RGj,t+2 ATOj,t ATOj,t+1 ATOj,t+2 MtoBj,t MtoBj,t+1 MtoBj,t+2 
 
(0.003) (0.017) (0.017) (0.044) (0.000) (0.017) (0.084) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) 
 
(0.325) (0.547) (0.257) (0.594) (0.617) (0.428) 
ATOj,t 0.119
*** 0.081** 0.523*** 0.454*** 0.393*** 0.564*** 0.439*** 0.357*** 0.264*** 0.109*** 0.126*** 1.000 0.874*** 0.809*** 0.008 0.028 0.113*** 
 
(0.003) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.002) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.839) (0.489) (0.006) 
ATOj,t+1 0.112
*** 0.089** 0.450*** 0.491*** 0.414*** 0.481*** 0.475*** 0.398*** 0.227*** 0.216*** 0.096** 0.900*** 1.000 0.855*** -0.004 0.038 0.098** 
 
(0.006) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.915) (0.351) (0.016) 
ATOj,t+2 0.107
*** 0.094** 0.399*** 0.432*** 0.456*** 0.424*** 0.397*** 0.435*** 0.178*** 0.189*** 0.197*** 0.832*** 0.911*** 1.000 -0.023 0.008 0.087** 
 
(0.009) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.576) (0.847) (0.031) 
MtoBj,t 0.084
** 0.061 0.361*** 0.404*** 0.325*** 0.373*** 0.386*** 0.318*** 0.016 0.068* 0.021 0.129*** 0.109*** 0.062 1.000 0.739*** 0.523*** 
 




*** 0.100** 0.351*** 0.475*** 0.482*** 0.343*** 0.403*** 0.453*** -0.026 0.085** 0.072* 0.142*** 0.168*** 0.131*** 0.789*** 1.000 0.774*** 
 




*** 0.153*** 0.365*** 0.463*** 0.558*** 0.355*** 0.339*** 0.475*** 0.011 0.040 0.088** 0.191*** 0.193*** 0.200*** 0.570*** 0.813*** 1.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.793) (0.330) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 










Table 24: Pearson and spearman correlations for financial performance measurements (continued) 
Table 24 Panel B: Pearson and spearman correlations for value relevance variables 
 
Rj,t  Ej,t-1 Ej,t Ej,t+1to3 Rj,t+1to3 ICj,t ICj,t*Ej,t-1 ICj,t*Ej,t ICj,t*Ej,t+1to3 ICj,t*Rj,t+1to3 HICj,t HICj,t*Ej,t-1 HICj,t*Ej,t HICj,t*Ej,t+1to3 HICj,t*Rj,t+1to3 
Rj,t 1.000 -0.146
*** -0.086** 0.187*** 0.082** -0.007 -0.158*** -0.081** 0.196*** 0.098** -0.002 -0.062 -0.052 0.185*** 0.078* 
  
(0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.050) (0.864) (0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (0.018) (0.959) (0.128) (0.199) (0.000) (0.063) 
Ej,t-1 -0.123




(0.000) (0.107) (0.914) (0.403) (0.000) (0.000) (0.608) (0.886) (0.690) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.824) 
Ej,t 0.074




(0.000) (0.942) (0.554) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.811) (0.432) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.417) 
Ej,t+1to3 0.247
*** 0.409*** 0.571*** 1.000 0.177*** -0.044 0.021 0.207*** 0.984*** 0.152*** -0.054 0.070* 0.037 0.170*** 0.057 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.280) (0.607) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.182) (0.086) (0.362) (0.000) (0.169) 
Rj,t+1to3 0.044 0.034 0.055 0.373
*** 1.000 0.070* 0.012 -0.007 0.179*** 0.956*** 0.072* 0.040 -0.029 0.176*** 0.602*** 
 
(0.297) (0.411) (0.190) (0.000) 
 
(0.095) (0.771) (0.875) (0.000) (0.000) (0.084) (0.334) (0.481) (0.000) (0.000) 
ICj,t -0.021 0.026 0.030 0.048 0.082
** 1.000 0.065 0.074* 0.021 0.044 0.815*** 0.290*** 0.230*** 0.310*** -0.027 
 (0.616) (0.532) (0.472) (0.253) (0.050)  (0.107) (0.069) (0.598) (0.288) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.524) 
ICj,t*Ej,t-1 -0.153
*** 0.904*** 0.568*** 0.371*** 0.060 0.343*** 1.000 0.698*** -0.008 0.011 0.071* 0.470*** 0.216*** 0.223*** 0.011 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.150) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.853) (0.791) (0.081) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.790) 
ICj,t*Ej,t 0.031 0.584
*** 0.904*** 0.530*** 0.077* 0.353*** 0.678*** 1.000 0.190*** -0.019 0.049 0.266*** 0.644*** 0.171*** -0.052 
 (0.464) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.652) (0.231) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.210) 
ICj,t*Ej,t+1to3 0.223
*** 0.384*** 0.531*** 0.929*** 0.357*** 0.332*** 0.468*** 0.622*** 1.000 0.164*** 0.001 0.118*** 0.073* 0.271*** 0.078* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.973) (0.004) (0.072) (0.000) (0.061) 
ICj,t*Rj,t+1to3 0.048 0.036 0.054 0.345
*** 0.985*** 0.108** 0.071* 0.088** 0.351*** 1.000 0.041 0.034 -0.048 0.199*** 0.764*** 
 (0.250) (0.395) (0.193) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.090) (0.035) (0.000)  (0.328) (0.419) (0.253) (0.000) (0.000) 
HICj,t 0.011 0.031 0.012 0.030 0.067 0.866




Table 24 Panel B: Pearson and spearman correlations for value relevance variables (continued) 
 Rj,t  Ej,t-1 Ej,t Ej,t+1to3 Rj,t+1to3 ICj,t ICj,t*Ej,t-1 ICj,t*Ej,t ICj,t*Ej,t+1to3 ICj,t*Rj,t+1to3 HICj,t HICj,t*Ej,t-1 HICj,t*Ej,t HICj,t*Ej,t+1to3 HICj,t*Rj,t+1to3 
 
(0.787) (0.463) (0.775) (0.477) (0.109) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.055) 
HICj,t*Ej,t-1 -0.097
** 0.528*** 0.322*** 0.204*** 0.089** 0.511*** 0.738*** 0.518*** 0.359*** 0.106** 0.591*** 1.000 0.480*** 0.544*** -0.007 
 
(0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.876) 
HICj,t*Ej,t -0.014 0.314
*** 0.473*** 0.270*** 0.086** 0.579*** 0.523*** 0.691*** 0.436*** 0.104** 0.649*** 0.781*** 1.000 0.338*** -0.102** 
 




** 0.223*** 0.254*** 0.403*** 0.193*** 0.689*** 0.441*** 0.477*** 0.599*** 0.220*** 0.756*** 0.690*** 0.774*** 1.000 0.205*** 
 
(0.028) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
HICj,t*Rj,t+1to3 0.060 0.016 0.033 0.151
*** 0.647*** 0.066 0.042 0.060 0.174*** 0.730*** 0.035 0.064 0.073* 0.198*** 1.000 
 
(0.152) (0.703) (0.426) (0.000) (0.000) (0.114) (0.312) (0.149) (0.000) (0.000) (0.398) (0.127) (0.083) (0.000) 
 
            p-value in parentheses  
                  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
            Pearson (spearman) correlations are presented above (below) 
Note: ICj,t is the sum of natural logarithm of frequency counts of internal capital, external capital, and human capital for firm j, in year t. HICj,t is dummy variable where each year is ranked on IC and then the upper 
quartile of IC is selected as sufficient IC disclosure and coded as one, zero otherwise. ROEj,t ROEj,t+1 and  ROEj,t+2 are return on equity ratios measured by earnings before tax over average shareholders’ equity for firm j, 
in year t, in year t+1 and in year t+2, respectively. ROAj,t, ROAj,t+1 and ROAj,t+2  are return on assets ratios measured by earnings before tax over average total assets for firm j, in year t, in year t+1 and in year t+2, 
respectively. RGj,t, RGj,t+1 and RGj,t+2 are revenue growth rates measured by changes of current total revenue and prior year revenue divided by prior year revenue for firm j, in year t, in year t+1 and in year t+2, 
respectively. ATOj,t, ATOj,t+1 and ATOj,t+2 are revenue-to-assets ratios measured by total revenue over average total assets for firm j, in year t, in year t+1 and in year t+2, respectively. MtoBj,t, MtoBj,t+1 and MtoBj,t+2 are 
market-to-book ratios measured as market value of equity divided by the book value of equity for firm j, in year t, in year t+1 and in year t+2, respectively. Rj,t is the annual stock returns for firm j, year t, measured by 
natural logarithm of stock price three months after year end t/ stock price three months after year end t-1. Ej,t-1 is earnings before tax for firm j, in year t-1, deflated by the market capitalisation at beginning of year t for 
firm j. Ej,t is earnings before tax for firm j, year t, deflated by the market capitalisation at beginning of year t for firm j. Ej,t+1to3 is the sum of earnings before tax for firm j, years t+1, t+2, and t+3, deflated by the market 
capitalisation at beginning of year t for firm j. Rj,t+1to3 is the sum of annual stock returns for firm j, years t+1, t+2, and t+3, over the 12-month period beginning on the first day of the third month of the given year and 
ending on the last day of the second month of the subsequent year; IC j,t*Ej,t-1/HICj,t*Ej,t-1 is interaction of IC disclosure or sufficient IC disclosure for firm j, in year t and earnings before tax for firm j, in year t-1, 
deflated by the market capitalisation at beginning of year t for firm j. ICj,t*Ej,t/HICj,t*Ej,t is interaction of IC disclosure or sufficient IC disclosure for firm j, in year t and earnings before tax for firm j, in year t, deflated 
by the market capitalisation at beginning of year t for firm j. ICj,t*Ej,t+1to3/HICj,t*Ej,t+1to3 is interaction of IC disclosure or sufficient IC disclosure for firm j, year t and earnings before tax for firm j, the years t+1,t+2, and 
t+3, deflated by the market capitalisation at beginning of year t for firm j. ICj,t*Rj,t+1to3/HICj,t*Rj,t+1to3 is interaction of IC disclosure or sufficient IC disclosure for firm j, year t and sum of annual stock returns for firm j, 




4.5.5 Results for IC and financial performance (H8) 
Table 25 presents the results for H8 with profitability as the dependent variable using the year 
industry fixed-effects panel regressions. Table 25 panel A and panel B provide evidence for 
profitability with ROEj,t, ROEj,t+1, and ROEj,t+2 as dependent variables
36
. Table 25 panel A 
shows the results with ICj,t as an independent variable, while panel B shows the results with 
HICj,t as an independent variable. As shown in panel A, ICj,t is positively and significantly 
associated with ROEj,t (coefficient=0.020, p-value=0.036), ROEj,t+1 (coefficient=0.026, p-
value=0.005), and ROEj,t+2 (coefficient=0.022, p-value=0.091). Panel B shows that HICj,t is 
positively and significantly associated with ROEj,t (coefficient=0.059, p-value=0.037), 
ROEj,t+1 (coefficient=0.090, p-value=0.001) but ROEj,t+2. Table 25 panel C and panel D 
provide evidence for profitability with ROAj,t, ROAj,t+1, and ROAj,t+2 as dependent variables. 
Table 25 panel C shows the results with ICj,t as an independent variable, while panel D shows 
the results with HICj,t as an independent variable. Panel C shows that ICj,t is significantly and 
positively related to ROAj,t (coefficient=0.016, p-value=0.073), ROAj,t+1 (coefficient=0.011, 
p-value=0.008) and ROAj,t+2 (coefficient=0.012, p-value=0.004). Similar results can be found 
in panel D where HICj,t is significantly and positively related to ROAj,t (coefficient=0.050, p-
value=0.062), ROAj,t+1 (coefficient=0.027, p-value=0.028) and ROAj,t+2 (coefficient=0.040, 
p-value=0.001). Table 25 panel E and panel F provide evidence for profitability with RGj,t, 
RGj,t+1, and RGj,t+2 as dependent variables. Table 25 panel E shows the results with ICj,t as an 
independent variable, while panel F shows the results with HICj,t as an independent variable. 
The results of panel E show that ICj,t is significantly and positively related to RGj,t 
(coefficient=0.051, p-value=0.061), RGj,t+1 (coefficient=0.062, p-value=0.075) but RGj,t+2. 
Similar results can be found in panel F where HICj,t is significantly and positively related to 
RGj,t (coefficient=0.153, p-value=0.056), RGj,t+1 (coefficient=0.179, p-value=0.082) and 
                                                          
36
 The number of observation decreased to 606 in 2014 as there were four firms deleted. They are Twenty-first Century Fox Inc; David 




RGj,t+2 (coefficient=0.196, p-value=0.053). Collectively, table 25 suggests that IC disclosure 
and sufficient IC disclosure reflect firm’s current and future profitability. Compared to IC 
disclosure, sufficient IC disclosure (HICj,t) has a higher absolute value of coefficients for all 
profitability measurements, which suggests that sufficient IC disclosure (HICj,t) is related 
more to enhancing firm’s profitability. Of the three profitability measurements, IC explains 
ROA better than the other two measurements because the ROA measurement models show 
the highest R squares; this is followed by the ROE measurement. The lowest R squares are 
presented in RG measurement models, which is consistent with Clarke et al.’ (2011) study 
where they found very low explanatory power in the RG measurement models where the R 





Table 25: Regression results for IC and firm’s profitability (H8) 
Table 25 panel A: Results for H8 with ROE as dependent variable and ICj,t as independent variable 
 
Model 41 with ROEj,t as dependent variable  Model 42 with ROEj,t+1 as dependent variable  Model 43 with ROEj,t+2 as dependent variable  
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
ICj,t 0.020
** 0.010 2.100 0.036 0.026*** 0.009 2.800 0.005 0.022* 0.013 1.690 0.091 
IND j,t 0.103 0.081 1.260 0.207 0.194
** 0.080 2.420 0.016 0.216** 0.109 1.980 0.048 
PISTj,t -0.032 0.068 -0.460 0.643 0.033 0.067 0.490 0.622 0.094 0.092 1.010 0.311 
Sizej,t 0.015
* 0.008 1.740 0.082 -0.002 0.008 -0.190 0.848 -0.006 0.011 -0.540 0.592 























_cons -0.088 0.096 -0.910 0.363 -0.095 0.095 -1.000 0.318 -0.106 0.130 -0.820 0.414 

























Table 25: Regression results for IC and firm’s profitability (H8) (continued) 
Table 25 Penal B: The results for H8 with ROE as dependent variable and HICj,t as independent variable 
 
Model 44 with ROEj,t as dependent variable  Model 45 with ROEj,t+1 as dependent variable  Model 46 with ROEj,t+2 as dependent variable  
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
HICj,t 0.059
** 0.028 2.090 0.037 0.090*** 0.028 3.210 0.001 0.046 0.038 1.200 0.230 
IND j,t 0.105 0.081 1.290 0.197 0.196
** 0.080 2.450 0.015 0.221** 0.109 2.030 0.043 
PISTj,t -0.036 0.068 -0.530 0.597 0.028 0.067 0.410 0.679 0.088 0.092 0.950 0.341 
Sizej,t 0.015
* 0.008 1.860 0.063 -0.001 0.008 -0.090 0.925 -0.004 0.011 -0.400 0.689 























_cons -0.018 0.089 -0.210 0.836 -0.006 0.087 -0.070 0.947 -0.027 0.119 -0.230 0.819 

























Table 25: Regression results for IC and firm’s profitability (H8) (continued) 
 Table 25 Panel C: Results for H8 with ROA as dependent variable and ICj,t as independent variable 
 
Model 47 with ROAj,t as dependent variable  Model 48 with ROAj,t+1 as dependent variable  Model 49 with ROAj,t+2 as dependent variable  
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
ICj,t 0.016
* 0.009 1.790 0.073 0.011*** 0.004 2.650 0.008 0.012*** 0.004 2.880 0.004 
IND j,t 0.040 0.076 0.520 0.602 0.014 0.035 0.400 0.690 0.007 0.035 0.210 0.835 
PISTj,t -0.083 0.064 -1.310 0.192 -0.034 0.029 -1.170 0.242 -0.055
* 0.029 -1.860 0.063 
Sizej,t 0.013 0.008 1.650 0.100 -0.002 0.004 -0.550 0.582 -0.006 0.004 -1.640 0.102 
Leveragej,t -0.021 0.048 -0.440 0.662 -0.002 0.022 -0.100 0.919 0.008 0.022 0.380 0.706 












_cons 0.101 0.090 1.120 0.264 0.082** 0.041 2.020 0.044 0.140*** 0.041 3.400 0.001 
























Table 25: Regression results for IC and firm’s profitability (H8) (continued) 
 Table 25 Panel D: Results for H8 with ROA as dependent variable and HICj,t as independent variable 
 
Model 50 with ROAj,t as dependent variable  Model 51 with ROAj,t+1 as dependent variable  Model 52 with ROAj,t+2 as dependent variable  
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
HICj,t 0.050
* 0.027 1.870 0.062 0.027** 0.012 2.200 0.028 0.040*** 0.012 3.300 0.001 
IND j,t 0.041 0.076 0.540 0.589 0.016 0.035 0.450 0.652 0.008 0.035 0.230 0.815 
PISTj,t -0.087 0.064 -1.360 0.174 -0.036 0.029 -1.260 0.209 -0.057
* 0.029 -1.950 0.051 
Sizej,t 0.014
* 0.008 1.740 0.082 -0.001 0.004 -0.370 0.712 -0.006 0.004 -1.550 0.121 
Leveragej,t -0.023 0.048 -0.490 0.628 -0.003 0.022 -0.150 0.884 0.006 0.022 0.290 0.774 












_cons 0.156* 0.083 1.880 0.060 0.121*** 0.038 3.210 0.001 0.180*** 0.038 4.760 0.000 






















Table 25: Regression results for IC and firm’s profitability (H8) (continued) 
Table 25 Panel E: Results for H8 with RG as dependent variable and ICj,t as independent variable  
 
 
Model 53 with RGj,t as dependent variable  Model 54 with RGj,t+1 as dependent variable  





Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
ICj,t  0.051
* 0.027 1.870 0.061 0.062* 0.035 1.780 0.075 0.056 0.034 1.650 0.100 
IND j,t  -0.144 0.230 -0.630 0.530 -0.014 0.295 -0.050 0.963 0.053 0.289 0.180 0.854 
PISTj,t  -0.033 0.192 -0.170 0.863 0.155 0.247 0.630 0.530 0.093 0.245 0.380 0.703 
Sizej,t  0.074
*** 0.024 3.120 0.002 0.068** 0.030 2.230 0.026 0.062** 0.030 2.090 0.037 
Leveragej,t  0.076 0.145 0.520 0.600 0.200 0.186 1.070 0.283 0.116 0.184 0.630 0.527 
Industry effects  YES    YES    YES    
Year effects  YES    YES    YES    
_cons  -0.565** 0.272 -2.080 0.038 -0.894** 0.349 -2.560 0.011 -0.649* 0.343 -1.890 0.059 





















Table 25: Regression results for IC and firm’s profitability (H8) (continued) 
Table 25 Panel F: Results for H8 with RG as dependent variable and HICj,t as independent variable  
 
 
Model 56 with RGj,t as dependent variable  Model 57 with RGj,t+1 as dependent variable  





Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
HICj,t  0.153
* 0.080 1.910 0.056 0.179* 0.103 1.740 0.082 0.196* 0.101 1.940 0.053 
IND j,t  -0.139 0.229 -0.610 0.543 -0.007 0.295 -0.020 0.982 0.057 0.288 0.200 0.844 
PISTj,t  -0.044 0.192 -0.230 0.818 0.142 0.247 0.570 0.567 0.082 0.244 0.340 0.737 
Sizej,t  0.076
*** 0.023 3.230 0.001 0.070** 0.030 2.340 0.020 0.064** 0.030 2.160 0.031 
Leveragej,t  0.069 0.145 0.480 0.634 0.192 0.186 1.030 0.302 0.106 0.184 0.580 0.563 
Industry effects  YES    YES    YES    
Year effects  YES    YES    YES    
_cons  -0.391 0.250 -1.560 0.118 -0.680** 0.321 -2.120 0.034 -0.462 0.315 -1.470 0.143 













                            *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Note: Leveragej,t is measured by short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets for firm j, in year t. INDj,t is percentage of independent directors on the board for firm j, in year t. PISTj,t is 




Table 26 presents the results for H8 with productivity as the dependent variable using the 
year industry fixed-effects panel regressions. Table 26 panel A and panel B provide evidence 
for profitability with ATOj,t, ATOj,t+1, and ATOj,t+2 as dependent variables. Table 26 panel A 
shows the results with ICj,t as an independent variable, while panel B shows the results with 
HICj,t as an independent variable. Panel A shows that ICj,t is positively and significantly 
related to ATOj,t (coefficient=0.174, p-value=0.000), ATOj,t+1 (coefficient=0.157, p-
value=0.000), and ATOj,t+2 (coefficient=0.145, p-value=0.001). Panel B shows that HICj,t is 
positively and significantly associated with ATOj,t (coefficient=0.361, p-value=0.007), 
ATOj,t+1 (coefficient=0.378, p-value=0.003), and ATOj,t+2 (coefficient=0.386, p-value=0.002). 
Collectively, the results of table 26 combined with table 25 suggest that IC disclosure and 
sufficient IC disclosure reflect a firm’s current and future financial performance in terms of 
profitability and productivity, while sufficient IC disclosure is more related to financial 
performance measurements because evidence shows that the coefficients of HICj,t on firm’s 










Table 26: Regression results for IC and firm’s productivity (H8) 
Table 26 Panel A: Results for H8 with ATO as dependent variable and ICj,t as independent variable 
 
Model 59 with ATOj,t as dependent 
variable  
Model 60 with ATOj,t+1 as dependent 
variable 






t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
ICj,t 0.174
*** 0.045 3.900 0.000 0.157*** 0.043 3.620 0.000 0.145*** 0.042 3.440 0.001 
IND j,t 0.930
** 0.380 2.450 0.015 0.519 0.368 1.410 0.159 0.781** 0.358 2.180 0.030 
PISTj,t -0.022 0.319 -0.070 0.944 0.046 0.308 0.150 0.881 -0.047 0.303 -0.160 0.877 
Sizej,t 0.094
** 0.039 2.400 0.017 0.105*** 0.038 2.780 0.006 0.104*** 0.037 2.820 0.005 















































Table 26: Regression results for IC and firm’s productivity (H8) (continued)  
Table 26 Panel B: Results for H8 with ATO as dependent variable and HICj,t as independent variable 
 
Model 62 with ATOj,t as dependent 
variable  
Model 63 with ATOj,t+1 as dependent 
variable 






t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
HICj,t 0.361
*** 0.134 2.700 0.007 0.378*** 0.129 2.940 0.003 0.386*** 0.126 3.070 0.002 
IND j,t 0.968
** 0.382 2.530 0.012 0.546 0.369 1.480 0.139 0.805** 0.359 2.240 0.025 
PISTj,t -0.066 0.320 -0.210 0.837 0.009 0.309 0.030 0.977 -0.081 0.304 -0.270 0.790 
Sizej,t 0.106
*** 0.039 2.730 0.007 0.115*** 0.038 3.040 0.002 0.112*** 0.037 3.040 0.002 













































4.5.6 Results for value relevance of IC (H9) 
Table 27 presents the results for H9 with stock returns as the dependent variable using the 
year industry fixed-effects panel regressions. Since there were missing financial data in the 
database, the sample size was reduced to 574 firm-year observations
37
. Model 65 shows the 
value relevance of IC disclosure, while model 66 shows the value relevance of sufficient IC 
disclosure. The results of model 65 show that none of the earnings measurements (Ej,t-1, Ej,t 
and Ej,t+1to3) and its interaction measurements (ICj,t*Ej,t-1, ICj,t*Ej,t and ICj,t*Ej,t+1to3) are 
significantly related to Rj,t. These insufficient results may arise from a problem with 
multicollinearity, because the spearman and pearson correlations between earnings 
measurements and their interaction measurements are highly correlated to each other 
(coefficients>0.9, p-value=0.000) (see, section 4.5.4.2, table 24 panel B). Pearce & Reiter 
(1985) argued that multicollinearity can lead to estimated coefficients that are biased, as a 
cause of weak evidence. Model 66 of table 27 shows that HICj,t*Ej,t+1to3 is significantly and 
positively associated with Rj,t (coefficient=0.160, p-value=0.000), which indicates that 
investors only perceived the sufficient IC disclosure as useful and relevant information to 
reflect on firms’ future earnings, although the market reacted positively at stock pricing 
decisions with sufficient reporting. These results are consistent with H9 and suggest that 
sufficient IC disclosure signals future firm performance to the market, which then perceives 
such reporting is value-relevant. Moreover, there is a positive relationship between future 
earnings (Ej,t+1to3) and current stock returns (Rj,t) (coefficient=0.020, p-value=0.006) in 
sufficient IC disclosure model (model 66). The positive coefficients on future earnings show 
that news about future earnings is included in current stock returns. Rj,t+1to3, which played the 
role of a proxy to correct the measurement errors in future accounting-based earnings, is not 
significantly associated with the current stock return  (Rj,t) in model 66, which indicates that 
                                                          




the measurement error is not a problem for model 66. Model 66 results show that both 
MktCapj,t and Opcyclej,t are significantly and negatively associated with Rj,t (coefficient=-
0.096, p-value=0.000; coefficient=-0.056, p-value=0.013 respectively), indicating that large 
market capital firms and firms with long operating cycles have more difficulty in translating 
their financial information into current stock returns. MtoBj,t is positively and significantly 
associated with Rj,t (coefficient=0.165, p-value=0.000) which suggests that firms with a 
higher rate of growth have higher earnings potential and are more likely to disclose sufficient 















Table 27: Regression results for value relevance of IC (H9) 
 
Model 65 with Rj,t as dependent variable  Model 66 with Rj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Ej,t-1 0.038 0.293 0.130 0.896 -0.063 0.097 -0.640 0.520 
Ej,t -0.128 0.233 -0.550 0.585 0.097 0.100 0.970 0.333 
Ej,t+1to3 0.022 0.042 0.510 0.609 0.020
*** 0.007 2.740 0.006 
Rj,t+1to3 -0.107
* 0.057 -1.890 0.059 -0.001 0.021 -0.050 0.960 
ICj,t 0.008 0.012 0.630 0.529     
ICj,t*Ej,t-1 -0.002 0.065 -0.030 0.977     
ICj,t*Ej,t 0.038 0.048 0.790 0.429     
ICj,t*Ej,t+1to3 0.001 0.010 0.110 0.916     
ICj,t*Rj,t+1to3 0.026

























 0.008 0.034 0.250 0.805 
MtoBj,t 0.165
*** 0.019 8.570 0.000 0.165*** 0.019 8.690 0.000 
Mktcapj,t -0.108
*** 0.011 -10.240 0.000 -0.096*** 0.011 -9.120 0.000 
Opcyclej,t -0.055









Year effects YES  
 
 YES  
  









 R-squared 36.77%  
 
 38.29%  
  
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Note: Opcyclej,t is natural logarithm of days of accounts receivable plus days of inventory for firm j, in year t. MktCap j,t is 
size of the firm, measured as a natural logarithm of market capitalisation of firm j, at beginning of year t. MtoBj,t is measured 







4.5.7 Results for IC and opportunistic underlying earnings reporting (H10) 
 
Table 28 presents the results for H10 with ICj,t (model 67) and HICj,t (model 68) as dependent 
variables using the year industry fixed-effects panel regression and the fixed-effects logit 
regression respectively. The results of table 28 indicate that InExj,t is significantly and 
negatively related to both ICj,t and HICj,t (coefficient=-0.307, p-value=0.025; coefficient=-
0.394, p-value=0.044, respectively). Compared to the absolute value of the coefficient of 
InExj,t on ICj,t, the absolute value of the coefficient of InExj,t on HICj,t is higher and the result 
is more significant, which suggests that opportunistic underlying earnings management firms 
are less likely to disclose IC, particularly if they have difficulty in disclosing sufficient IC, 













Table 28: Regression results for IC and opportunistic underlying earnings reporting 
(H10) 
 
Model 67 with ICj,t as dependent variable  Model 68 with HICj,t as dependent variable  
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
InExj,t -0.307
** 0.137 -2.240 0.025 -0.394** 0.196 -2.010 0.044 
IND j,t 0.611
* 0.352 1.740 0.083 0.702 0.501 1.400 0.161 
PISTj,t -0.302 0.292 -1.030 0.301 -0.126 0.414 -0.300 0.762 
Sizej,t 0.164
*** 0.038 4.340 0.000 0.171*** 0.055 3.140 0.002 
Leveragej,t 0.138 0.220 0.620 0.532 0.390 0.332 1.170 0.241 
Meetj,t 0.094 0.133 0.710 0.480 0.160 0.189 0.850 0.398 






























*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Note: InExj,t is income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions, which is measured by dummy variable that equals 1 if j 
firm discloses a underlying earnings number greater than the statutory earnings in year t, and zero otherwise. Meetj,t is 
dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s earnings before tax in year t is greater or equal to earnings before tax in year t-1, and 
zero otherwise. Lossj,t is dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm made statutory losses in year t, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
4.6 Additional tests  
4.6.1 IC and market valuation (H9) 
Prior studies examined the market valuation of IC using market-to-book ratios and argued 
that market valuation describes the degree to which a firm’s market value exceeds its book 
value (e.g., Ghosh & Mondal, 2009). To robust the main result of value relevance, this paper 




dependent variable with market-to-book ratios. The market-to-book ratio is measured as the 
market value of equity divided by the book value of equity for firm j, in year t. Table 29 
panel A and panel B provide evidence for value relevance with MtoBj,t, MtoBj,t+1, and 
MtoBj,t+2 as dependent variables using the year industry fixed-effects panel regressions. Table 
29 panel A shows the results with ICj,t as an independent variable, while panel B shows the 
results with HICj,t as an independent variable. Panel A shows that ICj,t is positively and 
significantly associated with MtoBj,t (coefficient=0.085, p-value=0.000), MtoBj,t+1 
(coefficient=0.099, p-value=0.000), and MtoBj,t+2 (coefficient=0.120, p-value=0.000). Panel 
B shows similar results to panel A where HICj,t is positively and significantly associated with 
MtoBj,t (coefficient=0.167, p-value=0.013), MtoBj,t+1 (coefficient=0.222, p-value=0.001), and 
MtoBj,t+2 (coefficient=0.317, p-value=0.000). This indicates that sufficient IC disclosure is 
realised more effectively in the market value of a firm, as shown by the higher absolute value 
of coefficients rather than IC disclosure. To confirm the main results of H9, IC disclosure, 




Table 29: Regression results for value relevance of IC with MtoB as the dependent variable (H9) 
Table 29 Panel A: Results for H9 with MtoB as dependent variable and ICj,t as independent variable 
 
Model 69 with MtoBj,t as dependent variable  Model 70 with MtoBj,t+1 as dependent variable  Model 71 with MtoBj,t+2 as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
ICj,t 0.085
*** 0.022 3.820 0.000 0.099*** 0.023 4.280 0.000 0.120*** 0.024 4.970 0.000 
IND j,t -0.066 0.190 -0.350 0.729 -0.254 0.197 -1.290 0.199 -0.205 0.205 -1.000 0.317 
PISTj,t 0.277
* 0.160 1.730 0.084 0.230 0.165 1.390 0.165 0.210 0.174 1.210 0.227 
Sizej,t -0.193
*** 0.020 -9.870 0.000 -0.166*** 0.020 -8.190 0.000 -0.128*** 0.021 -6.080 0.000 
Leveragej,t 0.168 0.120 1.400 0.162 0.035 0.124 0.280 0.776 0.007 0.130 0.050 0.958 












_cons 1.412*** 0.225 6.260 0.000 1.488*** 0.234 6.370 0.000 1.137*** 0.243 4.670 0.000 






















Table 29: Regression results for value relevance of IC with MtoB as the dependent variable (H9) (continued) 
Table 29 Panel B: Results for H9 with MtoB as dependent variable and HICj,t as independent variable 
 
Model 72 with MtoBj,t as dependent variable  Model 73 with MtoBj,t+1 as dependent variable  Model 74 with MtoBj,t+2 as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
HICj,t 0.167
** 0.067 2.490 0.013 0.222*** 0.069 3.190 0.001 0.317*** 0.072 4.390 0.000 
IND j,t -0.046 0.192 -0.240 0.811 -0.234 0.198 -1.180 0.239 -0.186 0.206 -0.900 0.367 
PISTj,t 0.255 0.161 1.590 0.113 0.206 0.166 1.240 0.216 0.182 0.174 1.040 0.298 
Sizej,t -0.187
*** 0.020 -9.540 0.000 -0.159*** 0.020 -7.860 0.000 -0.122*** 0.021 -5.790 0.000 
Leveragej,t 0.164 0.121 1.350 0.176 0.028 0.125 0.230 0.821 -0.005 0.131 -0.040 0.971 












_cons 1.723*** 0.209 8.260 0.000 1.844*** 0.216 8.530 0.000 1.559*** 0.225 6.940 0.000 
















4.6.2 Results for value relevance of three individual IC categories  
This section attempts to investigate which category of IC disclosure is value-relevant to the 
market. Table 30 presents the results of H9 with sufficient disclosure of human capital 
(HHCj,t), internal capital (HINCj,t), and external capital (HECj,t) as independent variables 
using the year industry fixed-effects panel regressions. The results show that HHCj,t*Ej,t+1to3 
and HINCj,t*Ej,t+1to3 are positively and significantly related to Rj,t (coefficient=0.196, p-
value=0.000; coefficient=0.357, p-value=0.071 respectively), which suggests the market 
believes that sufficient disclosure of human capital and internal capital help to reflect firms’ 
future earnings. Interestingly, these results also find that HECj,t*Ej,t and Rj,t is positively and 
significantly associated (coefficient=0.794, p-value=0.005), which suggests that sufficient 
disclosure of external capital would bring current economic benefits to firms. The benefit of 
external capital is released faster than the other two categories because the market reacts 
positively to current earnings of firms with sufficient disclosure of external capital, and reacts 






Table 30: Regression results for value relevance of three individual IC categories as the independent variables (H9) 
 
Model 75 with Rj,t as dependent variable  Model 76 with Rj,t as dependent variable Model 77 with Rj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Ej,t-1 -0.032 0.093 -0.350 0.728 -0.352
** 0.179 -1.970 0.049 0.059 0.081 0.730 0.465 
Ej,t 0.061 0.096 0.630 0.528 -0.027 0.128 -0.210 0.834 -0.032 0.077 -0.420 0.673 
Ej,t+1to3 0.021
*** 0.007 2.890 0.004 0.034* 0.020 1.690 0.092 0.027*** 0.007 3.870 0.000 
Rj,t+1to3 0.007 0.021 0.340 0.735 -0.012 0.025 -0.460 0.646 -0.016 0.022 -0.710 0.475 
HHCj,t -0.051 0.037 -1.390 0.165 
 
 




** 0.215 -1.990 0.047 
 
 
   
 
  
HHCj,t*Ej,t -0.036 0.143 -0.250 0.803 
 
 




*** 0.041 4.820 0.000 
 
 
   
 
  
HHCj,t*Rj,t+1to3 -0.013 0.034 -0.380 0.707 
 
 














































   
 
  




   
 
  





Table 30: Regression results for value relevance of three individual IC categories as the independent variables (H9) (continued) 
 Model 75 with Rj,t as dependent variable  Model 76 with Rj,t as dependent variable Model 77 with Rj,t as dependent variable 




   
 
  




   
 
  




   
 
  
0.067** 0.033 2.020 0.044 
MtoBj,t 0.160
*** 0.019 8.380 0.000 0.164*** 0.019 8.520 0.000 0.171*** 0.019 8.880 0.000 
Mktcapj,t -0.093
*** 0.010 -8.840 0.000 -0.102*** 0.010 -10.000 0.000 -0.107*** 0.011 -9.910 0.000 
Opcyclej,t -0.053




































*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Note: HHCj,t is dummy variable where each year is ranked on human capital (HC) and then the upper quartile of HC is selected as sufficient human capital disclosure and coded as one, zero 
otherwise. HINCj,t is dummy variable where each year is ranked on internal capital (INC) and then the upper quartile of INC is selected as sufficient internal capital disclosure and coded as one, 
zero otherwise. HECj,t is dummy variable where each year is ranked on external capital (EC) and then the upper quartile of EC is selected as sufficient external capital disclosure and coded as 




4.6.3 Results for three individual IC categories and opportunistic underlying earnings 
reporting  
 
The relationship between underlying earnings management and frequency of reporting by 
three categories of IC (internal capital, external capital, and human capital) are also examined 
to determine whether firms with underlying earnings management are less likely to disclose 
which category of IC. Table 31 presents the results of H10 with three categories of IC 
disclosure (including internal capital disclosure, external capital disclosure, and human 
capital disclosure). Panel A of table 31 presents the results of H10 with HCj,t (model 78), 
INCj,t (model 79) and ECj,t (model 80) as dependent variables using the fixed-effects panel 
regressions, while panel B of table 31 presents the results of H10 with HHCj,t (model 81), 
HINCj,t (model 82) and HECj,t (model 83) as dependent variables using the year industry 
fixed-effects logit regressions. The results show that HINCj,t is significantly and negatively 
related to InExj,t (coefficient=-0.421, p-value=0.035), and ECj,t and HECj,t are significantly 
and negatively related to InExj,t (coefficient=-0.223, p-value=0.003; coefficient=-0.475, p-
value=0.017, respectively). The results of table 31 panel A and panel B indicate that firms 
who practice opportunistic underlying earnings management are less likely to disclose 
internal capital and external capital but have no association with human capital. A possible 
explanation for no association between opportunistic underlying earnings reporting and 
human capital disclosure is that a portion of human capital items can be easily imitated by 
low reporting quality firms. Here, 60% of sample firms reported employee thanked, 49% of 
sample firms reported employee numbers, 70% of sample firm reported managing directors’ 
professional experience in the director prolife section. Because this paper argues that 
opportunistic underlying earnings reporting firms find it difficult to disclose inimitable IC, 
these three human capital items may introduce the bias in the regression model. Therefore, 




numbers, and professional experience from human capital category. Model 84 is tested using 
the year industry fixed-effects panel regression with HCj,t excluding employee thanked, 
employee numbers, and professional experience items as the dependent variable, while model 
85 is measured by the year industry fixed-effect logit regression with HHCj,t excluding 
employee thanked, employee numbers, and professional experience items as the dependent 
variable. The results show that after excluding employee thanked, employee numbers, and 
professional experience from human capital category, the HCj,t and HHCj,t are negatively and 
significantly associated with InExj,t (coefficient=-0.085, p-value=0.004; coefficient=-0.813, 
p-value=0.018, respectively) suggesting that opportunistic underlying earnings reporting 
firms are hardly to disclose inimitable human capital. 
Interestingly, the result shows a negative relationship between PISTj,t and HICj,t (coefficient=-
0.334, p-value=0.021) in model 79; this negative relationship supports the hypothesis of 
entrenchment, whereas an excessive ownership by institutional investors may have adverse 
effects on strategic disclosure decisions (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). This result has been 
confirmed by empirical research; for example, Hidalgo et al. (2011) analysed corporate 
governance factors on voluntary disclosure of intangibles during fiscal years from 2005 to 
2007 in a Mexican context and found a negative relationship between institutional investor 
shareholding and voluntary disclosure. Koh (2003) argued that institutional shareholders, 
who focus excessively on current earnings rather than long-term earnings in determining 





Table 31: Regression results for three individual IC categories disclosures and opportunistic underlying earnings reporting (H10) 
Table 31 panel A: Results for H10 with HCj,t, INCj,t and ECj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 78 with HCj,t as dependent variable  Model 79 with INCj,t as dependent variable Model 80 with ECj,t as dependent variable  
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
InExj,t 0.026 0.052 0.510 0.610 -0.111 0.067 -1.640 0.101 -0.223
*** 0.075 -2.980 0.003 
INDj,t 0.122 0.133 0.910 0.361 0.289
* 0.173 1.670 0.095 0.200 0.192 1.040 0.298 
PISTj,t 0.157 0.111 1.410 0.158 -0.334
** 0.144 -2.320 0.021 -0.125 0.160 -0.790 0.433 
Sizej,t 0.038
*** 0.014 2.620 0.009 0.009 0.019 0.470 0.641 0.117*** 0.021 5.700 0.000 
Leveragej,t 0.028 0.083 0.330 0.740 0.106 0.108 0.980 0.327 0.003 0.120 0.030 0.977 
Meetj,t 0.004 0.051 0.080 0.937 -0.029 0.066 -0.440 0.659 0.119 0.073 1.640 0.102 
Lossj,t -0.082 0.064 -1.290 0.197 -0.003 0.083 -0.030 0.975 0.156
* 0.092 1.700 0.090 












_cons 1.620*** 0.153 10.620 0.000 1.334*** 0.198 6.730 0.000 0.833*** 0.220 3.790 0.000 



















Table 31: Regression results for H10 with three individual IC categories disclosures and opportunistic underlying earnings 
reporting (H10) (continued)  
Table 31panel B: Results for H10 with HHCj,t, HINCj,t and HECj,t as dependent variables 
 
Model 81 with HHCj,t as dependent variable  Model 82 with HINCj,t as dependent variable  Model 83 with HECj,t as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
InExj,t 0.010 0.197 0.050 0.961 -0.421
** 0.200 -2.110 0.035 -0.475** 0.199 -2.380 0.017 
INDj,t 0.646 0.507 1.270 0.203 0.822 0.518 1.590 0.112 0.433 0.502 0.860 0.388 
PISTj,t 0.415 0.416 1.000 0.318 -0.618 0.433 -1.430 0.154 -0.232 0.425 -0.550 0.585 
Sizej,t 0.224
*** 0.056 4.020 0.000 0.063 0.056 1.140 0.255 0.313*** 0.058 5.390 0.000 
Leveragej,t -0.248 0.363 -0.680 0.495 0.186 0.323 0.580 0.565 -0.007 0.312 -0.020 0.983 
Meetj,t -0.168 0.191 -0.880 0.378 0.131 0.193 0.680 0.498 0.226 0.193 1.170 0.241 
Lossj,t -0.002 0.241 -0.010 0.993 0.202 0.242 0.840 0.402 0.157 0.244 0.640 0.521 












_cons -2.739*** 0.592 -4.630 0.000 -0.417 0.584 -0.710 0.475 -2.386*** 0.595 -4.010 0.000 


























Table 31: Regression results for H10 with three individual IC categories disclosures and opportunistic underlying 
earnings reporting (H10) (continued) 
 
Table 31panel B: Results for H10 with HCj,t, HHCj,t excluding employee thanked, employee numbers, and professional experience as dependent variables 
 
Model 84 with HCj,t excluding employee thanked, employee numbers, and 
professional experience as dependent variables as dependent variable 
Model 85 with HHCj,t excluding employee thanked, employee numbers, and 
professional experience as dependent variables as dependent variable 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
InExj,t -0.085
*** 0.029 -2.880 0.004 -0.813*** 0.344 -2.360 0.018 
INDj,t -0.004 0.076 -0.050 0.957 -0.524 0.730 -0.720 0.472 
PISTj,t 0.001 0.063 0.020 0.982 -0.140 0.628 -0.220 0.824 
Sizej,t 0.025
*** 0.008 3.130 0.002 0.281*** 0.093 3.030 0.002 
Leveragej,t -0.051 0.047 -1.070 0.284 -1.447 0.988 -1.470 0.143 
Meetj,t 0.035 0.029 1.220 0.222 0.289 0.314 0.920 0.358 
lossj,t 0.041 0.036 1.130 0.259 0.557 0.403 1.380 0.167 
Industry effects YES 
  
 YES 
   
Year effects YES 
  
 YES 
   
_cons 0.038 0.087 0.440 0.663 -2.819*** 0.941 -3.000 0.003 
Number of obs. 610 
   
610 
   
R-squared 8.80% 
  
Pseudo R-squared 13.04% 
   
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Note: INCj,t is natural logarithm of frequency counts of internal capital for firm j, in year t. ECj,t is natural logarithm of frequency counts of external capital for firm j, in year t. HCj,tis natural 
logarithm of frequency counts of human capital for firm j, in year t. ICj,t is the sum of natural logarithm of frequency counts of internal capital, external capital, and human capital for firm j, in 
year t. HHCj,t is dummy variable where each year is ranked on human capital (HC) and then the upper quartile of HC is selected as sufficient human capital disclosure and coded as one, zero 
otherwise. HINCj,t is dummy variable where each year is ranked on internal capital (INC) and then the upper quartile of INC is selected as sufficient internal capital disclosure and coded as one, 
zero otherwise. HECj,t is dummy variable where each year is ranked on external capital (EC) and then the upper quartile of EC is selected as sufficient external capital disclosure and coded as 
one, zero otherwise. 
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4.7 Summary of chapter four 
Using resource-based theory and signalling theory, this paper has examined whether 
disclosing IC, which is treated as an inimitable and non-substitutable resource, can reflect a 
firm’s financial performance, where financial performance is measured by firm’s profitability 
and productivity. This paper has also looked at whether signals such IC through annual 
reports are seen by investors as value-relevant signals with which to evaluate firm. The value 
relevance of IC disclosure is measured by Lundholm & Myers’ (2002) model. Finally, this 
paper has investigated whether opportunistic underlying earnings reporting firms are difficult 
in terms of signalling inimitable IC. Through a content analysis of 610 annual reports of 
ASX200 listed Australian firms, this paper finds the following results: a firm’s financial 
performance indicates that IC disclosure, especially sufficient IC disclosure, is positively 
related to current and future profitability (as measured by ROA, ROE, and RG in the current 
year and the following two years) and productivity (as measured by ATO in the current year 
and the following two years). The result of value relevance shows a significant positive 
relationship between sufficient IC disclosure and the amount of future earnings reflected in 
the current annual returns. Collectively, the results confirm resource-based theory and 
signalling theory, in that IC is treated as the inimitable and non-substitutable resources of a 
firm to enhance their current and future financial performance, and also discloses these 
valuable resources through annual reports that reveal relevant future information to 
incorporate into current stock returns. Finally, this paper finds that IC disclosure, especially 
sufficient IC disclosure, is negatively related to opportunistic underlying earnings 
management. This results correlated with the results of paper one and paper two suggest that 
low quality firms are less likely to disclose IC because it is a resource that is difficult to 
imitate or replace; therefore, these firms engage in opportunistic underlying earnings 
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reporting to influence their investors’ perceptions regarding performance in order to increase 
and maintain their stock prices. 
In the additional tests this paper re-examines the value relevance of IC disclosure, using 
market-to-book ratios to measure market valuation. The results validate the value relevance 
results and find that IC disclosure and sufficient IC disclosure are positively and significantly 
associated with current and future market-to-book ratios. This paper also investigates which 
particular category of IC (including internal capital, external capital and human capital) is 
value-relevant to the market. The results show that external capital can carry information 
about current earnings to the market, while human capital and internal capital can bring 
future earnings forward to current stock returns such that the market perceives that disclosure 
of external capital reflects current earnings, while human capital and internal capital reflect 
future earnings. Finally, this paper finds that firms who disclose opportunistic underlying 














































5.1 Aims and results of this thesis 
This thesis contains three papers with the following objectives. Paper one is to examine how 
manager’s report underlying earnings in order to determine whether this is used to help 
investors evaluate firms’ underlying performance or to opportunistically influence investors’ 
perceptions of firm performance and how investors respond to this type of reporting. Two 
types of reporting are tested in the first paper: efficient reporting based on signalling theory 
and opportunistic reporting based on prospect theory and agency theory. Based on signalling 
theory, the first paper argues that to reduce information asymmetry and dissatisfaction with 
statutory earnings, managers are more likely to make voluntary disclosure of underlying 
earnings to reflect underlying performance which could recur in the future. Based on prospect 
theory and agency theory, this first paper assumes that because people are self-interested and 
averse to loss, when firms fail to meet statutory earnings targets or make current statutory 
losses, managers may opportunistically define underlying earnings higher than statutory 
earnings to influence investors’ perceptions of firm performance when firms miss their 
statutory earnings target or make current statutory losses. Efficient reporting is investigated 
by the relationship between earnings persistence and the likelihood of underlying earnings 
reporting; the relationship between earnings predictability and the likelihood of underlying 
earnings. Opportunistic reporting is examined by the likelihood of managers using 
opportunistic income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions when firms miss their 
statutory earnings target or make current statutory losses. The results confirm the 
opportunistic reporting hypothesis that when firms do not meet earnings targets or make 
statutory losses, managers are more likely to use income-increasing underlying earnings 
exclusions to make them look greater than statutory earnings. Specifically, managers 
opportunistically exclude recurring expenses to make underlying earnings look better than 
statutory earnings and categorise them as ‘Other’ unspecific expenses so there is less chance 
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of them being detected; this suggests that income-increasing exclusions represents 
inappropriate classification of the earnings component by managers. Investors, however, are 
misled by this opportunistic reporting behaviour. They perceive current statutory earnings 
irrelevant and reacted favourably to such underlying earnings.  
 
Since paper one found that managers disclose underlying earnings opportunistically to induce 
investors’ perceptions of firm performance such that they overvalue the stock price. Paper 
two applies agency theory of overvalued equity to examine whether overvalued firms engage 
in earnings management and whether the duration of overvaluation is an important 
determinant on managers’ decision of using accrual earnings management and opportunistic 
underlying earnings reporting. According to agency theory of overvalued equity, when a 
firm’s stock price becomes overvalued, managers of overvalued firms not only refuse any 
market correction of overvalued stock prices, but they actually tend to extend overvaluation 
by engaging in different earnings management techniques that increase reported earnings. 
Therefore, equity overvaluation induces managers to engage in alternative earnings 
management in order to maintain this upward trend in stock prices (Jensen, 2005). The 
second paper shows evidence consistent with this reasoning, finding that overvalued firms are 
more likely to disclose underlying earnings and report them opportunistically for the whole 
sample periods. Considering how the duration of overvalued equity influenced managers’ 
choices of earnings management, the results suggest that managers engage in accruals 
earnings management at an early stage, as the duration of overvaluation continues, they are 
more likely to also disclose underlying earnings opportunistically. The results of second 
paper suggest that the duration of equity overvaluation is an important determinant of 




Paper three applies resource-based theory and signalling theory to examine whether 
disclosing IC, which is treated as an inimitable and non-substitutable resource, can reflect a 
firm’s financial performance, and whether signals IC to investors are value-relevant for 
evaluating firm value. Paper three finds that IC signals firms’ future economic benefits, 
which are value-relevant for decision-making and carries future benefits forward to current 
stock returns. Specifically, IC disclosure and sufficient IC disclosure are positively and 
significantly related to a firm’s current and future financial performance (i.e., they are 
positively and significantly related to current and future ROE, ROA, RG, and ATO); 
sufficient IC disclosure is significantly and positively associated with the amount of future 
earnings reflected in the current stock returns. In addition, paper three provides an insight into 
the relationship between IC disclosure and earnings management by arguing that low quality 
firms are less likely to voluntarily disclose IC because they find it hard to imitate. The results 
confirm the hypotheses made because evidence has presented that IC disclosure, especially 
sufficient IC disclosure, is negatively related to opportunistic underlying earnings 
management. Combining the results of paper one and paper two suggests that low quality 
firms are less likely to disclose IC because it is a difficult signal to imitate, so these firms 
engage in opportunistic underlying earnings reporting to influence investors’ perception of 
firms’ performances to increase and maintain their stock prices. 
 
5.2 Contributions 
This section discusses the contributions of each paper in turn. Paper one makes three 
significant contributions; first, prior research in the U.S. provides mixed results about how 
managers’ report non-statutory earnings (e.g., Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Brown & 
Sivakumar, 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Doyle et al., 2003; Johnson & Schwartz, 2005), 
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so it contributes to existing debates about non-statutory earnings reporting by examining the 
way manager’s report underlying earnings and market reactions to underlying earnings 
reporting in the Australia context. Second, only a few studies have examined how manager’s 
report non-statutory earnings based on theories, so paper one developed research hypotheses 
based on signalling theory, prospect theory, and agency theory. Signalling theory is used to 
test the efficient underlying earnings reporting hypothesis, while prospect theory and agency 
theory are used to examine the opportunistic underlying earnings reporting hypothesis. Third, 
paper one contributes to the policy debate surrounding the usefulness of underlying earnings 
for users such as investors or creditors. AICD supports firms’ reporting underlying earnings 
as an alternative performance measurement (AICD &FINSIA, 2009), although the ASIC is 
concerned that underlying earnings is information that may mislead investors (ASIC, March, 
December 2011). Paper one contributes to these debates by stating that underlying earnings 
are opportunistically manipulated by managers when they do not meet earnings targets, or 
make current statutory losses.  
 
The second paper contributes to the literature on equity overvaluation and earnings 
management by examining whether overvalued equity firms engage in earnings management 
and whether managers alternate between accruals earnings management and opportunistic 
underlying earnings reporting to sustain the overvaluation. There are three papers in the 
extant literature that have examined the association between opportunistic non-statutory 
earnings disclosure (pro forma earnings) with within-statutory earnings management 
techniques (accruals earnings management and/or real activities earnings management) 
(Black et al., 2014; Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al., 2010). All three papers found that 
managers alternate between within-statutory earnings management and opportunistic non-
statutory earnings disclosure, but these three papers did not examine whether the duration of 
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equity overvaluation motivates managers to use different earnings management techniques 
alternatively. Second, while previous studies have examined the relationship between pro 
forma earnings and accruals earnings management using the absolute value of accruals 
earnings management, paper two examines the absolute value of accruals earnings 
management and also whether managers use income-increasing accruals earnings 
management and income-increasing underlying earnings exclusions alternatively. Third, 
paper two also empirically tests Jensen’s (2005) agency theory of overvalued equity. 
Badertscher (2011) examined overvaluation and managers choice of non-statutory earnings 
management and found that overvalued firms are more likely to engage in non-statutory 
earnings management than firms that are not overvalued. However, Badertscher (2011) 
defined non-statutory earnings management as firms that identified restatement 
announcements that raised questions about the quality of financial reporting. It is not clear 
whether managers use opportunistic non-statutory earnings disclosure as an earnings 
management tool to substitute for other earnings management tools to sustain overvalued 
equity. Paper two extends Badertscher’s (2011) study by investigating how the duration of 
overvalued equity influences managers’ to use accruals earnings management and 
opportunistic underlying earnings reporting. Fourth, Zang (2012) examined the role of 
earnings management costs in managers’ decisions to trade off different earnings 
management tools. Paper two extends Zang’s (2012) study by examining whether the 
constrained abilities of managers using accruals earnings management and income-increasing 
accruals earnings management influence their decision to transit into underlying earnings 
disclosure and disclose them opportunistically in order to sustain overvalued equity.  
 
The third paper makes several contributions to existing literature on IC disclosure and 
earnings management. First, prior studies have found that firms who make sufficient IC 
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disclosure have a high earnings quality and therefore argue that IC was quite important with 
regards to a firm’s growth and success (see, Darabi et al., 2012; Mojtahedi, 2013), but none 
looked at whether firms with earnings management are less likely to disclose IC. Paper three 
is the first paper to examine the relationship between earnings management and IC 
disclosure, and suggests that firms with earnings management find it hard to disclose IC 
because it is difficult to imitate and replace. Second, previous studies found that IC is the key 
to maximising the economic value of firms (Edvinsson & Malone, 1997) and contributing to 
their long-term strategic focus (Roos et al., 1998), but it cannot yet be determined whether the 
benefits of IC disclosure are long-term. Previous studies with regards to whether IC 
disclosure can demonstrate the value-relevant information that took place during the 
reporting period to investors or value-creation for the future are rare (Abeysekera, 2011. 
p.20). Paper three is the first study in Australia to examine whether IC disclosure can enhance 
current and future financial performance, and whether disclosing IC through annual reports is 
value-relevant to investors’ decision making using content analysis for a large sample of 
Australian listed firms. Third, Abeysekera (2006) observed that the development of a 
theoretical framework underlying IC disclosure is in its infancy, with few studies providing a 
strong theoretical basis for interpreting their findings; in fact research on IC underpinned by 
signalling theory is extremely limited (Li et al., 2008). Paper three has built a theoretical 
framework based on resource-based theory and signalling theory to develop research 
hypotheses. 
The findings of this thesis can have positive implications for the development of accounting 
standards and practices in Australia. As this thesis finds that managers report underlying 
earnings opportunistically to mislead investors and sustain overvalued equity, these findings 
provide useful insights for corporate regulators such as the Australian Securities & 
Investments Commission, who presently oppose firms’ publishing underlying earnings, so 
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that they can make an empirically valid decision for further action. It may prove useful for 
investors to have a better understanding of how managers exercise the discretion inherent 
within accounting standards and outside accounting standards alternatively, to mask poor 
firm performance or to sustain the overvalued stock prices. Findings are also useful to those 
who use IC to assess the quality of a firm (such as creditors and investors) because the 
findings confirm that low quality firms are unlikely to disclose sufficient IC.  
 
5.3 Main limitations of the research and suggestions for future research  
There are several limitations that should be considered when interpreting the results of this 
thesis. First, they may not be applicable to other countries and other non-listed Australian 
firms because only ASX200 listed Australian firms were investigated. Second, the limited 
sample size constrains paper two to use more precise overvaluation measurements. Third, 
since underlying earnings reporting is a new area in earnings management literature, the 
specific control variables of underlying earnings reporting have not been examined by the 
current literature, so the specific controls for underlying earnings are not supported by 
literature and may not comprehensively explain underlying earnings reporting. Fourth, the 
coding framework of IC used in paper three contains 33 IC items, whereas other studies used 
coding frameworks with less or more varied IC items, so when comparing the results of paper 
three with other studies, the findings must recognise these different approaches. Fifth, paper 
three is the first to examine the relationship between IC disclosure and earnings management, 




The results of this thesis provide several avenues for future academic research. Since paper 
two only examined the relationship between overvaluation and managers’ decision to use 
accruals earnings management and underlying earnings disclosure alternative, researchers can 
extend this result to examine the effect of real activities earnings management on 
overvaluation and managers’ choices on using accruals earnings management, real activities 
earnings management, and underlying earnings disclosures. Moreover, paper one and paper 
two provided the evidence that meeting earnings benchmarks and sustaining the overvalued 
equity motivate managers to engage in opportunistic underlying earnings reporting. Finding 
other motivations for underlying earnings reporting would also be an attractive area for 
researchers. For example, studies can examine the influence of management share options on 
the underlying earnings disclosures. Future research could also examine what factors cause 
firms to become overvalued and what are the solutions to the agency costs of overvalued 
equity, including the role of governments, regulators, and other constraints on earnings 
management mechanisms. Furthermore, research would examine IC disclosure and its 
implications for other aspects of firm’s benefits such as corporate reputations. Finally, future 
research could extend the current study of IC disclosure and earnings management into a 
detailed examination from a different angle, using different methods. For example, a future 
study could conduct interviews or surveys to examine directors’ perceptions on IC and how 
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Appendix 1: Literature review summaries  
Appendix 1.1: Literature review summary for paper one (Non-statutory reporting and market reactions) 
 Motivations  Market Reactions  




Co-exist Market efficient Market mispricing Test Variables Significant Results  
Bradshaw, M. 
T., & Sloan, R. 
G. 
2002 1985-1997 OLS YES   YES  Dependent variable-Buy-and-hold returns from 
two days after the last quarterly earnings 
announcement and through the day after the 
current period earnings announcement;  
 
Independent variables- Forecast errors of Street 
earnings, Forecast errors of GAAP earnings, 
time-period dummy variable  
Both the earnings response coefficient 
and regression R squares significantly 
higher for Street earnings than GAAP 
earnings 
Brown, L., & 
Sivakumar, K. 






Vuong Z tests 
YES   YES  Predictive Ability: absolute value of differences 
between prediction errors of Street earnings 
(I/B/E/S) and  predication errors of Operating 
income (Compustat); 
 
Valuation: Dependent variable-market value per 
share; 
Independent variables - Operating income 
reported by Compustat, Street earnings reported 
by I/B/E/S; 
 
Information content: Dependent variable- CAR 
Independent variables- unexpected operating 
income, unexpected Street earnings 
Street earnings are a better measure of 
predictive ability, valuation, and 
information content than GAAP 
earnings 
Bhattacharya, 
N., Black, E. 
L., 
Christensen, T. 
E., & Larson, 
C. R. 
2003 1998-2000 Vuong Z tests, t-
test, and OLS 
YES   YES  Informativeness: Dependent variable-CAR  
Independent variables-forecast errors of street 
earnings (IBES), forecast errors of Pro forma 
earnings(hand-collation), forecast errors of 
GAAP Operating earnings  
 
Permanence: Dependent variables- revision in 
one-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts based on 
information in the current quarterly earnings 
announcement; 
Independent variables-forecast errors of street 
earnings (IBES), forecast errors of Pro forma 
earnings(hand-collation), forecast errors of 
GAAP Operating earnings  
Coefficient on forecast errors of Pro 
forma significantly and positively 
associate with CAR and Revision. R 
square is higher for Pro forma earnings 
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Appendix 1.1 (continued) 
 Motivations  Market Reactions  




Co-exist Market efficient Market mispricing Test Variables Significant Results  
Bowen, R. M., 
Davis, A. K., 
& Matsumoto, 
D. A. 














  YES  Dependent variable -CAR;  
 
Independent variables-Emphasis scores from 
most to least (pro forma earnings reported in the 
headline; in the first/second paragraph; in 
paragraph three or later; in the financial 
statements only)  
Incremental information of pro forma 
earnings increases with greater relative 
emphasis on this metric, when the 
GAAP earnings have low value 
relevance 
Collins, D., Li, 
O., & Xie, H. 
2009 1985-2000 Huber-White t-
test, OLS 
YES   YES  Dependent variables -Abnormal returns, 
abnormal-return volatility, and abnormal trading 
volume;  
Independent variables -Street earnings surprises 
and GAAP earnings surprises  
Market participants increasingly rely on 
street earnings for their stock pricing 
decisions. Street earnings surprises are 
significantly and positively related to 
three models 
Albring, S. M., 
Cabán-García, 
M. T., & Reck, 
J. L.  
2010 2002-2007 Huber-White t- 
test, OLS, Vuong 
Z tests 
YES   YES  Dependent variables-Fiscal year-end closing 
stock price; 1-year total stock return;  
 
Independent variables-GAAP operating EPS; pro 
forma EPS 
Pro forma earnings are mainly associated 
with stock prices and stock returns;  
Pro forma EPS is much more value 
relevant in determining stock price and 
return than GAAP EPS (Vuong Z is 
significantly positive) 
Walker, M., & 
Louvari, E. 
2003 1996 Chi-squared 
tests, logistic 
 YES    Dependent variable-Alternative EPS;  
 
Independent variables-The alternative EPS is 
positive when FRS3 is negative, The alternative 
would be negative but not as negative as FRS3 
EPS, Firms that would report a greater loss 
under the alternative than under FRS3, A firm 
reporting profit under FRS3 would report a loss 
under the alternative, A firm would report a 
higher profit under the alternative, Disclosure of 
the alternative would result in a lower profit  
The voluntary disclosure of an alternative 
EPS measure is positively related to the 
extent to which the alternative measure 
exceeds FRS3 EPS after controlling 
analyst following, firm size, return 
volatility, firm’s general attitude towards 
public disclosure for the full sample; 
  
Voluntary disclosure of an alternative 
EPS measure is negatively related to the 
alternative would be negative but not as 
negative as FRS3 EPS after controlling 
analyst following, firm size, return 
volatility, firm’s general attitude towards 
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2005 June to 
August 
2000 
t-tests, OLS  YES  YES  Persistence of GAAP: compare the persistence 
of GAAP earnings reported by pro forma 
reporters and non-pro forma reporters;  
Stock pricing (price level):compute a market-
multiple prediction error (actual value minus 
warranted value) for pro forma firms;  
Stock returns: Dependent variable-CAR, 
Independent variables-earnings surprise 
(difference between an adjusted EPS and the 
latest consensus EPS forecast from analysts, 
scaled by the stock price 23 days prior to the 
earnings announcement), Loss dummy variable 
equals 1 when GAAP operating EPS is negative, 
and 0 otherwise, and the interaction between 
earnings surprise and Loss dummy variable  
Persistence of GAAP- no difference in 
the persistence of GAAP operating EPS 
for pro forma and non–pro forma firms; 
Stock pricing-mean prediction error is 
reliably positive and economically 
significant. However, median prediction 
errors are not reliably positive across 
valuation models; 
Stock returns-The incremental pro forma 
coefficients for earnings surprise and 
interaction between earnings surprise and 




& Soliman, M. 
2003 1988-1999 Fama-MacBeth 
t-statistics, OLS 
 YES   YES Predictability of the exclusions: Dependent 
variable-cash flows up to three years into the 
future,  
Independent variables-total exclusions (Pro 
forma earnings minus GAAP earnings), special 
items, other exclusions; 
 
Value relevance of exclusions: Dependent 
variable-market-adjusted stock return over the 
next one, two, or three years 
Independent variables-total exclusions, special 
items, ‘other’ exclusions  
Future cash flows are negatively 
significantly related to total exclusions 
and also negatively related to ‘other’ 
exclusions; 
 
Significant negative relationship between 
future market returns and total 




G. D., & 
Chima, M. 









YES    Disclosing pro forma earnings in a potentially 
misleading manner (GAAP Terminology and 
Claiming Achievements)  
S&P 500 firms are disclosing pro forma 
earnings in a potentially misleading 
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Co-exist Market efficient Market mispricing Test Variables Significant Results  
Black, D. E., 
& Christensen, 
T. E. 
2009 1998–2003 OLS and Logit  YES    Aggressive pro forma reporting: Dependent 
variables-convert a GAAP operating loss to a 
pro forma profit; pro forma earnings meet the 
analyst’ benchmark while GAAP earnings are 
not; Independent variables-nine different 
adjustment items 
Managers use recurring items to convert 
a GAAP operating loss to a pro forma 
profit and to meet the analyst’ benchmark 
Landsman, W. 
R., Miller, B. 
L., & Yeh, S. 
2007 1990-2000 Year and 
industry fixed-
effects 
 YES   YES Abnormal earnings forecasting: Dependent 
variables-abnormal earnings;  Independent 
variables-measured as earnings less a normal 
return on beginning equity book value; total 
exclusions, special items or other exclusions as 
independent variables;  
Exclusion component prediction: Dependent 
variables-one year ahead total exclusions, special 
items or other exclusions;  Independent 
variables-total exclusions, special items or other 
exclusions;  
Valuation: Dependent variable-market value of 
common shares outstanding at fiscal year-end;  
Independent variables-total exclusions, special 
items or other exclusions  
The market misprices positive and 
negative total exclusions, special items, 
and other exclusions, and that the over-
valuation or under-valuation is generally 
consistent with the market-inefficiency 
Barth, M., 
Gow, I., & 
Taylor, D. 
























YES    Opportunism: Dependent variables-pro forma 
(Street) stock-based compensation excluders 
(dummy variable code as one if firm’s pro forma 
(Street) earnings excludes stock-based 
compensation expense,  
Independent variables-stock-based compensation 
expense, earnings surprise, loss avoidance 
(dummy variable code as one if excluding stock-
based compensation expense results in the firm 
avoiding a loss), earnings smoothness (standard 
deviation of a firm’s stock-based compensation 
expense across sample years); 
Predictability: Dependent variable-annual 
changes of one year ahead GAAP earnings, 
Independent variables-annual changes stock-
based compensation expense, pro forma (Street) 
stock-based compensation excluders, the 
interaction between annual changes stock-based 
compensation expense and pro forma (Street) 
stock-based compensation excluders  
Opportunism-stock-based compensation, 
earnings surprise, loss avoidance, 
earnings smoothness are positively and 
significantly associate with pro forma 
excluders; 
Predictability- stock-based compensation 
expense has predictive ability for future 
earnings for Street Includers, but that is 
not true for Street Excluders. The 
coefficient on interaction between annual 
changes stock-based compensation 
expense and Street stock-based 
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Co-exist Market efficient Market mispricing Test Variables Significant Results  
Isidro, H., & 
Marques, A. 
2014 2003–2007 logistic  YES    Dependent variables-Non-GAAP earnings meet 
or beat the earnings benchmark (dummy variable 
code as one if non-GAAP earnings meet or beat 
analysts’ consensus when GAAP earnings 
fall short); profit growth (dummy variable code 
one if non-GAAP earnings meets or beats last 
year’s GAAP earnings when GAAP earnings is 
less than last year’s GAAP earnings); and loss 
avoidance (dummy variable code one if the non-
GAAP earnings are positive when GAAP 
earnings are negative);  
Independent variables- efficiency of the legal 
and enforcement system, investor protection, 
financial market development, communication 
and dissemination of information  
Beating all earnings benchmarks with 
non-GAAP earnings is positively related 
to efficiency of the legal system; is 
positively associated with strong investor 
protection and development of financial 
market; is positively associated with 
good communication and dissemination 
of information 





 YES    Determinants of pro forma disclosures: 
Dependent variable-pro forma disclosure  
Independent variables-earnings management 
incentives, in formativeness of GAAP earnings; 
 
Emphasis: Dependent variable-emphasis 
assigned to Non-GAAP earnings vis-à-vis 
GAAP earnings  
Independent variables-earnings management 
incentives, in formativeness of GAAP earnings  
Firms emphasise non-statutory profit 
versus GAAP profit and firms that miss 
earnings benchmarks are much more 
likely to disclose non-statutory profit 
than firms that meet or beat these 
benchmarks 
Lougee, B. A., 
& Marquardt, 
C. A. 





























 YES YES  Determinants of pro forma reporting decision: 
Dependent variable-pro forma disclosures;  
Independent variables-GAAP earnings in 
formativeness (earnings response coefficient; 
adjusted R squares); Controls-high-technology 
firms and intangible intensity, Growth Firms, 
Leverage, Earnings Variability; 
 
Investors response to pro forma earnings: 
Dependent variable-CAR;  
Independent variables-earnings surprise 
(difference between the earnings measure in pro 
forma/GAAP earnings and the same measure 
from the comparable quarter from the prior 
year), seasonally pro forma earnings, seasonally 
GAAP earnings; 
 
Predictive ability: Dependent variables-year-
ahead GAAP and pro forma earnings market-
year-ahead adjusted return,  
Independent variable-earnings surprise based on 
pro forma earnings 
Efficient reporting-Firms with less 
informative GAAP earnings are more 
likely to disclose pro forma earnings;  
 
Opportunistic reporting-Firms that miss 
earnings benchmarks under GAAP 
earnings (earnings surprise based on 
GAAP is negative) are more likely than 
other firms to include pro forma earnings 
in their press releases; 
 
Pro forma earnings are more useful for 
investors when GAAP earnings in 
formativeness is low or when strategic 
considerations are absent 
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Co-exist Market efficient Market mispricing Test Variables Significant Results  
Frederickson, 
J. R., & Miller, 
J. S. 
2004 2001 Experiment 
study, t-tests, 
OLS  






Two groups: one is MBA as less-sophisticated 
investors; another is analysts as sophisticated 
investors;  
Purposes: 1. Test the difference stock valuation 
between two groups. 2. Test the different 
valuation model used by less-sophisticated 
investors and more sophisticated investors 
 
Non-professional investors who received 
an earnings announcement that contained 
both GAAP and pro forma disclosures 
assessed a higher stock price than non-
professionals who received an 
announcement containing only GAAP 
disclosure; 
Financial analysts’ judgments on stock 
price are not affected by the pro forma 
disclosure 
Curtis, A. B., 
McVay, S. E., 
& Whipple, B. 
C. 
2014 2004-2009 Paired t-test, 
Fixed-effects, 
Logistic 
  YES  YES Transitory Gain Persistence: Dependent 
variable-Future Operating Earnings;  
Independent variable-Transitory Gain;  
 
Earnings Response Coefficients: Dependent 
variable-Announcement Return, Independent 
variable-Filing Return, transitory gain;  
 
Determinants of Disclosure Choice: Dependent 
variable-Opaque Disclosers (Non-GAAP EPS 
Includes Gain); 
Independent variables-meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks (analysts-dummy variable code as 
one if including the transitory gain in EPS results 
in meeting the analyst forecast; prior period- 
dummy variable code as one if including the 
transitory gain in EPS results in meeting the 
four-quarter-ago EPS; profit-dummy variable 
code as one if including the transitory gain in 
EPS results in a profit)  
Efficient reporting- transitory gains 
assisting investors in the efficient pricing 
of these gains; 
 
Opportunistic reporting-Opaque 
Disclosers group is significantly 
negatively associated with future 
operating earnings and significantly 
positively related to announcement return 
and filing return.  The meeting or beating 
earnings benchmarks is significantly 
positively related to opaque disclosing  
Choi, Y.-S., & 
Young, S. 
2015 1993-2001 Chi-square 


















 YES   Dependent variable-Non-GAAP earnings 
disclosure; 
 
Independent variables-GAAP miss benchmarks 
(one if unscaled GAAP EPS falls short of 
unscaled IBES forecast EPS),  absolute value of 
all transitory items, the interaction between 
GAAP miss benchmarks and absolute value of 
all transitory items  
Efficient reporting- disclosure probability 
of non-GAAP earnings is positively 
related to transitory items when the 
GAAP earnings met or exceeded 
analyst’s consensus earnings forecast; 
 
Opportunistic reporting-the positive 
relationship between disclosure 
probability of non-GAAP earnings and 
transitory items is significantly weaker 










Appendix 1.1 (continued) 
    Motivations  Market Reactions   








Market mispricing Test Variables Significant Results  
Elliott, W. B. 2006 2002 Experiment 
study, t-tests, 
OLS  






Four conditions: condition one-presents 
quarterly GAAP earnings only without 
emphasis; condition two-only quarterly  GAAP  
earnings was  presented  in the headline; 
condition three-quarterly Pro forma (GAAP)  
earnings was  presented  in  the  headline but 
without reconciliation; condition four- quarterly   
pro  forma  earnings was presented  in the 
headline with reconciliation; 
Test the firm performance valuation: Dependent 
variables-earnings performance, investment 
amount; 
Independent variables -reconciliation, pro forma 
reliability  
The judgments and decisions of 
nonprofessional investors were 
influenced by the emphasis that 
management places on pro forma 
earnings, but that this influence is 
mitigated by the presence of a 
quantitative reconciliation between 
GAAP earnings and Pro forma 
earnings;  
 
The presence of reconciliation between 
GAAP earnings and Pro forma 
earnings also influenced analysts’ 
judgments and decisions, but in the 
opposite direction to those of 
nonprofessional investors 
Andersson, P., 
& Hellman, N. 
2007 2007 Experiment 
study, t-tests 
    YES Two groups: One group includes pro forma 
earnings and GAAP earnings, while the second 
group involves GAAP earnings only 
Analysts who were given both GAAP 
and pro forma earnings had much higher 
GAAP EPS forecasts than the analysts 
who received GAAP earnings only 
Allee, K. D., 
Bhattacharya, 










Dependent variables-Small investors’ abnormal 
net buying activities over the three-day 
announcement window, large investors’ 
abnormal net buying activities over the three-day 
announcement window;  
 
Independent variables-earnings surprise, the 
interaction between earnings surprise and pro 
forma earnings disclose, the interaction between 
earnings surprise and pro forma emphasis, the 
interaction between earnings surprise and 
reconciliation 
Less-sophisticated investors react 
positively on quarterly earnings press 
releases that include a pro forma number, 
while more sophisticated investors react 
negatively on these information;  
 
Less sophisticated investors react 
positively on the pro forma figure when 
management emphasises pro forma 
earnings strategically, while trading of 
sophisticated investors is unaffected by 


























   Incremental value: Dependent variable- stock 
price per share measured as 3 months after the 
fiscal year-end. Independent variables-additional 
aggregate management exclusions made by 
managers beyond analysts (management 
exclusions), aggregate items classified by 
analysts as non-recurring but included by 
managers (management inclusions); 
 
Incremental forecasting relevance: Dependent 
variables-1-year-ahead and aggregate 2-year-
ahead operating cash flow; 
Independent variables-management exclusions, 
management inclusions 
Management exclusions are not 
significantly related to stock price and 
future cash flows; management 
inclusions are negatively and 
significantly associated with stock price 
and future cash flows 
298 
 
Appendix 1.2: Literature review summary for paper two (Managers’ decisions on using multiple earnings management mechanisms) 
Authors Year Study 
Period 
Method Substitute Complement Unspecific  Test variables  Significant results  




  YES  Dependent variables- current abnormal stock return or 
future abnormal stock returns (one to four years ahead) 
Independent variables- Myopic firms (dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if  firm i in year t engaged in real 
activities earnings management); no accruals inflation 
(dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if myopic firms 
not engaging in aggressive accruals earnings management 
which is measured by modified cross-sectional Jones model, 
Dechow et al., 1995) 
Market is misled by real activities earnings management. Real 
activities earnings management has a long-term net negative 
impact on firm value. It is real activities earnings management, 
not accruals earnings management, have the greater negative 














  YES  Dependent variable-Probability of IPO failure-IPO failure in 
subsequent periods (dummy variable code 1 if IPO firms 
that delist from the stock exchange for negative reasons) 
Survivability-survival rates in subsequent periods;  
 
Independent variables- real activities earnings management 
(Roychowdhury,2006) and/or accruals earnings 
management (cross-sectional Jones, 1991); 
 
Control variables: size, IPO firm age, underwriter (1 if the 
IPO is underwritten by a prestigious underwriter), venture 
capitalists (1 if the firm is backed by a venture capitalists), 
Big N auditors, IPO under-pricing, offer price, leverage 
ratio, book-to-market ratio, ROA, absolute value of cash 
flows from operations.    
IPO firms in the UK engage in real activities earnings 
management and/or accruals earnings management during the 
IPO year; 
IPO firms with high levels of real and/or accrual earnings 
management during the IPO year have a higher probability of 
IPO failure and lower survival rates in subsequent periods, 












YES    Trade-off between accruals and real earnings management: 
Dependent variable-real activities earnings management 
(dummy variable code as 1 if a firm’s real earnings 
management proxy greater than the industry-year median 
real earnings management proxy and 0 otherwise).  
Independent variable (cost of accruals earnings 
management)- BIG8 auditors; auditor tenure; net operating 
assets; litigation 
 
Consequences: Dependent variable-post SEO changes in 
ROA; Independent variable-real earnings management 
(Roychowdhury, 2006) and accruals earnings management 
(cross-sectional Jones,1991) 
 
Control variables- the frequency of meeting/beating 
analysts’ earnings forecasts; shares outstanding; bonus 
compensation; option compensation; ROA; leverage; market 
capitalisation; book to market ratio 
First: it documents that firms use real and accruals earnings 
management methods around SEOs; 
Second, it finds that firms’ choices differ predictably as a 
function of their ability to use accrual management and the costs 
of doing so; 
Third: the study finds that the post-SEO operating performance 
decline is attributable to real activities management is more 
severe than that attributable to accruals management 
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Appendix 1.2 (continued) 
Authors Year Study 
Period 
Method Substitute Complement Unspecific  Test variables  Significant results  







YES   Dependent variables- real earnings management 
(Roychowdhury,2006) or accruals earnings management 
(cross-sectional Jones,1991); 
 
Independent variables: Cost of accruals earnings 
management-Big 8 auditors, auditor tenure, SOX, net 
operating assets, operating cycle, 
Cost of real activities earnings management- market leader 
status, financial health, institutional ownership, and 
marginal tax rates; 
 
Control variables-ROA, size, Market-to-book ratio, pre-
managed earnings, inverse Mills ratio 
Managers use real activities earnings management and accruals 
earnings management substitutes based on the relative costs to 
their firms; If firms operate in an environment where the cost of 
real activities earnings management is high, then they will apply 
accruals earnings management more; If firms have high cost of 
accruals earnings management, then they will use real activities 








OLS YES    Dependent variable- real earnings management 
(Roychowdhury, 2006) or accruals earnings management 
(cross-sectional Jones,1991); 
 
Independent variables-before SOX periods (pre-SCA and 
SCA), after SOX periods, unexercised options, the number 
of unexercised options (excluding options grants in the 
current period), new option grants, restricted stock grants, 
average bonus compensation; 
 
Control variables-changes in GDP, market value of equity, 
big 5(4) auditors, time, accruals earnings management or 


















Subsequent to the passage of SOX, the level of real earnings 
management activities increased, the level of accrual-based 
earnings management decreased, and the total level of earnings 
management returned to the trend line of pre-SOX;  
Managers’ option compensation is positively related to total 
level of earnings management  
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Appendix 1.2 (continued) 
Authors Year Study 
Period 














YES    Usage of real earnings management and accruals earnings 
management among family firms: 
Dependent variables- real earnings management 
(Roychowdhury, 2006) or accruals earnings management 
(modified cross-sectional Jones, Dechow et al., 1995), 
Independent variables- two measurements for family firms: 
1. family ownership 2. family firms (dummy variable code 
as one if family members are either on the management 
board and/or on the supervisory board of the firm, or hold at 
least 25% of voting rights) 
 
Use accruals and real earnings management alternatively: 
Dependent variable- real earnings management 
(Roychowdhury, 2006) 
Independent variables- the interaction between two 
measurements of family firms 
 
Control variables- current earnings losses, size, firms’ 
growth rate, net income divided by average total assets, sum 
of all squared block-holdings, cumulative percentage of 
common shares held by members of the management board 
and the supervisory board that are not family members, 
leverage ratio, dummy that firms use GAAP, Big 4 auditors 
Compared to non-family firms, family firms engage in more 
earnings decreasing accruals earning management and less real 
activities earnings management; 
 
Compared to non-family firms, family firms treat real activities 
earnings management and accruals earnings management 
substitutes 
Elshafie, 
E., Yen, A. 





YES    Earnings management: dependent variables-DIFF 
(aggressive pro forma earnings reporting measured by 
difference between pro forma earnings and GAAP earnings, 
is a measure of pro forma reporting aggressiveness).  
Independent variables- Meet (meet earnings targets 
measured by dummy variable that has value of 1 if a firm 
meets its earnings targets and zero otherwise); accruals 
earnings management (measured by modified Jones model-
Dechow et al. 1995); real activities earnings management 
(Roychowdhury, 2006);  
 
Control variables- Industry, Size, Growth (price-earnings 
ratio); 
 
Market ratio-dependent variable: stock price at the end of 
the following quarter. Independent variables: pro forma 
earnings per share, GAAP earnings per share, and book 
value per share 
 
 
Meet earnings targets, accruals earnings management, and real 
activities earnings management are significantly negatively 
related to aggressive pro forma earnings reporting, suggesting 
that firms report aggressive pro forma earnings when they do not 
meet earnings targets or they have limited abilities to 
management earnings;  
 
Pro forma earnings value relevance is always higher than GAAP 
earnings regardless of whether firms are involved in high or low 
accruals earnings management. The relevance of GAAP earnings 
is higher for firms with higher levels of real activities 
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Appendix 1.2 (continued) 
Authors Year Study 
Period 












YES    Trad-offs strategy: Dependent variables-Aggressive pro 
forma reporting (Converting a GAAP operating loss to a pro 
forma profit; Using pro form exclusions to meet 
expectations when GAAP earnings fall short; the exclusion 
of recurring items), 
Independent variables-past earnings management (Balance 
Sheet Constraint following), current unmanaged earnings 
(net income-discretionary accruals), real earnings 
management measure following Roychowdhury (2006); 
discretionary accruals measure following modified Jones 
model- Kothari et al. (2005); 
Control variables-Accruals quality, negative analyst 
expectation, current statutory loss, special items, size, ROA, 
Leverage ratio, consecutive earnings increases over the past 
four years, management earnings guidance, company issued 
debt or equity during the year, company issued debt or 
equity within one year following the earnings announcement 
date, institutional ownership, BigN auditor, litigious 
industry; 
 
Market reactions: Dependent variable-CAR, Independent 
variables-interaction between pro forma earnings and past 
earnings management  
Trade-offs strategy- past earnings management is positively and 
significantly related to aggressive pro forma reporting. Current 
unmanaged earnings, current real earnings management, current 
accruals-base earnings management are negatively and 
significantly associated with aggressive pro forma reporting; 
 
Market reactions-interaction between pro forma earnings and 










YES    Meet earnings targets: Dependent variable- Meet earnings 
target (dummy variable code as‘1’ EPS minus the median 
consensus analyst forecast greater or equal to zero), 
Independent variable-income-increasing pro forma earnings 
exclusions (dummy variable code as ‘1’ if management has 
pro forma earnings greater than GAAP earnings); 
 
Trade-off between earnings management: Dependent 
variable-pro forma exclusions level (total exclusions divided 
by price), Independent variable-accruals earnings 
management (modified Jones model, Kothari et al., 2005); 
real activities earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006); 
expectations management (abnormal forecasts); 
 
Market reactions: Dependent variable-three-day market-
adjusted buy-and-hold returns, Independent variables-
income-increasing pro forma exclusions; the interaction of 
income-increasing pro forma exclusions and earnings 
surprise; 
Control variables -sales growth, size, profitable, ROA, 
market-to-book 
Managers use within-GAAP earnings management and non-
GAAP earnings management alternatively to meet earnings 
targets; 
 
Investors discount positive earnings surprises when accompanied 
by income-increasing exclusions from pro forma earnings, 
suggesting market partially understands the opportunistic nature 
of income-increasing exclusions 
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Appendix 1.2 (continued) 
Authors Year Study 
Period 
Method Substitute Complement Unspecific  Test variables  Significant results  
Badertscher
, B. A. 






YES    Overvaluation and accruals earnings management: 
Dependent variable-Accruals earnings management (Cross-
sessional modified Jones model, Kothari et al., 2005), 
Independent variables-Over (i, i=1to5) dummy variable equal to 
1 if the firm has been in the top quintile of price-to-value ratio 
for (i) consecutive years. For example, Over 2 is equal to 1 if the 
firm is overvalued for two consecutive years; Specific controls 
for accruals earnings management-number of analysts, litigation 
risk industry, SEO; 
 
Overvaluation and real activities earnings management: 
Dependent variable- real activities earnings management 
(Roychowdhury 2006);  
Independent variables-Over (i, i=1to5) dummy variable;  
Specific controls for real earnings management-Herfindahl 
Index, market shares, Altman’ Z-score; 
Overvaluation and non-GAAP earnings management: 
Dependent variable- non-GAAP firm dummy variable equals to 
1 if firm with restatement announcements that raise questions 
about the quality of financial reporting, 
Independent variables-Over (i, i=1to5) dummy variable  
Specific controls for non-GAAP earnings management-book-tax 
differences; 
Corporate control variables-CEO’s base salary, CEO’s 
compensation, number of shares held by executives, number of 
option grants; 
General control variables- Net operating assets, Big 8 auditors, 
meet earnings targets, ROE, SOX, changes of GDP, Leverage 
ratio, size, firm’s interest coverage ratio  
The longer a firm is overvalued, the greater is the amount of 
total earnings management; Managers engage in accruals 
management in the early stages of overvaluation and move to 
real transactions management to sustain their overvalued equity. 
The longer a firm is overvalued, the more likely it is to engage in 
non-GAAP earnings management 
Chen, C. 
L., Huang, 









 YES  Model one: Dependent variable-real activities earnings 
management (Roychowdhury, 2006), 
Independent variables-accruals earnings management (cross-
sectional Jones, 1991), 
Control variables-size, market-to-book, leverage, firm’s 
earnings performance, net operating assets, insider’s stocking 
holdings, firm’s production capacity, intangible intensive 
industry, seasoned equity offerings. 
Model two: Dependent variable- accruals earnings management 
(cross-sectional Jones, 1991), 
Independent variables- real activities earnings management 
(Roychowdhury, 2006); 
Control variables-size, market-to-book, leverage, firm’s 
earnings performance, net operating assets, insider’s stocking 
holdings, firm’s production capacity, intangible intensive 
industry, seasoned equity offerings, Big 4 auditors, accruals 
earnings management in previous year 
Real activities earnings management is positively associated 
with the accruals earnings management and supports that 
accruals and real activities earnings management play important 
roles in concurrently strategically boosting and/or suppressing 
firm’s earnings in the relatively low accounting disclosure 
environment and low litigation costs settings found in Taiwan 
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Appendix 1.2 (continued) 
Authors Year Study 
Period 





2012 2003 to 
2007 
OLS  YES   Dependent variable- Accruals earnings management (cross-
sectional Jones, 1991); 
Independent variable- real activities earnings management 
(Roychowdhury, 2006); 
Control variables- Unexpected income before accruals 
earnings management, leverage ratio, firm’s growth 
 
Real activities manipulation is positively related to accruals 
earnings management suggesting that the increase of real 














Appendix 1.3: Literature review summary for paper three (The impacts of IC on firm’s financial performance and market valuation) 










Joshi, M., Cahill, 








 Dependent variable – financial 
performance (average ROA); 
 
Independent variables-Average VAIC 
(value added intellectual coefficient); 
Average HCE (human capital 
efficiency); average CEE (capital 
employed efficiency); average SCE 
(structural capital efficiency); 
Control variables- firm size 
The financial performance of the financial sector in Australia is 
highly influenced by human capital efficiency, however high 
levels of capital and structural efficiencies do not necessarily lead 
to higher levels of financial performance 
Chen, M., 





















OLS VAICTM Positive  Positive Dependent variable- Firm’s market 
valuation (MtoB); Firm’s current and 
future financial performance (four 
variables-ROE, ROA, Growth in 
revenues, and Employee productivity); 
 
Independent variables-Firm’s current 
market valuation and Firm’s current 
financial performance (VAIC (value 
added intellectual coefficient), HCE 
(human capital efficiency), CEE (capital 
employed efficiency), and SCE 
(structural capital efficiency); Firm’s 
future financial performance (lagged 
one-year, lagged two-year, and lagged 
three-year VAIC (value added 
intellectual coefficient), HCE (human 
capital efficiency), CEE (capital 
employed efficiency), and SCE 
(structural capital efficiency); 
 
Control variables-R&D expenditures and 











Firm’s market valuation: VAIC, HCE, CEE and SCE are 
positively and significantly related to MtoB; 
 
Firm’s current financial performance: VAIC, HCE and CEE are 
positively and significantly related to ROE, ROA, Growth in 
revenues, and Employee productivity;  SCE is positively and 
significantly related to ROA; 
 
Firm’s future financial performance:  lagged VAIC, HCE and 
CEE are positively and significantly related to ROE, ROA, 
Growth in revenues, and Employee productivity.  Lagged SCE is 
positively and significantly related to ROA 
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Appendix 1.3 (continued) 
  




Purpose Test Variables Significant Results  
FP  MV  
Vafaei, A., 






COB -SC  Partial  
positive 
Dependent variables- Share price three 
months after the balance date;  
 
Independent variables- Value relevance: EPS, 
BVPS (the book value of net assets per share), 
and IC; Incremental value relevance:  EPS 
(the net profit or loss after tax per share), 
BVPS (the book value of net assets per share), 
IC, BVPSDIF (the difference between BVPS 
determined under GAAP and under IFRS), 
and EPSDIF (the difference between EPS 
determined under GAAP and under IFRS); 
Moderating effects of IC- BVPS, EPS, IC, 
BVPSDIF, EPSDIF, BVPSDIF*IC (the 
interaction between BVPSDIF and IC), and 
EPSDIF*IC (the interaction between EPSDIF 
and IC); 
 
Control variable- Industry type (dummy 
variable code as one if a firm in non-
traditional industry) 
Value relevance of IC: IC is positively related to share price for  
Hong Kong and Britain, however, it is significantly neither 
Singapore nor Australia; 
 
Incremental value relevance: share price is not significantly 
associated with  BVPSDIF and EPSDIF, suggesting that IFRS 
adjustment amounts are not value relevant; 
Moderating effects of IC: The interaction between EPSDIF and IC 
as well as the interaction between BVPSDIF and IC are 








OLS VAICTM Positive  Dependent variables- firm’s performance -
ROE, ROA, growth in revenues, and 
employee productivity;  
 
Independent variables- VAIC  (value added 
capital coefficient), VAHC (human capital 
efficiency), VACE (capital employed 
efficiency), and SCVA (structural capital 
efficiency), InCE (innovation capital); 
 
Control variables-  None 
VAIC is positively related to four firm performance indicators 
(ROE, ROA, growth in revenues, and employee productivity); 
 
VACE is positively related to ROE and ROA; 
 
VAHC is positively related to ROA; 
 
In CE is positively related to growth in revenues 
Abeysekera, I. 2011b 1998 to 
2003 
Content analysis, 
Fixed effect  
COB-SC  None Dependent variables-current stock returns; 
 
Independent variables-the frequency of IC 
disclosures (internal capital with ten 
components, external capital with ten 
components, human capital with twenty five 
components),  earnings per share for year t−1,  
earnings per share for year t,  the sum of 
earnings per share for years t+1, t+2, and t+3, 
interactions between IC disclosures and 
earnings variables; 
 
Control variables- sum of annual stock returns 
for years t+1, t+2, and t+3, Market to book 
value, Size 
IC had no significant correlation with the current stock return and 
had no effect on accounting based earnings included in the current 
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Purpose Test Variables Significant Results  
FP  MV  








 Positive Dependent variable- share price three months 
later at the end of fiscal year; 
 
Independent variables-Productivity of book-
value assets- Book-value per share (BVPS); 
interaction between BVPS and ROE; 
interaction between value added divided by 
book-value total assets and BVPS; 
Productivity of IC-Book-value per share 
(BVPS); interaction between BVPS and ROE; 
interaction between value added divided by IC 
(or its two components human capital and 
structural capital) and BVPS; 
 
Control variables- year (code as 1 if year 2008 
or year 2009, 0 otherwise) and industry (code 
as 1 if firm is in high-tech industry, 0 
otherwise) 
The productivity of  IC and its human and structural capital 
components are each positively associated with share price, 
whereas the productivity of book value of total assets is non-
significant; 
 
Year is negatively related to share price and industry is 
insignificant associated with share price 






COB -SC  Partial 
positive 
Dependent variable- stock price of company 
at 3 month later than the financial year; 
 
Independent variables- Book value per share 
(BVPS); EPS; Intellectual capital includes 
HC, RC, PC, and InC. Where: Human capital 
(HC) measured by salaries and benefit 
expenses per share; Relation Capital (RC) 
measured by sales per share; Process Capital 
(PC) measured by Selling, General & 
Administration expenses per share. Innovation 
capital (InC) measured by intangible assets 
per share; 
 
Control variables- Total asset  per share 
The traditional accounting variables (BVPS and EPS) are value 
relevant for investors. With relations to the main IC 
effects, investors price only relational capital 




COB -SC  Positive Dependent variable- market valuation-stock 
price, Market changes valuation-stock returns; 
 
Independent variables- market valuation-
human capital total index 
(qualification/competence index and 
motivation/commitment index and personnel 
index), book value per share, earnings per 
share, Market changes valuation- changes of 
human capital total index (changes of 
qualification/competence index and changes 
of motivation/commitment index and changes 
of personnel index), earnings per share, 
changes of earnings per share; 
 
Control variables-year and industry dummy  
Human capital index is significant positively related to stock price, 
while it is not associated with stock returns, suggesting that human 
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Purpose Test Variables Significant Results  
FP MV 
Clarke, M., 
Seng, D. & 





VAICTM Positive   Dependent variables- firm’s performance ( 
ROE, ROA, growth in revenues, and 
employee productivity);  
Independent variables- VAIC  (value added 
capital coefficient), HCE (human capital 
efficiency), CEE (capital employed 
efficiency), and SCE (structural capital 
efficiency/lagged VAIC  (value added capital 
coefficient), lagged HCE (human capital 
efficiency), lagged CEE (capital employed 
efficiency), and lagged SCE (structural capital 
efficiency; 
Control variables- Leverage, Research 
intensive, year, industry 
Positive relationship between VAIC and firm’s performance; 
particularly with CEE and HCE. Positive relationship between 
lagged HCE and lagged SCE and firm’s current performance 
Tan, H.P., 




















Dependent variable-Firm’s current financial 
performance (ROE, EPS, and annual stock 
returns in year t); Firm’s future financial 
performance (ROE, EPS, and annual stock 
returns in year t+1); 
 
Independent variables-VACA (value added 
capital coefficient), VAHU (human capital 
coefficient), STVA (structural capital 
coefficient) in year t;  
 
Control variables- industry type 
(Manufacturing related, trading related, 
services related and property related) 
Positive correlation between a firm’s IC and company 
performance; 
 
Positive relationship between increased value of a  firm’s IC and 
that company’s future performance;  
Positive correlation between the rate of growth of a  firm’s IC and 
that company’s future performance;  
The results indicate a higher contribution of IC to companies in 
the Services and Property sector, less in the Manufacturing sector 
and even less in the Trading sector. 






 The influence of investment in intangible 
assets on firms’ future growth: dependent 
variables- the change in the company’s annual 
sales (Growthit); change in the company’s 
annual operating earnings; change in the 
company’s annual market values; 
Independent variables-annual change in the 
investments in intangible (∆ITAit-1; ∆ITAit-2; 
∆ITAit-3; ∆ITAit-4); 
 
The factors that influnce on the investment in 
intangibel assets: dependent variables-
Investments in intangible (ITAit); annual 
change in the investments in 
intangible(∆ITAit); 
Independent variables-Firm size; industry 
sectors; firm age; financial status measured by 
company leverage, growth is the growth in 
profit measured by changes in sales; dividends 
per share; natural logarithm of net cash flow 
Investment in intangible is not always positively associated with 
near future growth; 
 
Firm size; industry sectors; financial status measured by company 
leverage, growth is the growth in profit measured by changes in 
sales; dividends per share; natural logarithm of net cash flow were 
significantly releated to investment on intangible assets but firm’s 
age was not; 
 
The results suggest that while investing in intangible assets 
dosen’t lead directly to future grwoth, these investments are 
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Theriou, G.  
2011 2006-
2008 
OLS VAICTM Partial  
positive 
None Market value: dependent variable- Market to 
book ratio; Independent variables-VACA 
(indicator of value added efficiency of capital 
employed); VAHU (indicator of value added 
efficiency of human capital); STVA (indicator 
of value added efficiency of structural 
capital); VAIC (the composite sum of the 
three separate indicators). 
 
Financial performance: dependent variables- 
ROE (return on equity), or ROA (return on 
assets), or GR (growth revenues); 
Independent variables- VACA (indicator of 
value added efficiency of capital employed); 
VAHU (indicator of value added efficiency of 
human capital); STVA (indicator of value 
added efficiency of structural capital); 
VAIC (the composite sum of the three 
separate indicators). 
There is a statistically significant positive relationship between 
human capital efficiency and financial performance only. 
Kamath, G. 2008 1996 - 
2006 
OLS VAICTM Partial  
positive 
None Dependent variables- ROA to reflect 
profitability, MtoB to reflect market valuation 
and ATO to reflect productivity (measured by  
total revenue to the book value total assets); 
 
Independent variables- VACA (indicator of 
value added efficiency of capital employed); 
VAHU (indicator of value added efficiency of 
human capital); SCVA (indicator of value 
added efficiency of structural capital); 
VAIC (the composite sum of the three 
separate indicators); 
 
Control variables- Leverage and firm size 
(market  capitalisation) 
None of the independent variables individually explain and have a 
significant impact on the ROA, MtoB and ATO; 
 
However, the correlation analysis provided a slight indication that 
human assets are more important than the physical and structural 
assets in Indian pharmaceutical industry’s profitability and 
productivity 
Chan, K.H. 2009b 2001 - 
2005 
OLS VAICTM Partial  
positive 
None The dependent variables- market valuation 
(MtoB), profitability (ROA), productivity 
(ATO revenue to book value total assets) and 
return on equity (ROE); 
 
Independent variables-structural capital 
efficiency (SCE),  human capital efficiency 
(HCE), and physical capital efficiency (CEE); 
VAIC (the composite sum of the three 
separate indicators); 
 
Control variables- firm size and leverage 
 
 
VAIC is positively associated with profitability; is weakly related 
to return on equity; no statistical  association with market 
valuation; 
 
Physical capital employed has been found to be positively 
associated with market valuation, productivity and profitability; 
 
This empirical finding clearly demonstrates that physical capital, 
among the three individual IC components, has the greatest impact 
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Purpose Test Variables Significant Results  
FP MV 
Tseng, C. & 
Goo, J. 




COB -SC  Positive Positive Dependent variable- corporate value (Market 
to Book value; Tobin’q and Value Added 
Intellectual Coefficient in year t; 
Independent variables- human capital, 
organizational capital, innovation capital and 
relationship capital as four constructs of 
intellectual capital; 
Control variables- None 
Positive relationship between IC and corporate value 
Firer, S. & 
Williams, S.M. 
2003 2001 OLS VAICTM Mixed Mixed Dependent variables-ROA, ATO,  MtoB; 
Independent variables- Human capital 
efficiency (HCE); Capital employed 
efficiency (CEE); Structural capital efficiency 
(SCE); 
Controls-size, leverage, industry, ROE 
SCE is positive significant related to profitability; CEE is  
positively significant  related to market valuation; HCE is 
negatively significant related to productivity and market valuation 
Ghosh, S. & 
Mondal, A. 
2009 2002 to 
2006 
OLS VAICTM Partial 
positive 
None Dependent variables-ROA, ATO,  MtoB; 
Independent variables-Capital employed 
efficiency (CEE); Human capital efficiency 
(HCE); Structural capital efficiency (SCE); 
Controls-size, leverage, industry, Physical 
capital intensity 
IC performance is positively related to profitability but not 
productivity and market valuation. 
Abdolmohamma
di, M. J. 




COB -SC  Positive Dependent variables-Logarithm of market 
capitalisation;  
Independent variables-the frequency of IC 
disclosures (internal capital with six 
components, external capital with seven 
components, human capital with five 
components), logarithm of book value, 
difference between a firm’s ROA and its 
industry average; 
Controls-None 
IC is positively significantly related to market values  
Abeysekera, I. 2011a 1998 to 
2004 
Content analysis, 
Fixed effect  
COB -SC  Partial 
positive 
Dependent variables-Logarithm of market 
value of equity; 
Independent variables-the frequency of 
narrative IC disclosures (IC is measured by 45 
items), the frequency of visual IC disclosures, 
the frequency of numerical IC disclosures, 
Interaction of narrative, visual, and numerical 
IC disclosures, logarithm of book value, 
Logarithm of income; 
Control variables- Size, Market to book, 
Leverage 
During the civil war (from 1998-2000), the current market value 
of equity is positively related to current earnings and net book 
value , and has no relations to visual,  narrative, or numerical IC 
disclosure; 
 
During the period of temporary truce (2002-2004), the current 
market value of equity is positively associated with current 
earnings, net book value, and narrative disclosure, but not related 
to numerical or visual IC disclosure 
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Appendix 2: Underlying earnings reporting adjustments, impacts of underlying earnings on statutory earnings, and underlying earnings 
reporting locations 
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Appendix 3: IC items definitions and examples 
IC items  Explanations  Example 
Internal capital  
Intellectual property ‘Intellectual property’ is a term that includes 
copyrights, patents, and trademarks (Li et al., 
2008, p.156).  
Patented Ultramatrix™ diamond coring bits are 
engineered to drill faster, last longer, and outperform 
existing bit technology in a wide range of drilling 
conditions and formations (Boart Longyear Limited 
2010, p.5). 
Our patented easyBreathe technology underpinned 
growth in CpAps, ApAps and VpAp bi-levels this 
past year (ResMed Inc. 2009, p.5). 
DuluxGroup Limited is an Australian company that 
owns the Dulux® trademark (DuluxGroup Limited 
2011, p.1). 
Management processes  ‘A process that consists of a series of actions 
(e.g., administrative or operational processes, 
corporate specialisation, etc.) that are chiefly 
concerned with relations between people that 
enable the firm to accomplish its objectives’ 
(Newman et al., 1972, p.11).  
To assist our people to understand what is expected 
of them, we launched Leading at Rio Tinto in 2009. 
This requires seven leadership competencies to be 
demonstrated at each level of our organisation and 
includes promoting sustainable development. It is 
being incorporated in our recruitment and selection, 
performance management and development planning 
processes (Rio Tinto Limited 2009, p24). 
Technological processes  ‘Any technological activity that devotes to the 
organizational capital creation’ (Roos et al., 
1997, p.49).  
Work also continues to commercialise Origin’s 
SLIVER® photovoltaic technology and focus has 
shifted to transitioning the manufacturing process to 
a larger wafer platform, a change which offers 
potential to significantly enhance SLIVER’s 
economics (Origin Energy Limited 2009, p7). 
Information systems ‘These includes enterprise-wide systems that 
designed to manage all major functions of the 
firm such as PeopleSoft, JD Edwards, SAP, and 
general purpose database products targeted 
towards specific users, for example, products 
that offered by Microsoft, Oracle, and many 
others’ (Dewett & Jones, 2001, pp.313-314).  
One of the major milestones this year was the 
implementation of SAP, Atlas’ new accounting 
software and reporting system. A key contributor to 
the success of the implementation was the 
commitment, dedication and enthusiasm of all those 
involved. As a result, we have an ERP that will 
support our growth through 15Mtpa and beyond 
(Atlas Iron Limited 2012, p45).  
Network systems ‘Are information technologies which include a 
wide range of communication devises and 
media. These communication devises and 
media link people and information systems 
including video conferencing, e-mail, 
voicemail, voice conferencing, car phones, 
personal digital assistants, fax machines, the 
internet, corporate intranets and groupware, and 
so on’ (Dewett & Jones, 2001, p.314). 
During the year employee relations and 
communication has been a key focus area. Langer 
Heinrich implemented the INVOCOM (Employee 
Involvement through Communication for 
Commitment and Innovation) methodology which is 
a delivery vehicle for improved business 
performance through organisation, operational and 
service excellence. This ensures that employees are 
involved through effective communication and 
information sharing (Paladin Energy Limited 2012, 
p55).  
Management philosophy  ‘It is the way leaders in the firm think about its 
employees and the firm’ (Brooking, 1996, 
p.62). ‘The management philosophy is often 
communicated through mission statements 
which can have either a positive or negative 
influence on corporate culture and firm’s 
performance. It is depending on whether 
employees understand, remember and 
committed to it’ (Bart, 2001, p.322).  
MDL’s philosophy is that all work-related injuries, 
diseases and property losses are preventable. The 
Company continues to develop and implement 
programmes that comply with international safety 
management standards using both system and a 
behavioural-based approach for safety and training 
(Mineral Deposits Limited 2012, p12).  
 
Our philosophy is that  at all times we shall: 
Hold ourselves committed and accountable for 
‘Delivering the Promise’. Have as our driving force 
the achievement of client satisfaction. Offer and 
provide genuine value for money. Acknowledge the 
loyalty of our clients, shareowners, and suppliers. 
Recognise and reward the creativity and dedication 
of our people. Provide a safe and fulfilling work 







Appendix 3 (continued)  
IC items (Internal capital 
continued) 
Explanations  Example 
Corporate culture  ‘The set of beliefs, key values, and 
understandings shared by firm’s members’ 
(Samson & Daft, 2003, p.50).  
AGL’s culture is built around five values – One 
Team, Delivery, Authentic, Safe & Sustainable and 
Vitality – which create the framework for delivering 
our brand promise of ‘Actions, not words’ (AGL 
Energy Limited 2010, p.9). 
Financial relations ‘Favourable relationships that the firm has with 
banks, investors, and other financiers’ 
(Brooking, 1996, p.80). 
The banking group includes all four major Australian 
banks as well as international banks, reaffirming the 
attractiveness of PNG as a place to invest. It also 
highlights the strength of our banking relationships, 
which have been built up over two decades. The five 
year term of the new credit facility provides the 
Company with funding flexibility well beyond the 
commencement of cash flows from the PNG LNG 
Project (Oil Search Limited 2012, p.14). 
External capital 
Brands  ‘Strongly influence the decision of customers to 
purchase services and products in preference to 
another firm. They can encompass service 
brand that represents its reliability and quality, 
or corporate brands that express the value in the 
market place in relation to the name of the firm’ 
(Brooking, 1996, pp.20-21). 
As the leading accommodation booking service 
across Australasia, Wotif.com saw its brand 
awareness remain above 50% 17 in Australia 
(Wotif.com Holdings Limited 2009, p.11).  
Customer satisfaction  ‘It is the after-purchase judgment or evaluation 
of customers on a specific service or product.  
The benefits are related to firm’s profitability, 
customer loyalty, higher economic returns, and 
less reliance upon price based competition 
(Stank et al., 1997, p.3).  
The development of our private label range and 
controlled brands continues, with all our ranges 
gaining strong customer acceptance. The growth in 
private label products exceeds our overall sales 
growth, which is a strong endorsement of their 
quality and value for money and also demonstrates 
good levels of repeat purchase (Woolworths Limited 
2009, p.4).  
Quality standards ‘Retaining of requisite standards in services and 
products’ (The Oxford Dictionary for 
International Business, 1998, p.703).  
The Group strives to ensure that its services are of 
the highest standard. Towards this aim the Group has 
gained national accreditation AS/NZS ISO 
9001:2000 Quality Management Systems (SMS 
Management and Technology Limited 2010, p.56). 
Company names ‘The evaluation of a firm by its stakeholders in 
terms of their esteem, impacts, and knowledge’ 
(Deephouse, 2000, p.1093).  
In June 2009, the Company’s name was changed 
from Paladio Group Limited to Decmil Group 
Limited. This change was made to allow the 
Company to leverage value from our main 
subsidiary, Decmil Australia, which has operated 
successfully for 30 years and has developed an 
outstanding reputation for safety, engineering 
construction, maintenance and industrial services 
(Decmil Group Limited 2009, p.13).  
Favorable contracts  ‘A contract achieved because of the firm’s 
unique market position (Brooking, 1996, pp.33-
34). 
WorleyParsons won a number of major new 
contracts during the year, including several important 
global services agreements, reflecting the deep and 
enduring relationships we have with clients 
(WorleyParsons Limited 2010, p.3).  
Business collaborations ‘Collaboration established with other business 
partners’ (Brooking, 1996, p.31). 
AGL has partnered with Coles’ loyalty program 
which rewards customers for everyday spending on 
electricity and gas. AGL is the only energy retailer 
able to offer customers this benefit (AGL Energy 
Limited 2012, p.25). 
Licensing agreements ‘A wide range of agreements that give the right 
to a party to sell services, products, or 
technology to other parties based on the 
conditions set out in the agreement’ (Brooking, 
1996, p.33).  
They include both licensing and cross-licensing 
agreements’ (Burton & Cross, 1997, p.138). 
The two Australian underwriting licences were 
consolidated during the year, which will result in 
capital efficiencies in the order of $25 million and 
operational efficiencies arising from the development 








Appendix 3 (continued) 
IC items (External capital 
continued)  
Explanations  Example 
Franchising agreements  ‘A contractual agreement that grants the license 
by ranchiser to franchisee to carry out a 
franchise, franchiser to provide assistance to 
franchisee to carry out business in payment of a 
franchise fee. But, it is not a transaction within 
the consolidated group of firms’ (Brooking, 
1996, p.32). 
Oates has been established in the Australian cleaning 
products sector since early in the 20th century. It 
holds a unique position in the market having a strong 
franchise with both professional cleaners and 
Australian householders; it accesses these users 
through a blend of industrial/commercial distributors 
and traditional retail outlets such as supermarkets, 
hardware stores and mass merchants (GUD Holdings 
Limited 2012, p.9). 
Distribution channels  ‘They are internal networks of distribution, 
such as distribution centres. They are what a 
firm forms and owns a very essential part of the 
supply chain’ (Li et al., 2008, p.158). 
We have re-engineered our supply chain to 
accommodate the introduction of this second 
distribution centre via the use of overseas 
consolidation hubs (The Reject Shop Limited 2010, 
p.2). 
Market share ‘The extent of market share held in relation to 
the total market share for a given service or 
product’ (Ailawadi et al., 1999, pp.20-22). 
It was also a year that produced sustained sales 
performance throughout all of our commercial 
regions, terrific gains in capturing market share and 
success in managing our expenses (ResMed Inc. 
2009, p.4). 
Favourable relations with 
stakeholders  
Includes customer relationships, public 
relationships and supplier relationships. 
‘Customer relationship includes programmes 
and policies for building customer 
relationships. Public relationship is defined as 
the managing of outside communication of a 
firm to generate and sustain a positive image. 
Supplier relationship includes, e.g., reliance on 
key suppliers, payment terms, knowledge of 
suppliers, support of suppliers and bargaining 
power against suppliers)’ (Li et al., 2008 
p.158). 
Woodside has extensive experience in developing, 
constructing and operating LNG projects, and has a 
strong relationship with government and customers 
in the region. Woodside is well placed to proceed 
with its portfolio of conventional LNG projects. In 
doing so, we continue to play a leading role in the 
industry, both in Australia and in the global LNG 





Employee involvement in the 
community  
‘It is an opportunity for face-to-face 
communicate with an often concealed but 
significant part of the firm’s stakeholders. It is a 
source for new ideas and the beat chance for 
furthering the development and growth of a 
vital social institution’ (Byrne & Powell, 1976, 
p.6). 
 
In addition to being first response or mine rescue 
members, many company staff are also dedicated 
volunteers outside of work with organisations such 
as the local fire brigade and the St John ambulance 
service. This preparedness to volunteer within a 
range and number of independent community 
organisations illustrates the unique individual 
commitment company employees have to the 
communities in which they live and work 
(OceanaGold Corporation 2009, p.41). 
Employee thanked ‘Express gratitude to an employee for his or her 
contribution to the firm publicly’ (The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary, 1977, p.1198).  
On behalf of my Board and fellow shareholders, I 
extend my thanks to John Borshoff and all Paladin 
staff for continuing to focus on the business of the 
Company and steer it through an extremely difficult 
period (Paladin Energy Limited 2012, p.7). 
Employee featured  ‘Give special prominence to, or make special 
attraction or display of firm’s employees’ (The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1977, p.381). 
Our exploration team, including Mr John Evans and 
Ms Margaret Hawke – the Project Geologist credited 
with the DeGrussa discovery – received well-
deserved recognition for their achievements with the 
award of the highly prestigious AMEC “Prospector 
of the Year” Award for 2010 and “Excellence in 
Discovery” award at the National Excellence in 
Mining Conference (Sandfire Resources NL 2010, 
p.5). 
Employee numbers ‘Firm’s employee count’ (The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary, 1977, p.748). 
Ramsay Health Care now employs almost 25,000 
staff across three continents. To ensure that we have 
a sustainable business we must be able to build a 
sustainable workforce. Through our People & 
Culture division, we are implementing a number of 
programs to assist with this aim (Ramsay Health 
Care Limited 2009, p.8). 
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Appendix 3 (continued) 
IC items (Human capital 
continued) 
Explanations  Example 
Professional experience ‘The number of years that an executive worked 
in his or her profession’ (Sveiby, 1997, p.79). 
Mr Poll is the founding Managing Director of 
Mirabela Nickel and led the discovery and 
development of the Santa Rita project. He is a 
geologist with more than 20 years’ experience in the 
development of mining projects internationally, 
including several years as a corporate development 
consultant in London (Mirabela Nickel Limited 
2009, p.11). 
Value-added by employee  ‘The value created by the activities of the group 
and its subsidiaries by employees in their 
disciplines’ (Abeysekera, 2008, p.84). 
Betsy brings with her a wealth of experience and 
knowledge of our industry, particularly within the oil 
and gas sector and her contributions to the 
deliberations of the board will continue to be 
invaluable (Imdex Limited 2010, p.13). 
Know-how ‘Amount of knowledge that an employee has to 
possesse about a particular topic. It could be a 
straightforward activity (e.g., raise an invoice) 
or a complex activity (e.g., design airplane 
wings). It would be tacit, for instance, taste tea 
by tea taster’ (Brooking, 1996, p.41).  
Our technology teams have a great depth of 
knowledge in this area and a number of experienced 
senior staff have relocated to the US for the duration 
of the project. Running the same platforms for all our 
major business lines allows us to call on resources 
from all over the world. A significant amount of the 
expected synergies will be realised by our 
Technology Group (Computershare Limited 2012, 
p.12). 
Education  ‘The exposure to new concepts, new 
knowledge, and new ideas in a structured way 
to increase knowledge or modify beliefs and 
attitudes’ (Mayo & Lank 1994, p.51). 
In this thesis, it also includes the ‘education 
acquired by an employee of the firm for a 
particular vocation that proves the knowledge, 
skill, and understanding the employee has to a 
job well’ (Brooking, 1996, pp.48-50).  
An electronic learning management system is being 
progressively rolled out across the business, ensuring 
wide access to e-learning and online induction. ‘On 
boarding’ sessions have been held widely across the 
business, ensuring new co-workers understand the 
Amcor values and The Amcor Way (Amcor Limited 
2010, p.16). 
 
Mr Karl M Simich Managing Director and Chief 
Executive Officer Qualifications B.Comm, FCA, 
F.Fin Experience and other directorships (Sandfire 
Resources NL 2011, p.2). 
Career development  ‘Gradual uncovering of a course of progress 
through history or life of an employee with a 
firm’ (The Concise Oxford Dictionary 1977, 
pp.149, 281). 
Our two-year Foundations for Graduates Program 
has been recognised as a leader in the field and has 
been designed specifically for graduates from tertiary 
institutions. Our aim is for our graduates to build a 
long and successful career with BHP Billiton. Each 
year, we recruit approximately 400 graduates in 
meaningful business roles, who each have the 
opportunity to work across teams, businesses and 
geographic regions (BHP Billiton Limited 2011, 
p.47). 
Training programmers ‘Solutions to learning needs that takes the form 
of teaching or showing a way of doing things 
and are essentially skills-oriented’ (Mayo & 
Lank, 1994, p.51). 
During the year, Decmil developed people strategies 
aimed at supporting the Company’s long-term 
growth, including Indigenous Traineeship, Plumbing 
Apprenticeships, and Certificate IV Training in Front 
Line Management, Training and Assessment and 
Environmental Management (Decmil Group Limited 
2010, p18). 
Entrepreneurial spirit, 
innovativeness, proactive and 
reactive abilities and 
changeability 
‘It includes creativity (e.g., tolerance of creative 
people, valuing creativity), empowerment 
(responsibility taking), knowledge sharing, and 
employee proactive and reactive ability’ (Li et 
al., 2008, p.156). 
Innovation is at the heart of everything we do. It is 
reflected in our creation of state-of-the-art plasma 
collection and manufacturing facilities, our 
investment in improving current therapies, finding 
new indications for existing therapies, and 
innovating new therapeutic products for unmet needs 
(CSL Limited 2011, p.1). 
Employment safety  ‘Freedom from risks or danger when an 
employee is at work’ (The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary, 1977, p.994). 
Computershare acts to meet this commitment by 
implementing work practices and procedures 
throughout the Group that comply with the relevant 
regulations governing the workplace. Employees are 
expected to take all practical measures to ensure a 
safe and healthy working environment in keeping 
with their defined responsibilities and applicable law 






Appendix 3 (continued) 
IC items (Human capital 
continued) 
Explanations  Example 
Employee diversity  ‘Diversity is the division of classes among a 
certain population. It refers to the mix of 
gender, ethnicity, sexual, and colour 
orientation. Relevant disclosures include 
employee diversity policy, the mix and 
breakdown of employee by religion, race, and 
culture’ (Li et al., 2008, p.155).  
Mirabela is an equal opportunity employer and in 
2010 the Company employed people with disabilities 
through a program of social inclusion. Gender 
diversity is also important and at the end of 2010, 
12.7% of the Company’s employees were women 
(Mirabela Nickel Limited 2010, p.10). 
Employee welfare  It refers to the employee (excluding executive 
staff) benefits compensation plans, share and 
share options schemes (Abeysekera, 2008, 
pp.87-88).  
At the time of launch in May 2008, Woolworths was 
the largest private sector employer to introduce Paid 
Parental Leave. 1,080 Woolworth’s employees have 
accessed this benefit (Woolworths Limited 2009, 
p.6).  
 
Under the Oceana Gold Corporation Employee Share 
Acquisition Plan (the “Plan”), the Company offers 
all employees of the consolidated entity (other than 
directors of the Company) the opportunity to 
purchase shares in OceanaGold. Eligible employees 
are able to direct up to 10% of their gross salary to 
acquire shares, with the Company matching the 
employee contribution on a dollar for dollar basis 
(OceanaGold Corporation 2009, p70).   
Sources: Adopted from Abeysekera (2008, p79-appendix 5.2): definitions and examples of intellectual capital items in the 
coding sheet for content analysis and Li et al. (2008, p155-appendix): definition and nature of information. 
 
